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  INTRODUCTION   
The juvenile court lies at the intersection of youth policy and 
crime policy. How should the legal system respond when the kid 
is a criminal and the criminal is a kid? Since juvenile courts’ cre-
ation more than a century ago, they have evolved through four 
periods: the Progressive Era (1899–1960s), the Due Process Era 
(1960s–’70s), the Get Tough Era (1980s–’90s), and the contem-
porary Children Are Different Era (2005–Present).1 In each pe-
riod, juvenile justice policies have reflected different views about 
children and crime control and appropriate ways to address 
youths’ misconduct. With the U.S. Supreme Court recognizing 
again that children are not miniature adults, we have an oppor-
tunity to enact policies for a more just and effective justice sys-
tem for youth.2 
Competing conceptions of adolescents—immaturity and in-
competence versus maturity and competence—and differing 
strategies of crime control—treatment or diversion versus pun-
ishment—affect the substantive goals and procedural means 
that juvenile courts use. Substantively, conceptions of youths’ 
culpability or criminal responsibility affect juvenile courts’ deci-
sions to detain and sentence delinquents, transfer youths to 
criminal court, and sentence children as adults. Competence fo-
cuses on youths’ capacity to employ rights, ability to understand 
and participate in the legal process, ability to exercise Miranda 
rights, competence to stand trial, and ability to exercise right to 
 
 1. See generally BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT (1999) [hereinafter FELD, BAD KIDS]; BARRY 
C. FELD, THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE 
CRIMINALIZING OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (2017) [hereinafter FELD, EVOLUTION OF 
JUVENILE COURT]; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: 
A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH 32–48 (2013) (outlining the historical context of 
juvenile courts in the United States); ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEIN-
BERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE (2008). 
 2. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (holding that children 
are constitutionally different from adults). 
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counsel and right to a jury trial. The historical epochs of the ju-
venile court reflect the differing views of youths’ culpability and 
competence. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the transition from a 
rural agrarian to a manufacturing economy increased immigra-
tion, fostered rapid urbanization, and posed problems of assimi-
lation and integration.3 During the Progressive Era, upper and 
middle class child-savers promoted a social construction of chil-
dren as vulnerable, immature, and dependent, requiring protec-
tion and supervision.4 Positivist criminology attributed criminal 
behavior to external antecedent forces and Progressive reform-
ers adopted discretionary policies to rehabilitate offenders: pro-
bation, parole, indeterminate sentences, and juvenile courts.5 
They created a separate justice system to shield children from 
criminal courts, jails, and prisons. Two goals animated juvenile 
courts’ creators: an interventionist rationale and a diversionary 
one.6 The more-expansive interventionist vision expected juve-
nile courts to identify causes of youths’ misbehavior, to inter-
vene, and to promote their development into responsible adults.7 
Juvenile courts’ less-articulated diversionary purpose was to 
minimize the harms the criminal justice system inflicted on 
young people. They could accomplish their diversionary goal 
simply by providing an alternative to criminal courts, even if 
their rehabilitative goal proved more elusive. Juvenile courts 
melded the new ideology of childhood with the new theory of 
crime control, introduced a judicial-welfare alternative to re-
move children from the criminal justice system, and promised 
individualized treatment in a nonpunitive child welfare system.  
Juvenile courts’ rehabilitative mission envisioned a special-
ized judge trained in social work and child development whose 
empathy and insight would enable him to make dispositions in 
 
 3. See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 17–45; DAVID J. ROTH-
MAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN 
PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980); DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE 
MAKING (2004). 
 4. See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 46–78; ANTHONY M. 
PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977). 
 5. See generally Francis A. Allen, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative 
Ideal, in THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN LAW AND CRIMI-
NOLOGY 25 (1964); ROTHMAN, supra note 3. 
 6. See generally FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1; 
Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in Juvenile Justice, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 2477, 2481–84 (2000). 
 7. See Zimring, supra note 6, at 2480. 
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the child’s best interests.8 Progressives defined the court’s juris-
diction broadly to include youths accused of crimes, noncriminal-
status offenders at risk to become delinquents, and abused and 
neglected children.9 Juvenile courts’ rehabilitative dispositions 
focused on youths’ future welfare rather than their past offenses 
and imposed indeterminate sentences that could continue for the 
duration of minority. The courts’ founders conceived of children 
as immature and irresponsible and opposed procedural safe-
guards which could impede open communication between judge 
and child.10 Progressive reformers intended juvenile courts to 
discriminate: to control poor and immigrant children, to assimi-
late and Americanize them, and to distinguish between their 
own children and other people’s children.11 While probation was 
the disposition of first resort, the institutions to which judges 
disproportionately committed poor and immigrant children more 
closely resembled youth prisons than clinics.  
Despite the Progressives’ rehabilitative aspirations, the 
1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement issued a task 
force report on juvenile delinquency and youth crime revealing 
juvenile courts’ procedural deficiencies, inadequate correctional 
institutions, and racial disparities.12 Drawing on its critique, the 
Supreme Court in In re Gault highlighted the disjunction be-
tween juvenile courts’ rehabilitative rhetoric—long used to jus-
tify the dearth of procedural safeguards—and the reality of court 
and correctional practices.13 Mandating procedural safeguards, 
the Court envisioned youths as competent to exercise legal rights 
and to participate in an adversarial system.14 Subsequent deci-
sions further criminalized delinquency proceedings. In re Win-
ship required states to prove delinquents’ guilt by the criminal 
law standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.15 Breed v. 
Jones applied the ban on double jeopardy based on the functional 
 
 8. See generally TANENHAUS, supra note 3; Allen, supra note 5.  
 9. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 32. 
 10. See e.g., FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 33–38. 
See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1. 
 11. See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1; ROTHMAN, supra note 3. 
 12. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE 
REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 77–84, 91–107 (1967) 
[hereinafter PRESIDENT’S COMM’N]; see also FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE 
COURT, supra note 1, at 10. 
 13. 387 U.S. 1, 13–57 (1967). See infra notes 90, 144, 148–50, 248–33, 299 
and accompanying text. 
 14. Gault, 387 U.S. at 56. 
 15. 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970). See infra notes 133, 315 and accompanying 
text. 
 2017] COMPETENCE AND CULPABILITY 477 
 
equivalence of criminal trials and delinquency proceedings.16 
However, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania denied delinquents the con-
stitutional right to a jury trial available to criminal defendants 
because it might adversely affect juvenile courts’ informality, 
flexibility, and confidentiality.17 Although granting delinquents 
some procedural rights might impair juvenile courts’ ability to 
intervene in children’s lives, safeguards would not impede their 
ability to divert youths and avoid the harms of the criminal jus-
tice system. But granting delinquents some procedural safe-
guards legitimated increasingly punitive penalties that fell most 
heavily on minority offenders.18 The Court’s due process revolu-
tion coincided with a synergy of campus disorders, escalating 
crime rates, urban racial rebellions, dissatisfaction with the 
treatment model, and emerging politics of crime that prompted 
calls for a return to classical criminal law and paved the way for 
get-tough policies.19  
Structural, economic, and racial demographic changes in 
American cities during the 1970s and 1980s contributed to esca-
lating black youth homicide rates at the end of the 1980s and 
provided the context within which states adopted get-tough pol-
icies.20 The Great Migration increased the concentration of im-
poverished African Americans consigned to inner-city ghettoes. 
Federal housing, highway, and mortgage policies combined with 
bank redlining, real estate block-busting, and sales practices to 
create increasingly poor minority urban cores surrounded by 
 
 16. 421 U.S. 519, 528–33, 541 (1975). See infra notes 134, 381 and accom-
panying text. 
 17. 403 U.S. 528, 545–51 (1971). See infra notes 46, 135, 305–06, 308–09, 
316, 338 and accompanying text. See generally Barry C. Feld, The Constitu-
tional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based 
on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1143–69 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, Constitutional 
Tension]. 
 18. See Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 17, at 1145. 
 19. Youth crime increased in the 1960s as baby-boomer children reached 
adolescence. The increased urbanization of blacks led to higher crime rates in 
minority areas. Race riots rocked many American cities between 1964 and 1968. 
These broader structural and demographic changes provided the backdrop for 
the Warren Court’s civil rights decisions, criminal procedure rulings, and juve-
nile court opinions. See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1; FELD, EVOLU-
TION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1; DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF 
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); Barry 
C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Con-
servative “Backlash,” 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, Race, Pol-
itics]. 
 20. See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1; FELD, EVOLUTION OF JU-
VENILE COURT, supra note 1.  
 478 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:473 
 
predominantly white affluent suburbs. Beginning in the early 
1970s, the globalization of manufacturing and technological in-
novations eliminated many jobs of less-skilled workers and pro-
duced a bifurcation of economic opportunities based on education 
and technical skills. The economic changes adversely affected 
blacks more deeply than other groups because of their more re-
cent entry into the manufacturing economy, their vulnerability 
in the social stratification system, their lower educational at-
tainments, and their spatial isolation from sectors of job 
growth.21 By the 1980s, deindustrialization and white flight left 
an impoverished black underclass trapped in urban ghettos.22 
The introduction of crack cocaine and proliferation of guns 
sparked turf wars over control of drug markets.23 Black youth 
homicide rates sharply escalated and gun violence provided po-
litical impetus to transform juvenile-justice policies.24  
Beginning in the 1960s, the rise in youth crime and urban 
racial disorders evoked fear of crime in the streets. National Re-
publican politicians decried a crisis of law and order, pursued a 
southern strategy to appeal to white southern voters’ racial an-
tipathy and resistance to school integration, and engineered a 
conservative backlash to foster a political realignment around 
race and public-policy issues.25 Political divisions about race and 
social policy enabled conservative politicians to advocate puni-
tive crime and welfare policies for electoral advantage. In the 
1980s and 1990s, those policies produced longer sentences and 
mass incarceration for adult offenders and punitive changes in 
juvenile courts’ transfer and sentencing laws.  
Contemporary juvenile justice policies reflect the harsh leg-
acy of the 1980s’ and 1990s’ get-tough policies—extensive pre-
 
 21. Feld, Race, Politics, supra note 19. See generally FELD, EVOLUTION OF 
JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1.  
 22. See generally WILLIAM J. WILSON, MORE THAN JUST RACE: BEING 
BLACK AND POOR IN THE INNER CITY (2009) [hereinafter WILSON, MORE THAN 
JUST RACE]; WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, 
THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987) [hereinafter WILSON, THE TRULY 
DISADVANTAGED]. 
 23. Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 
86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10, 26–29 (1995). See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, 
supra note 1; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE (1998). 
 24. Blumstein, supra note 23, at 32–36. See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, su-
pra note 1; ZIMRING, supra note 23.  
 25. THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IM-
PACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 7–14 (1992). See gen-
erally KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY (1969). 
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trial detention, punitive delinquency sanctions, increased trans-
fer to criminal courts, and severe sentences as adults—all of 
which are rife with racial disparities. Although serious youth 
crime and violence peaked around 1993 and has dropped precip-
itously over the subsequent two decades, those harsh laws re-
main on the books in most states.26 The recent Supreme Court 
trilogy of Eighth Amendment decisions—Roper, Graham, and 
Miller—reaffirmed that children are different, relied on develop-
mental psychology and neuroscience research to support its con-
clusions about youths’ diminished criminal responsibility, and 
limited the most draconian sentences. However, they provided 
affected youths with limited relief and gave state courts and leg-
islatures minimal guidance to implement their jurisprudence of 
youth. 
I divide this Article into two parts: delinquents in juvenile 
courts and youths tried in criminal courts. I analyze the contexts 
within which questions of adolescents’ competence and culpabil-
ity arise. Part I.A examines substantive decisions that affect de-
linquents’ custody status: (1) pretrial detention; and (2) delin-
quency sanctions—and the increased punitiveness and racial 
disparities associated with each decision. Part I.B examines pro-
cedural issues associated with delinquency adjudications: (1) 
youths’ ability to exercise Miranda rights; (2) competence to 
stand trial; (3) waivers of counsel; and (4) right to a jury trial. 
Juvenile courts’ increased punitiveness, procedural deficiencies, 
and assembly-line process compound youths’ developmental lim-
itations, heighten risks of excessive and discriminatory interven-
tions, and raise the specter of wrongful convictions. Part II ex-
amines transfer of youths to criminal court, and their sentencing 
as adults. Part II.A describes: (1) state laws’ shift from a focus 
on offenders to offenses; (2) the increased role of prosecutors to 
make adulthood determinations; (3) transfer laws’ failure to 
achieve their legislative intent; and (4) their racially disparate 
impacts. Part II.B examines Supreme Court decisions—Roper, 
Graham, and Miller—that: (1) somewhat mitigated the harshest 
sentencing policies; (2) reaffirmed that children are different; 
and (3) used developmental psychology and neuroscience re-
search to bolster its conclusions about youths’ diminished re-
sponsibility. The Article concludes with proposals for substan-
tive and procedural reforms to address juvenile and criminal 
courts’ failure to provide developmentally appropriate justice for 
children. 
 
 26. See generally FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1. 
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I.  DELINQUENTS IN JUVENILE COURT: CUSTODY, 
RACIAL DISPARITY, AND COMPETENCE   
Social welfare and social control operate in fundamental 
tension. How do we balance young offenders’ best interests with 
punishment for their offenses? How do we safeguard children 
and protect communities? The Progressives’ interventionist ju-
venile court asserted a social welfare mission in which children’s 
and society’s interests were congruent, but get-tough politicians 
subordinated welfare to crime control. This imbalance inevitably 
occurs because states define delinquency jurisdiction based on 
criminal behavior rather than children’s welfare needs, which 
diverts attention from the criminogenic conditions in which 
many youths live. 
By the 1990s, punitive policies supplanted juvenile courts’ 
earlier emphases on offenders’ rehabilitation and had a dispro-
portionate impact on children of color. This section focuses on 
juvenile court decisions that reflect judgments about delin-
quents’ culpability and affect their custody status: (1) pretrial 
detention—the delinquency equivalent of jail; and (2) changes in 
delinquency sanctions that emphasized offense-based punish-
ment rather than offender rehabilitation.  
A. PRETRIAL AND POST-CONVICTION CUSTODY STATUS 
Questions about effectiveness of rehabilitation emerged in 
the 1960s, eroded juvenile courts’ interventionist rationale, and 
evoked a sense of failure among practitioners and the public. In 
1974, Robert Martinson’s essay, What Works?, concluded that 
“[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts 
that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on 
recidivism.”27 “Nothing works” became the conventional wisdom 
for several decades thereafter, undercut efforts to treat offend-
ers, and reinforced conservatives’ distrust of government efforts 
to reduce crime or ameliorate social problems.  
Violence and homicide in the late 1980s and early 1990s en-
abled conservative politicians to promote a stereotype of danger-
ous superpredators—cold-eyed young killers suffering from 
moral poverty—rather than traditional images of disadvantaged 
youths who needed help. Based on erroneous demographic pro-
 
 27. Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison 
Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 25 (1974). 
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jections, they predicted a bloodbath of youth crime, even as juve-
nile violence declined precipitously.28 Relying on those flawed 
predictions, legislators preemptively enacted laws that empha-
sized suppression of crime—punishment, deterrence, and inca-
pacitation—rather than efforts to rehabilitate children. Juvenile 
justice shifted from a welfare to a penal orientation and assumed 
responsibility to manage and control delinquents rather than to 
treat them. Beginning in the 1970s, just deserts and retribution 
displaced rehabilitation as rationales for adult and juvenile sen-
tencing policy. Judges focused primarily on offenders’ present of-
fense and criminal history. 
1. Preventive Detention of Delinquents 
Conservatives claimed that juvenile courts’ lenient sanc-
tions failed to protect the public and emphasized punishment. 
Detention laws give judges broad discretion to confine youths 
prior to trial. Judges overuse and abuse detention facilities and 
disproportionally detain children of color. Reform efforts can re-
duce unnecessary and inappropriate use of pretrial confinement. 
Pretrial detention involves a youth’s interim custody status 
pending trial.29 In 1984, the Supreme Court in Schall v. Martin 
upheld a statute that authorized preventive detention if a judge 
found there was a “serious risk” that the child “may . . . commit 
an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a 
crime.”30 The law did not specify the type of present offense, the 
likelihood or seriousness of any future crime, burden of proof, 
criteria, or evidence a judge should consider to make the predic-
tion. Despite these flaws, Schall held that preventive detention 
“serves a legitimate state objective, and that the procedural pro-
tections afforded pre-trial detainees” satisfy constitutional re-
quirements.31  
Social scientists question Schall’s confidence in judges’ clin-
ical prognostication abilities. Research comparing statistical-
versus-clinical prediction strongly supports the superiority of ac-
 
 28. See generally Franklin E. Zimring, American Youth Violence: A Cau-
tionary Tale, 42 CRIME & JUST. 265 (2013). 
 29. BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMIN-
ISTRATION 441–43 (4th ed. 2013) [hereinafter FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS]; 
Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juve-
nile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 191–209 (1984) [hereinafter Feld, Criminaliz-
ing Juvenile Justice]. 
 30. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 255 (1984). 
 31. Id. at 256–57. 
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tuarial risk-assessment instruments over professional judg-
ments.32 The fallibility of prediction is compounded because 
judges at an initial appearance often lack the types of infor-
mation—psychometric tests, professional evaluations, and social 
histories—on which clinicians would rely. 
States hold about twenty percent of youths referred to juve-
nile courts in pretrial detention facilities—between one-quarter 
and one-third of a million juveniles annually.33 In 2011, judges 
detained a larger proportion of youths arrested for person of-
fenses (25.4%) than for property crimes (16.5%), but because po-
lice arrested so many more youths for property crimes, they con-
fined roughly equal numbers.34 Rates of detention rose and 
peaked between 1998 and 2007, even as the absolute numbers of 
youths referred to juvenile courts declined.35 Courts detained 
older youths at higher rates than younger juveniles, proportion-
ally more boys than girls, and more children of color than white 
youths.36 
Inadequate and dangerous conditions have characterized 
detention facilities for decades. Get Tough Era policies exacer-
bated overcrowding as states detained more youths to impose 
short-term punishment or to house those awaiting postadjudica-
 
 32. The American Psychiatric Association (APA) has long disclaimed psy-
chiatrists’ competence to predict future dangerousness because they tend to not 
use information reliably, to disregard base rate variability, to consider factors 
that are not predictive, and to assign inappropriate weights to relevant factors. 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899–902 (1983) (discussing APA misgivings 
regarding expert testimony, but nonetheless declining to bar psychiatric expert 
testimony with respect to future dangerousness); FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 
1, at 140–45.  
 33. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND 
VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 168–70 (2006); Melissa Sickmund et al., Easy 
Access to Juvenile Court Statistics: 1985–2014, OJJDP, https://www.ojjdp.gov/ 
ojstatbb/ezajcs (last visited Nov. 15, 2017). See generally FELD, EVOLUTION OF 
JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1. 
 34. Sickmund et al., supra note 33 (reporting that 80,472 youths were de-
tained in connection with 316,602 person crimes, and 73,474 youths were de-
tained in connection with 444,070 property crimes in 2011). 
 35. Id. (reporting that detention numbers began to decline after their peak 
in 2007, a year in which 349,274 juveniles were detained). 
 36. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 33, at 169–70; Sickmund et al., supra 
note 33 (reporting that between 2005 and 2012, youths under the age of twelve 
were detained in 7.3% of cases, while seventeen-year-olds were detained in 
23.5% of cases; males were detained in 23.1% of cases, while females were de-
tained 16.3% of the time; whites were detained at a lower rate than any other 
reported race, at 17.1%, compared to 24.5% for black youths and 23.3% of His-
panic youths). 
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tion placement. Conditions of confinement studies report inade-
quate physical and mental health care, poor education, lack of 
treatment services, and excessive use of solitary confinement 
and physical restraints.37 Pretrial detention disrupts youths’ 
lives, weakens ties to family, school, and work, stigmatizes them, 
and impairs legal defenses. Judges convict and institutionalize 
detained youths more often than similar youths released pend-
ing trial.38  
There are substantial racial disparities in rates of detention. 
States detain black youths more often than similarly situated 
white offenders.39 Detention rates for drug crimes exacerbated 
racial disparities. Between 1988 and 1991—the peak of the crack 
cocaine panic and the Get Tough Era—judges detained about 
half of all black youths charged with drug offenses, a rate twice 
 
 37. See DALE G. PARENT ET AL., CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: JUVENILE 
DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS FACILITIES 7 (1994) (finding “substantial defi-
ciencies” in detention facilities in areas including living space, security, control-
ling suicidal behavior, and healthcare). 
 38. William H. Barton, Detention, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE 
CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 636, 645, 648 (Barry C. Feld & Donna M. Bishop 
eds., 2012) (finding that detention “may foster further delinquency rather than 
suppress it,” and that youths are “more likely to receive formal and punitive 
treatment by the juvenile justice system simply as a result of having been de-
tained”). 
 39. Donna M. Bishop, The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Juvenile Justice 
Processing, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND 
ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 23, 31–32 (Darnell Haw-
kins & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005) [hereinafter OUR CHILDREN, THEIR 
CHILDREN]; Kimberly Kempf-Leonard, Minority Youths and Juvenile Justice: 
Disproportionate Minority Contact After Nearly 20 Years of Reform Efforts, 5 
YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 71, 73 (2007); Alex R. Piquero, Disproportionate 
Minority Contact, 18 FUTURE CHILD. 59, 62 (2008) (reporting racial disparity at 
“each decision point” in the juvenile justice system, from arrest to detention to 
post-adjudication placement). Between 1985 and 2014, juvenile court judges de-
tained about one-fifth of all youths referred to them. Sickmund et al., supra note 
33 (reporting 21.1% detention rate among all juvenile defendants between 1985 
and 2011). During that period, judges on average detained 18% of white youths 
compared to 24.5% of black youths. Id. Judges detain youths charged with per-
son offenses at higher rates than youths charged with other crimes. Id. (finding 
that 26.4% of youths charged for person crimes are detained, while only 16.8% 
and 16.9% of youths charged with property and drug crimes, respectively, are 
subject to detention). On average, judges detained 23.1% of white youths 
charged with person offenses compared with 28.3% of black youths. Id. The ra-
cial disparities for drug crimes are especially disturbing because, since the 
1970s, self-report research consistently reports that black youths use and sell 
drugs at lower rates than do white youths. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 50 (2014) (finding higher drug use among whites than blacks 
in both high school and adult self-report surveys). 
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that of white youths.40 While race affects detention decisions, de-
tention adversely affects youths’ subsequent case processing and 
compounds disparities at disposition.41 
a. Reform Efforts  
In the late 1980s, the Annie E. Casey Foundation launched 
the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) which 
aimed to reduce use of detention, develop alternatives to institu-
tions, reduce overcrowding, improve conditions of confinement, 
and lessen racial disparities.42 JDAI reforms enlist justice sys-
tem stakeholders to develop consensus rationale for detention, 
to adopt objective intake and risk assessment criteria, to use al-
ternatives to secure detention—home detention, electronic mon-
itoring, after school or day reporting centers—and to expedite 
cases to reduce pretrial confinement.43 Stakeholders develop cri-
teria to determine which youths to detain based on present of-
fense, prior record, and other factors. Although not all efforts 
 
 40. Sickmund et al., supra note 33 (reporting 9600 detentions out of 49,200 
total white youths processed for drug crimes in 1988 (19.5%), and 15,500 deten-
tions out of 31,200 black youths processed for drug crimes in the same year 
(49.7%)). In 1989, 9900 of the 45,300 white youths processed for drug crimes 
were detained (21.9%), while 16,900 of the 33,600 black youths processed for 
drug crimes were detained (50.3%). Id. This trend continued through 1990, 
when 48% of black youths processed for drug offenses were detained, compared 
to 19.7% detention rate among white youth processed for drug offenses. Id. 
 41. Michael J. Leiber, Race, Pre- and Post-detention, and Juvenile Justice 
Decision Making, 59 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 396, 399 (2013) (“Race has . . . in-
direct effects on decision making through detention . . . [B]eing detained 
strongly predicts more severe treatment at judicial disposition.”); Nancy Rodri-
guez, The Cumulative Effect of Race and Ethnicity in Juvenile Court Outcomes 
and Why Pre-Adjudication Detention Matters, 47 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 391, 
391 (2010) (reporting that youths who are detained preadjudication are more 
likely to have a petition filed, less likely to have a petition dismissed, and more 
likely to be removed from the home at disposition). 
 42. Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., 
http://www.aecf.org/work/juvenile-justice/jdai (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (ex-
plaining the project’s mission to “reduce reliance on local confinement of court-
involved youth”). 
 43. See id. (outlining strategies including implementation of “new or ex-
panded alternatives to detention programs” and combatting racial disparities 
in youth detention through data analysis and policy reform). See also NAT’L RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 5 (outlining the advantages of community 
service over “unduly harsh interventions” in reducing the likelihood of re-of-
fense, and discussing specific procedural and assessment reforms necessary to 
improving the juvenile system); Barton, supra note 38, at 660–68 (discussing 
the systematic improvements in confinement conditions and successful reform 
of youth detention policies achieved by JDAI). 
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have been equally successful, many sites have reduced the num-
bers of youths detained with no increases in crime or failures to 
appear.44 JDAI efforts to reduce racial disparities among de-
tained youths have been less successful.45 
b. Policy Recommendations 
Juvenile court judges, in collaboration with other stakehold-
ers and social scientists, should develop validated risk-assess-
ment instruments to better identify youths who pose a high risk 
of offending. Statutes should presume release of all nonfelony 
offenders and place a heavy burden (clear and convincing evi-
dence) on the state to prove that a youth needs secure detention 
and that nonsecure alternatives—house arrest, electronic moni-
toring, shelter-care, and day-reporting—have been exhausted or 
would fail. Other than youths who pose a risk of flight or who 
have previously absconded from an institution, states should re-
serve detention for youths charged with serious crimes—felo-
nies, violence, or firearms—for whom, if convicted, commitment 
to a secure facility would likely result. States should bolster de-
tention hearing procedures with a non-waivable right to counsel 
and an opportunity to meet with defense counsel prior to the 
hearing.  
2. Punitive Delinquency Dispositions 
Supreme Court decisions identify factors distinguishing 
punishment from treatment: (1) legislative purpose clauses; (2) 
indeterminate or determinate sentencing laws; (3) judges’ sen-
tencing practices; (4) institutional conditions of confinement; 
and (5) intervention outcomes.46 In the 1980s and 1990s, law-
 
 44. Barton, supra note 38, at 666. 
 45. William H. Feyerherm, Detention Reform and Overrepresentation: A 
Successful Synergy, 4 CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. 44 (2000). 
 46. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 371–74 (1986) (analyzing the differences 
in conditions and procedures applied to inmates held under criminal sentences, 
versus the conditions and procedures applied to persons held for sex offender 
treatment, and finding the State act in question was non-punitive based on 
these differences); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 540, 550 (1971) 
(pointing to “various diagnostic and rehabilitative services” in the juvenile sys-
tem as evidence that the intent of the system is to provide treatment rather 
than punishment, and rejecting arguments that the juvenile system is punitive 
based on procedural similarities between juvenile court and criminal proceed-
ings); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (identifying 
“tests traditionally applied to determine whether an Act . . . is penal or regula-
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makers repudiated offender-based treatment, shifted delin-
quency sanctions toward offense-based punishments, and fos-
tered a punitive convergence between juvenile and criminal 
courts’ sentencing policies.47  
States repeatedly amended their juvenile codes’ purpose 
clauses to endorse punishment.48 The revisions focused on ac-
countability, responsibility, punishment, and public safety ra-
ther than, or in addition to, a child’s welfare or best interests.49 
 
tory in character” including “[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative dis-
ability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as punishment,” 
whether it requires scienter, and whether it promotes “the traditional aims of 
punishment—retribution and deterrence,” among other factors); FRANCIS A. AL-
LEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL 
PURPOSE 2–3 (1981); FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 251–83; Allen, supra note 
5, at 25–27; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle Offense: Pun-
ishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 822 (1988) 
(highlighting the shift in the juvenile system “from treatment to punishment” 
and the “procedural criminalization of the juvenile court”) [hereinafter Feld, 
Punishment, Treatment]; Martin R. Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice: 
A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Constitutional Rights of Youthful Of-
fenders, 35 VAND. L. REV. 791, 791–92 (1982); Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Ju-
venile Justice and Public Trials by Jury: Sixth Amendment Applications in a 
Post-McKeiver World, 91 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Gardner, Punitive 
Juvenile Justice] (discussing the original conception of the juvenile system as a 
“therapeutic tradition” designed to “cure undesirable or unhealthy states of be-
ing . . . treating [children] for what they are rather than punishing them for 
what they have done” and outlining the disjunction between this conceptual 
ideal and the reality of juvenile court in practice). 
 47. Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 46, at 850–57 (discussing the 
shift to determinate sentencing, legislative guidelines emphasizing uniformity, 
and proportionality over rehabilitation as the predominant sentencing justifica-
tion in juvenile court); Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 46, at 22–
25 (discussing the emergence of punishment rather than the original rehabili-
tative goals of the juvenile system). 
 48. PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT 
JUVENILE CRIME: RESEARCH REPORT 11 (1996) (noting evolution from “tradi-
tional emphasis on . . . future welfare of the juvenile” to punishment, incapaci-
tation, public safety, and accountability); Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal 
Justice Systems’ Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189, 222–23 
(1998) [hereinafter Feld, Responses to Youth Violence] (“[M]ore than one-quarter 
of the states have revisited their juvenile codes’ statement of legislative purpose, 
deemphasized rehabilitation and the child’s best interest, and asserted the im-
portance of . . . punishment.”); See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1. 
 49. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 31–32 (noting that the 
1980s saw the advent of a “harsher attitude toward juvenile crime,” leading to 
policy reform which lasted through the 1990s as lawmakers “reformed juvenile 
crime policy to facilitate the adult prosecution and punishment of young offend-
ers”); Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 46, at 833–47 (contrasting pur-
poses of treatment and punishment in juvenile systems and noting states’ move-
ment to include concepts of public safety and punishment in legislative purpose 
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Accountability became synonymous with retribution, deter-
rence, and incapacitation, and state courts affirmed punishment 
as a legitimate element of juvenile courts’ treatment regimes.50  
Originally, juvenile courts viewed delinquency as a symp-
tom of a child’s needs and imposed indeterminate nonpropor-
tional dispositions. The shift from an interventionist to a crimi-
nalized court culminates a trend Gault set in motion by 
providing modest procedural safeguards that legitimated 
harsher sanctions.51 In subsequent decades, states amended de-
linquency sentencing laws to emphasize individual responsibil-
ity and justice-system accountability, and adopted determinate 
or mandatory minimum sentences.52 The National Research 
Council concluded that: 
State legislative changes in recent years have moved the court away 
from its rehabilitative goals and toward punishment and accountabil-
ity. Laws have made some dispositions offense-based rather than of-
 
statements); Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 48 at 222–23; Gard-
ner, Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 46, at 22–25 (discussing concepts of 
just deserts, accountability, and offense-oriented sentencing replacing rehabili-
tative aims in the juvenile system). 
 50. In re Seven Minors, 664 P.2d 947, 950 (Nev. 1983) (discussing the juve-
nile court’s original conception of a “child-centered” institution, and praising the 
court’s evolution to a harsher ethic, stating that the early court lacked the “mor-
alizing and socializing influence associated with the operation of criminal 
courts”); State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772, 773 (Wash. 1979) (finding that the state 
legislature may have rationally determined that “accountability for criminal be-
havior . . . does as much to rehabilitate, correct, and direct an errant youth as 
does the prior philosophy of focusing upon the particular characteristics of the 
individual juvenile” in enacting punitive legislation); FELD, BAD KIDS, supra 
note 1, at 252–53; ASHLEY NELLIS, A RETURN TO JUSTICE: RETHINKING OUR AP-
PROACH TO JUVENILES IN THE SYSTEM 47–48 (2016); Feld, Punishment, Treat-
ment, supra note 46, at 844–47 (explaining that punishment came to be viewed 
as an “acceptable purpose” of juvenile court proceedings and cataloging judicial 
decisions highlighting accountability and punishment as legislative purposes of 
the juvenile justice system). 
 51. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 57–68 (outlin-
ing Supreme Court decisions regarding process in juvenile court, ultimately 
leading to a procedural and substantive convergence with criminal courts, and 
noting that the provision of “meager” procedural safeguards “legitimated the 
escalation of penalties” imposed by juvenile courts); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND 
TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONT-
ING YOUTH CRIME 15–17 (1978). 
 52. TORBET ET AL., supra note 48, at 11–16 (discussing the juvenile court’s 
emphasis on punishment and accountability); Feld, Punishment, Treatment, su-
pra note 46, at 850–79 (addressing determinate sentencing in juvenile court, 
and providing state-specific analysis of legislative changes to juvenile codes); 
Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 48, at 220–28 (discussing the ef-
fects of reframing the juvenile system’s purpose in terms of punishment and 
accountability and states’ adoption of determinate and mandatory sentences). 
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fender-based. Offense-based sanctions are to be proportional to the of-
fense and have retribution or deterrence as their goals. Strategies for 
imposing offense-based sentences in juvenile court include blended 
sentences, mandatory minimum sentences, and extended jurisdic-
tion.53 
Several factors influence juvenile court judges’ sentencing 
decisions. States define juvenile courts’ delinquency jurisdiction 
based on criminal violations. The same factors that influence 
criminal court judges’ sentences—present offense and prior rec-
ord—influence juvenile court judges’ sentences as well.54 An-
other consistent finding is that juveniles’ race affects the sever-
ity of dispositions.55 Several factors account for racial 
disparities: differences in rates of offending, differential selec-
tion, and juvenile courts’ context—the interaction of urban locale 
with minority residency.56 As a result, juvenile courts’ punitive 
sanctions fall disproportionately heavily on African American 
youths. 
Delinquency case processing entails a succession of deci-
sions by police, court personnel, prosecutors, and judges. Com-
pounding effects of disparities produce larger cumulative differ-
ences between white youths and children of color.57 Although the 
greatest disparities occur at earlier less visible stages of the pro-
cess, differences compound, prior records accumulate, and blacks 
and other racial minorities comprise the largest plurality of 
youth in institutions.  
 
 53. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE 210 
(Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001). 
 54. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 264–67 (discussing the sentencing of 
juveniles, particularly in the context of racial disparities in sentencing); SCOTT 
& STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 229–31 (exploring sentencing factors in juvenile 
courts including a youth’s prior criminal record). 
 55. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 267–72 (citing studies finding that 
juvenile courts detain black youths at higher rates than white youths, even 
when controlling for relevant variables); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 
53, at 228 (noting “major disparities” in the involvement of minority and white 
youth in the juvenile justice system). See generally Donna Bishop & Michael 
Leiber, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Delinquency and Justice System Re-
sponses, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUS-
TICE, supra note 38, at 445.  
 56. See Bishop & Leiber, supra note 55, at 453–61. 
 57. In 2005, Black youths comprised about 16.6% of the population aged 
10–17, 31.4% of juvenile arrests, 33.2% of delinquency referrals, 38.1% of juve-
niles detained, 40% of youths charged, and 40% of youths placed out of home. 
Bishop and Leiber, supra note 55, at 446–53. See also NAT’L RESEARCH COUN-
CIL, supra note 53, at 231–34 (providing similar statistics for 1997); EILEEN 
POE-YAMAGATA & MICHAEL A. JONES, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DIFFERENTIAL 
TREATMENT OF MINORITY YOUTH IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 7–10 (2000) (provid-
ing statistics for 1997–1999). 
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Justice system decisions amplify racial differences in pro-
cessing youths. At each stage of the process, arrest, court refer-
ral, detention, petition, and sentencing decisions amplify dispar-
ities.58 Police stop and arrest youths of color more frequently 
than white youths.59 Probation officers attribute white youths’ 
offenses to external circumstances and black youths’ crimes to 
internal fault or character failings, which affects their referral, 
detention, and sentencing recommendations.60  
Judges’ focus on present offense and prior records further 
contribute to racial differences. Black youths commit violent 
crimes at higher rates than white juveniles, which account for 
some disparities.61 By contrast, police arrest black youths at 
 
 58. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 254–57; NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 77. See generally FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE 
COURT, supra note 1, at 139; Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial 
and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States, 21 
CRIME & JUST. 311, 363–64 (1997). 
 59. Factors contributing to heightened risk of arrest include: self-fulfilling 
deployment of police in neighborhoods, racial profiling, aggressive stop-and-
frisk practices, and youths’ attitude and demeanor during encounters. Bishop 
& Leiber, supra note 55, at 461 (explaining that minority youths have more 
exposure than white youths to “contexts of risk,” including socioeconomic, geo-
graphic, and family conditions). See generally Bishop, supra note 39. 
 60. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 257 (reporting that 
black adolescents are “being channeled to correctional facilities” while their 
“equally aggressive white counterparts are directed toward psychiatric treat-
ment facilities”). See generally George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Dispar-
ities in Official Assessments of Juveniles Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as 
Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554 (1998). 
 61. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 214–21; Piquero, supra note 
39, at 64. The higher rates of violent offending by black youth reflect their 
greater exposure to risk factors associated with criminal involvement, many of 
which are corollaries of living in dire poverty. See Bryanna Hahn Fox et al., 
Serious, Chronic, and Violent Offenders, in JUVENILE JUSTICE SOURCEBOOK 
553, 559–60 (Wesley T. Church II et al. eds., 2014); J. David Hawkins et al., A 
Review of Predictors of Youth Violence, in SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE OF-
FENDERS: RISK FACTORS AND SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTIONS 106, 140–46 (Rolf 
Loeber & David P. Farrington eds., 1998). Concentrated poverty, limited em-
ployment opportunities, broken or unstable families, poor parental supervision, 
harsh discipline, abuse or maltreatment, failing schools, gang-infested neigh-
borhoods, and community disorder contribute to higher rates of crime and vio-
lence in segregated urban areas. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra 
note 39, at 96–97; MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN 
DILEMMA 30 (2011); WILSON, MORE THAN JUST RACE, supra note 22, at 143–55 
(2009) (advocating for a framework for understanding the formation and 
maintenance of racial inequality that integrates both cultural and structural 
forces); WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 22 (discussing how in-
creasing rates of social dislocation are the product of a complex web of factors). 
Some inner-city black youths may be socialized in a code of the street that em-
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higher rates for drug crimes, although white youths use drugs 
more often.62  
Juvenile courts’ context also contribute to disparities. Urban 
courts are more formal and sentence all delinquents more se-
verely than do suburban or rural courts.63 They have greater ac-
cess to detention facilities, detain more minority youths, and 
sentence all detained youths more severely.64 Because more mi-
nority youths live in cities, judges detain them at higher rates, 
and sentence them in more formal, punitive courts.65  
Punitive sentencing laws have exacerbated racial dispari-
ties in confinement. Over the past quarter-century, the propor-
tion of white youths removed from home declined by about ten 
percent, while that of black youths increased by ten percent.66 In 
1985, states removed 105,830 delinquents from their homes and 
placed them in residential facilities.67 The number of youths who 
received out-of-home placements increased steadily during the 
 
phasizes masculinity, risk taking, autonomy, and violent responses to chal-
lenges or disrespect. See generally ELIJAH ANDERSON, THE CODE OF THE 
STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY (1999) 
(explaining that street culture has evolved a “code of the street” as a set of in-
formal rules which govern interpersonal public behavior, particularly violence); 
Jeffrey A. Fagan, Contexts of Choice by Adolescents in Criminal Events, in 
YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 371, 
382 (Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz eds., 2000). The presence of gangs can 
lead to intragang violence over status and intergang violence to settle territorial 
disputes or perceived disrespect. Id. at 377–78. 
 62. Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Juvenile Offend-
ing, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN, supra note 39, at 83, 95–100; NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 219–20. 
 63. BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND 
THE JUVENILE COURTS 158–62 (1993) [hereinafter FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHIL-
DREN]; Barry C. Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural Var-
iations in Juvenile Justice Administration, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 
185–90 (1991) [hereinafter Feld, Justice by Geography]. 
 64. Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical 
Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1337–39 (1989) [hereinafter Feld, Right to Counsel]; Rodri-
guez, supra note 41 (finding that minority juveniles were treated more severely 
in juvenile court outcomes than their white counterparts). 
 65. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 271–72; SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra 
note 33; Timothy M. Bray et al., Justice by Geography: Racial Disparity and 
Juvenile Courts, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN, supra note 39, at 270, 
292–94 (finding that a court’s rural or urban location was a significant predictor 
of placement decisions in juvenile cases). 
 66. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 141; see gener-
ally NELLIS, supra note 50 (explaining how the juvenile justice system changed 
focus from rehabilitation to retribution during the 1990s). 
 67. See sources cited supra note 66. 
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1990s and peaked at 168,395 delinquents in 1997—a 59% in-
crease that reflects Get Tough Era changes and judicial sensitiv-
ity to the punitive ethos. Since the peak in the late 1990s, the 
number of youth removed from home has declined dramati-
cally.68 Although we do not know why residential placements 
have decreased, fiscal considerations may have driven confine-
ment decisions. 
Despite the recent decline, the racial composition of youths 
in confinement changed substantially. In 1985, judges removed 
68.5% of non-Hispanic and Hispanic white youths, 28.5% of 
black youths and 2.9% of youths of other races from their 
homes.69 By 2012, the proportion of white youths removed from 
home declined to 57.8% of all youths—a 10.7% decrease—while 
the proportion of black youths increased to 39.3%—an offsetting 
10.8% increase.70 Despite dramatic overall reduction of youths 
in confinement, the racial composition of institutionalized in-
mates became ever darker. During the decade, the proportion of 
white inmates declined from 37.2% to 33.8% of all residents, the 
proportion of black inmates hovered around 40%, and that of 
other youths of color increased.71 
Congress amended the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act (JJDPA) in 1988 to require states receiving fed-
eral juvenile-justice funds to examine sources of minority 
over-representation in detention and institutions.72 It amended 
the JJDPA in 1992 to make reporting disproportionate minority 
confinement a core requirement and again in 2002 to require 
states to reduce disproportionate minority contact.73 States re-
sponded to the 1988 JJDPA requirement by conducting evalua-
tions and reporting disproportionate overrepresentation of mi-
nority youths in institutions.74  
 
 68. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 141–42; see 
generally NELLIS, supra note 50 (explaining how the juvenile justice system 
changed focus from rehabilitation to retribution during the 1990s).  
 69. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 143; see gener-
ally NELLIS, supra note 50 (explaining how the juvenile justice system changed 
focus from rehabilitation to retribution during the 1990s).  
 70. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 143. 
 71. Id. at 144; see generally NELLIS, supra note 50 (explaining how the ju-
venile justice system changed focus from rehabilitation to retribution during the 
1990s).  
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(16) (2000); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 
53, at 228–29. 
 73. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 211–12. 
 74. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 268; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra 
note 1, at 212. 
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Minority juveniles receive disproportionately more out-of-
home placements, while white youths receive more probationary 
dispositions.75 Judges commit black youths to public institutions 
at rates three and four times that of white youths, and send 
larger proportions of white youths to private residential treat-
ment programs. Black youths serve longer terms than do white 
youths committed for similar offenses.76 
 Researchers have evaluated programs in community and 
residential settings to determine what works, how well, and at 
what costs. The diversity of facilities and programs, the variabil-
ity of populations they serve, and the lack of control groups make 
it difficult to attribute positive outcomes to intervention or to 
sample selection bias of youths committed to them.77 Correc-
tional meta-analyses combine independent studies to measure 
effectiveness of different strategies to reduce recidivism or other 
outcomes. Evaluations have compared generic strategies (coun-
seling, behavior modification, and group therapy), more sophis-
ticated interventions and replications of brand-name programs 
(Functional Family Therapy (FFT) and Multisystemic Therapy 
(MST)), and cost-benefit appraisals of different treatments.78 
Substantial literature exists on effectiveness of probation and 
other forms of noninstitutional treatment.79 Community-based 
programs are more likely to be run by private (usually non-
profit) service providers, to be smaller and less overcrowded, and 
to offer more treatment services than do publicly run institu-
tions.80 
Delbert Elliot developed the Blueprints for Prevention pro-
gram that certifies programs as proven or promising. Proven pro-
 
 75. POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 57, at 2. 
 76. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 221–22; POE-YAMAGATA & 
JONES, supra note 57, at 18–21. 
 77. Peter W. Greenwood & Susan Turner, Probation and Other Noninstitu-
tional Treatment: The Evidence Is In, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE 
CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 723, 725–26. 
 78. Id. at 726–28; Doris Layton MacKenzie & Rachel Freeland, Examining 
the Effectiveness of Juvenile Residential Programs, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 771, 790. 
 79. See, e.g., Greenwood & Turner, supra note 77; MacKenzie & Freeland, 
supra note 78. 
 80. Greenwood & Turner, supra note 77, at 725; see PETER GREENWOOD, 
CHANGING LIVES: DELINQUENCY PREVENTION AS CRIME-CONTROL POLICY 183–
94 (2005) [hereinafter GREENWOOD, CHANGING LIVES] (explaining that provid-
ing programmatic support to the juvenile courts’ high-risk offenders is a critical 
part of the government’s approach to providing services for the young). 
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grams demonstrate reductions in problem behaviors with rigor-
ous experimental design, continuing effects after youths leave 
the program, and successful replication by independent provid-
ers.81 Although some proven programs treat delinquents, most 
programs aim to prevent school-aged youths’ involvement with 
the juvenile justice system.82 Mark Lipsey’s ongoing meta-anal-
yses report that treatment strategies such as counseling and 
skill-building are more effective than those adopted during the 
Get Tough Era that emphasize surveillance, control, and disci-
pline.83 The Campbell Collaboration conducted meta-analyses of 
rigorous empirical evaluations of treatment programs for serious 
delinquents in secure institutions and concluded that cognitive-
behavioral treatment reduced overall and serious recidivism.84 
Cost-benefit studies use meta-analytic methods to evaluate pro-
gram costs and benefits to the individual and community—recid-
ivism reduction, costs to taxpayers, and losses for potential vic-
tims.85 While there is a paucity of high-quality evaluations, 
research suggests that prevention programs—preschool enrich-
ment and family-based interventions outside of the juvenile jus-
tice system—provide benefits that exceed their costs and im-
provements in education, employment, income, mental health, 
and other outcomes.86 
Cumulatively, evaluations conclude that states can handle 
most delinquents safely in community settings with cognitive-
behavioral models of change.87 The most successful Blueprints 
programs—FFT and MST—focus on altering family interac-
 
 81. NELLIS, supra note 50, at 83–86; MacKenzie & Freeland, supra note 78, 
at 790–91. 
 82. Greenwood & Turner, supra note 77, at 728.  
 83. Mark W. Lipsey, The Primary Factors that Characterize Effective Inter-
ventions with Juvenile Offenders: A Meta-Analytic Overview, 4 VICTIMS & OF-
FENDERS 124, 143–45 (2009). 
 84. Vicente Garrido & Luz Anyela Morales, Serious (Violent and Chronic) 
Juvenile Offenders: A Systematic Review of Treatment Effectiveness in Secure 
Corrections, 3 CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS 1, 26 (2007), https://www 
.campbellcollaboration.org/media/k2/attachments/1029_Rv.2.pdf; MacKenzie & 
Freeland, supra note 78, at 793–95. 
 85. Brandon C. Welsh et al., Promoting Change, Changing Lives: Effective 
Prevention and Intervention to Reduce Serious Offending, in FROM JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME: CRIMINAL CAREERS, JUSTICE POLICY, AND PRE-
VENTION 245, 262–68 (Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington eds., 2012). 
 86. Id. at 267–70. 
 87. MacKenzie & Freeland, supra note 78, at 793–95. 
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tions, improving family problem-solving skills, and strengthen-
ing parents’ ability to deal with their children’s behaviors.88 But 
effective programs require extensive and expensive staff train-
ing, for which most state and local agencies are unwilling to pay. 
Despite decades of research, “only about 5% of the youths who 
could benefit from these improved programs now have the op-
portunity to do so. Juvenile justice options in many communities 
remain mired in the same old tired options of custodial care and 
community supervision.”89 
Gault mandated procedural safeguards, in part, because of 
conditions in training schools.90 Cases contemporaneous with 
Gault described inmates beaten by guards, hog-tied, or becoming 
psychotic through prolonged isolation.91 Recent lawsuits chal-
lenging institutional conditions reveal gang-conflict, inadequate 
education programs, deficient mental health and health care ser-
vices, suicide, heavy reliance on solitary confinement, and in-
mates’ sexual abuse and deaths at the hands of staff.92 
Analysts criticize training schools as sterile and unimagina-
tive, as inappropriate venues in which to treat juveniles, as 
schools for crime where children learn from more delinquent 
peers, and as settings in which staff and residents abuse and 
mistreat inmates.93 During the 1960s and 1970s, investigators 
conducted in-depth ethnographic research in correctional facili-
ties.94 Studies in different states reported similar findings—vio-
lent environments, minimal treatment or educational programs, 
physical abuse by staff and inmates, make-work tasks, extensive 
use of solitary confinement, and the like.95 In the ensuing dec-
ades, little has changed. States continue to confine half of all 
 
 88. NELLIS, supra note 50, at 84; Greenwood & Turner, supra note 77, at 
738–40.  
 89. Greenwood & Turner, supra note 77, at 744. 
 90. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1967). 
 91. Barry Krisberg, Juvenile Corrections: An Overview, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 748, 
751–52. 
 92. Id. at 754–57. 
 93. MacKenzie & Freeland, supra note 78, at 775. 
 94. See generally CLEMENS BARTOLLAS ET AL., JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION: 
THE INSTITUTIONAL PARADOX (1976) (conducting ethno-graphic research on cor-
rectional facilities); BARRY C. FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE: JUVE-
NILE OFFENDERS IN INSTITUTIONS (1977) [hereinafter FELD, NEUTRALIZING IN-
MATE VIOLENCE] (examining juvenile inmate subculture as influenced by 
organizational structure of correctional institutions). 
 95. See generally BARTOLLAS ET AL., supra note 94 (reporting on juvenile 
victimization in correctional settings); FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE, 
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youths in overcrowded facilities, more than three-quarters in 
large facilities, and more than one-quarter in institutions with 
200 to 1000 inmates.96 
Over the past four decades, juvenile inmates have filed 
nearly sixty lawsuits that challenge conditions of confinement, 
asserting that they violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishment, and deny their Fourteenth 
Amendment right to treatment.97 Eighth Amendment litigation 
is proscriptive, defines constitutionally impermissible practices, 
and delineates the minimum floor below which institutional con-
ditions may not fall. Judicial opinions from around the country 
describe youths housed in dungeon-like facilities, beaten with 
paddles, drugged for social control, locked in solitary confine-
ment, housed in overcrowded and dangerous conditions, and 
other punitive practices.98 The Fourteenth Amendment litiga-
tion is prescriptive and asserts that the denial of criminal proce-
dural protections imposes a substantive right to treatment and 
creates a duty to provide beneficial programs.99 
Do institutional treatment programs reduce recidivism, en-
hance psychological well-being, improve educational attain-
ments, provide vocational skills, or boost community readjust-
ment? There are no standard measures of recidivism—rearrest, 
reconviction, or recommitment—and most states do not collect 
data on programs’ effectiveness or recidivism, which complicates 
judges’ ability to distinguish treatment from punishment.100 De-
spite these limitations, evaluations of training schools provide 
scant evidence of effective treatment.101 Programs that empha-
size deterrence or punishment—institutions and boot camps—
 
supra note 94 (explaining how organizational features contribute to inmates’ 
incentive to use violence and provide a conducive environment in which to carry 
out violent activities); Krisberg, supra note 91 (describing the history of juvenile 
corrections as plagued with abuse, tragedy, and limited positive results). 
 96. PARENT ET AL., supra note 37, at 7–8; SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 
33; MacKenzie & Freeland, supra note 78, at 774. 
 97. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 274–77; NELLIS, supra note 50, at 
113–15; Krisberg, supra note 91, at 753–54. 
 98. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 275–76; Krisberg, supra note 91, at 
754–55. 
 99. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 29, at 969–81. 
 100. Greenwood & Turner, supra note 77, at 743–44; Krisberg, supra note 
91, at 761–62. 
 101. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 279–83; Krisberg, supra note 91, at 
762–64. 
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may lead to increased criminal activity following release.102 Cor-
rectional boot camps reflect punitive policies and emphasize 
physical training, drill, and discipline. Despite their popularity, 
they do not reduce recidivism and some studies report in-
creases.103 Evaluations of training schools report that police re-
arrest half or more juveniles for a new offense within one year of 
release.104 More than half of incarcerated youth have not com-
pleted the eighth grade and more than two-thirds do not return 
to school following release.105 
a. Juvenile Corrections Policy: What Should a Responsible 
Legislature Do? 
Justice system involvement impedes youths’ transition to 
adulthood and aggravates minority youths’ social disad-
vantage.106 Like the Hippocratic Oath, the first priority of juve-
nile court intercession should be harm reduction: to avoid or 
minimize practices that leave a youth worse off.107 Adolescence 
is a developmentally fraught period of rapid growth and person-
ality change. Most delinquents will outgrow adolescent crimes 
without extensive treatment and interventions should be short-
term, community-based, and as minimally disruptive as possi-
ble. “The best-known cure for youth crime is growing up. And the 
strategic logic of diversion and minimal sanctions is waiting for 
maturation to transition a young man from male groups to inti-
mate pairs and from street corners to houses and workplaces.”108  
More than four decades ago, the Massachusetts Department 
of Youth Services (DYS) closed its training schools and replaced 
them with community-based alternatives—group homes, mental 
 
 102. MacKenzie & Freeland, supra note 78, at 794. 
 103. NELLIS, supra note 50, at 57–58, 84–85; MacKenzie & Freeland, supra 
note 78, at 784. 
 104. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 33; Krisberg, supra note 91, at 763; 
McKenzie & Freeland, supra note 78, at 729.  
 105. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 149; NELLIS, 
supra note 50, at 65–67.  
 106. Franklin E. Zimring, Minority Overrepresentation: On Causes and Par-
tial Cures, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 169, 
169 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2014). 
 107. Id. at 174. 
 108. Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus, On Strategy and Tactics 
for Contemporary Reforms, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE 
JUSTICE, supra note 106, at 216, 228. 
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health facilities, and contracts for services for education, coun-
seling, and job training.109 Evaluations reported that more than 
three-quarters of DYS youths were not subsequently incarcer-
ated, juvenile arrest rates decreased, and the proportion of adult 
prison inmates who had graduated from juvenile institutions de-
clined.110 More recently, Missouri has replicated and expanded 
on the Massachusetts experiment and used continuous case 
management, decentralized residential units, and staff-facili-
tated positive peer culture to provide a rehabilitative environ-
ment.111 Although proponents claim reduction in recidivism 
rates, no rigorous evaluations demonstrate its effectiveness.112 
Other states have adopted deinstitutionalization strategies. The 
California Youth Authority has closed five large institutions and 
reduced its incarcerated population from about 10,000 juveniles 
to around 1600—changes driven in part by fiscal considera-
tions.113 New York’s Office of Children and Family Services 
(OCFS) announced plans to close six youth correctional facilities 
after a study found that nearly eighty percent of young people 
released from its facilities were rearrested within three years.114  
b. Punishment or Prevention 
Delinquency prevention programs provide an alternative to 
control or suppression strategies and reflect the adage, a stitch 
in time saves nine. Prevention programs intervene with children 
and youths before they engage in delinquency. Risk-focused pre-
vention identifies factors that contribute to offending and em-
 
 109. JEROME MILLER, LAST ONE OVER THE WALL 177–90 (1991); see gener-
ally FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 94 (describing how the 
Department of Youth Services in Massachusetts became a highly visible symbol 
of a new approach to juvenile corrections by repudiating training schools and 
advocating for community-based services). 
 110. BARRY KRISBERG ET AL., WORKING JUVENILE CORRECTIONS: EVALUAT-
ING THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES (1989); MILLER, 
supra note 109, at 218–26. 
 111. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 416. 
 112. Id. at 422–24; NELLIS, supra note 50, at 86–87. 
 113. Krisberg, supra note 91, at 748. 
 114. Press Release, N.Y. State Office of Children & Family Servs., New York 
Office of Children & Family Services Accelerating Transformation of State Ju-
venile Justice System (Jan. 11, 2008), https://ocfs.ny.gov/main/documents/press/ 
NYS_OCFS_PRESS_011108_Accelerating_juvenile_justice_transformation 
.pdf. 
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ploys programs to ameliorate or counteract them. Some inter-
ventions apply to communities and others to individuals, and 
their families, at risk of becoming offenders.115  
Some prevention strategies identify individual risk fac-
tors—low intelligence or delayed school progress—and provide 
programs to improve cognitive skills, school readiness, and social 
skills.116 The Perry Preschool project—an enhanced Head Start 
program for disadvantaged black children—aims to provide in-
tellectual stimulation, improve critical-thinking skills, and en-
hance later school performance.117 Cost-benefit analyses and 
evaluations report that larger proportions of experimental 
youths graduated from high school, received postsecondary edu-
cation, had better employment records (higher income and paid 
taxes), had fewer arrests, and reduced public expenditures for 
crime and welfare.118  
Other delinquency prevention programs address the fami-
lies in which at-risk youths live. Family-based risk factors in-
clude poor child-rearing techniques, inadequate supervision, 
lack of clear norms, and inconsistent or harsh discipline.119 
Home visitation, nurse home visitation, and parent management 
training can produce positive outcomes in the lives of children.120 
Family interventions for adjudicated delinquents that operate 
outside of the juvenile justice system—MST, FFT, and multidi-
mensional treatment foster care (MTFC)—also produce positive 
outcomes.121 
David Farrington and Brandon Welsh, in Saving Children 
From a Life of Crime, provide a comprehensive review of risk 
factors and effective interventions to prevent delinquency.122 
They identify individual-, family-, and community-level factors 
and effective programs to ameliorate delinquency. At each level, 
 
 115. DAVID P. FARRINGTON & BRANDON C. WELSH, SAVING CHILDREN FROM 
A LIFE OF CRIME: EARLY RISK FACTORS AND EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS 93–97 
(2007); GREENWOOD, CHANGING LIVES, supra note 80, at 5–6; Brandon C. 
Welsh, Delinquency Prevention, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME 
AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 395, 395 [hereinafter Welsh, Delin-
quency Prevention]; GREENWOOD, supra note 80, at 5–6. 
 116. Welsh, Delinquency Prevention, supra note 115, at 397–98. 
 117. Id. at 398–99.  
 118. Id. at 398. 
 119. Welsh et al., supra note 85, at 248. 
 120. GREENWOOD, CHANGING LIVES, supra note 80, at 51; Welsh et al., supra 
note 85, at 248–51. 
 121. GREENWOOD, CHANGING LIVES, supra note 80, at 70–73; Welsh et al., 
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they report proven or promising programs to improve youths’ 
lives and recommend risk-focused evidence-based prevention 
programs.123  
Peter Greenwood, in Changing Lives: Delinquency Preven-
tion as Crime-Control Policy, provides a comprehensive review 
of prevention programs. He focuses on interventions across the 
developmental spectrum, from infancy and early childhood 
through elementary-school-aged children, and into adolescence. 
Some prevention programs have been adequately evaluated and 
clearly do not work—for example, Drug Abuse Resistance Edu-
cation (DARE).124 Many prevention programs have no eviden-
tiary support; they either have not been evaluated or used such 
flawed design that researchers could draw no conclusions.125 
Greenwood uses cost-benefit analyses to evaluate various delin-
quency and prevention programs. While cost-benefit analyses 
could rationalize delinquency policy and resource-allocation de-
cisions, politicians do not embrace prevention programs because 
they lack a punitive component and do not demonstrate immedi-
ate impact.126 While highly visible crimes evoke fear and elicit a 
punitive response, delinquency prevention takes longer to real-
ize and has a more diffuse impact.127 Despite effective programs, 
delinquency prevention “holds a small place in the nation’s re-
sponse to juvenile crime. Delinquency control strategies oper-
ated by the juvenile justice system dominate.”128 
3. Conclusion 
Progressive reformers created juvenile courts to divert 
youths from the criminal justice system and rehabilitate them in 
a separate system. Politicians in the Get Tough Era assaulted 
the idea that children are different, repudiated the court’s wel-
fare role, and rejected its premise to keep youths out of prisons. 
Despite their punitive turn, changes in juvenile justice were less 
extreme than the mass incarceration that overtook the adult 
criminal justice system.  
While juvenile courts served their diversionary function, 
lawmakers sharply shifted their interventions from rehabilita-
tion toward offense-based punitive policies. During the last third 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. GREENWOOD, CHANGING LIVES, supra note 80, at 90–96. 
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 126. Id. at 167. 
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of the twentieth century, lawmakers abandoned even nominal 
commitment to treatment in favor of punishment. They changed 
juvenile codes’ purpose from care and treatment to accountabil-
ity and punishment. They amended delinquency sentencing stat-
utes to define length and location of confinement based on of-
fense. In practice, judges focused primarily on present offense 
and prior record when making dispositions. All of these punitive 
changes had a disproportionate impact on black youths and 
other children of color. Although most delinquents received pro-
bation, between 1987 and 1997, institutional confinement rose 
by fifty-four percent. Training schools more closely resembled 
prisons than clinics and seldom improved delinquents’ life tra-
jectories. Training schools are the least effective way to respond 
to youths’ needs. Meta-analyses and other evaluations identify 
effective programs and most of them are not administered by ju-
venile justice personnel.  
I emphasize juvenile courts’ explicitly punitive turn because 
it implicates their procedural safeguards. The Court in McKeiver 
v. Pennsylvania denied delinquents a right to a jury and In re 
Gault granted only watered-down safeguards because it as-
sumed that delinquents received treatment. But as juvenile 
courts punish youths, their justification for reduced safeguards 
evaporates. Finally, the turn toward punishment falls most 
heavily on black youths. At every critical decision, black youths 
receive more punitive sanctions than white youths. Differences 
in rates of violence by race contribute to some disparity in justice 
administration. But many black youths experience very different 
childhoods than do most white youths.129 Public policies and pri-
vate decisions created segregated urban areas and consigned 
children of color to live in concentrated poverty with crimino-
genic consequences. Race affects decision-makers’ responses to 
children of color: the way they see them, evaluate them, and dis-
pose of them. It is not coincidental that the turn from welfare to 
punishment and from rehabilitation to retribution occurred as 
African Americans gained civil rights and the United States 
 
 129. See generally FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 
87–88 (examining the causes of overrepresentation of minority youths in the 
juvenile justice system); ROBERT PUTNAM, OUR KIDS: THE AMERICAN DREAM IN 
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briefly flirted with integration and inclusionary, rather than ex-
clusionary, racial policies.130 
B. JUVENILE COURT PROCEDURES: ADOLESCENTS’ COMPETENCE 
TO EXERCISE RIGHTS 
Progressive reformers created juvenile courts to divert chil-
dren from criminal courts and to treat rather than punish them. 
Envisioned as a welfare agency, juvenile courts rejected criminal 
procedural safeguards and dispensed with formalities like law-
yers, juries, and rules of evidence.131 In 1967, In re Gault began 
to transform the juvenile court from a social welfare agency into 
a more formal legal institution.132 The Court emphasized juve-
nile courts’ criminal elements—youths charged with crimes fac-
ing institutional confinement, stigma of delinquency labels and 
records, judicial arbitrariness, and high rates of recidivism—and 
required proof of guilt using fair procedures. Although Gault did 
not adopt adult criminal procedural protections, it precipitated 
an operational convergence between juvenile and criminal 
courts. Subsequent decisions further emphasized delinquency 
proceedings’ criminal character. In re Winship required states to 
prove delinquency by the criminal standard—proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt—rather than by the lower civil standard of 
proof.133 Breed v. Jones posited a functional equivalency between 
juvenile and criminal trials and applied the Fifth Amendment’s 
Double Jeopardy Clause to delinquency prosecutions.134 How-
ever, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania posited a benevolent juvenile 
court, denied delinquents a constitutional right to a jury trial, 
and rejected procedural parity between delinquency and crimi-
nal proceedings.135 Punitive changes have eroded McKeiver ’s ra-
tionale and the absence of a jury adversely affects accurate fact-
finding, the presence and performance of counsel, and increases 
the likelihood of wrongful convictions.136 
 
 130. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 79; FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE 
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Juvenile courts handle about half the youths referred to 
them informally without filing a formal petition or proceeding to 
trial.137 Court intake workers or prosecutors perform a triage 
function and conduct a rapid assessment to determine whether 
a youth’s crime or welfare requires juvenile court attention or 
can be discharged or referred to others for care. Diversion mini-
mizes formal adjudication and provides supervision or services 
in the community. Proponents of diversion contend that it is an 
efficient gatekeeping mechanism, avoids labeling minor offend-
ers, and provides flexible access to community resources that re-
ferral after a formal process might delay.138 Most youths desist 
after one or two contacts and diversion conserves judicial re-
sources for those youths who distinguish themselves by recidi-
vism.139  
Critics of diversion contend that it widens the net of social 
control and exposes to informal supervision youths that juvenile 
courts otherwise might have ignored.140 Probation officers or 
prosecutors who do preliminary screening of cases make low-vis-
ibility decisions which are not subject to judicial or appellate re-
view.141 Many states do not use formal screening or assessment 
tools and discretion at intake constitutes the most significant 
source of racial disparities in case processing.142 Although the 
criteria and administration of diversion raise many significant 
policy concerns, cases handled informally do not raise the proce-
dural issues of formal adjudication. 
During the Get Tough Era, juvenile courts increasingly pun-
ished delinquents and increased their need for protection from 
the state. Gault made delinquency hearings more formal, com-
plex, and legalistic, and required youths to participate in making 
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difficult decisions. Developmental psychologists question 
whether younger juveniles possess competence to stand trial and 
whether adolescents have the ability to exercise Miranda rights 
or to waive counsel.143 Despite clear developmental differences 
between youths and adults in understanding, maturity of judg-
ment, and competence, the Court and most states do not provide 
either additional safeguards to protect them from their immatu-
rity or procedural parity with criminal defendants, thus increas-
ing the likelihood of excessive interventions and erroneous out-
comes.  
This section examines juvenile court practices and youths’ 
competence to exercise procedural rights: Miranda rights, com-
petence to stand trial, access to counsel, and jury trial. Subsec-
tion 1 analyzes juveniles’ ability to exercise Miranda rights. It 
contrasts states’ use of adult legal standards with psychological 
research that describes juveniles’ questionable competence, 
heightened vulnerability during interrogation, and increased 
likelihood to make false confessions. Subsection 2 reviews legal 
standards and developmental research on adolescents’ compe-
tence to stand trial. Subsection 3 examines juveniles’ compe-
tence to waive counsel, the impact of waivers on delivery of legal 
services, and appellate courts’ inability to oversee juvenile jus-
tice administration. Subsection 4 examines juveniles’ right to a 
jury trial. McKeiver ’s denial of a jury undermines accurate fact-
finding, makes it easier to convict delinquents than criminal de-
fendants, and heightens risks of wrongful convictions. States use 
these flawed convictions to punish delinquents, to enhance crim-
inal sentences, and to impose collateral consequences.  
1. Police Interrogation of Juveniles  
The Supreme Court has decided more cases about interro-
gating youths than any other issue of juvenile justice.144 Alt-
hough it repeatedly has questioned juveniles’ ability to exercise 
 
 143. THOMAS GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS WITH 
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Miranda rights or make voluntary statements, it does not re-
quire special procedures to protect them. Rather, Fare v. Michael 
C. endorsed the adult standard—knowing, intelligent, and vol-
untary under the totality of circumstances—to gauge juveniles’ 
Miranda waivers.145  
Most states’ laws equate juveniles with adults even though 
formal equality results in practical inequality. By contrast, de-
velopmental psychological research on juveniles’ competence to 
exercise Miranda rights questions adolescents’ ability to under-
stand warnings or exercise them effectively.146 Empirical re-
search on how youths respond to interrogation practices de-
signed for adults highlights how developmental immaturity and 
susceptibility to manipulation increase juveniles’ likelihood to 
confess falsely.  
a. The Law on the Books 
In the decades prior to Miranda, the Court cautioned trial 
judges to examine closely how youthfulness affected voluntari-
ness of confessions and found lengthy questioning of youth and 
the absence of a lawyer or parent could render confessions invol-
untary.147 Gault reiterated concern that youthfulness adversely 
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 145. Michael C., 422 U.S. at 725.  
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affected the reliability of juveniles’ statements.148 It ruled that 
delinquency proceedings based on criminal allegations that 
could lead to institutional confinement “must be regarded as 
‘criminal’ for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.”149 It recognized that the Fifth Amendment contributes to 
accurate factfinding and maintains the adversarial balance be-
tween (and protects the individual from) the State.150 Gault as-
sumed that youths could exercise rights and participate in the 
legal process.  
Fare v. Michael C. departed from the Court’s earlier con-
cerns about youths’ vulnerability and held that the legal stand-
ard used to evaluate adults’ waivers—knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary under the totality of the circumstances—governed ju-
veniles’ waivers as well.151 Michael C. reasoned that Miranda 
provided an objective basis to evaluate waivers, denied that chil-
dren’s developmental differences demanded special protections, 
and required them to assert rights clearly.152  
Miranda provided that if police question a suspect who is in 
custody—arrested or “deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way”—they must administer a warning.153 The Court 
in J.D.B. v. North Carolina considered whether a thirteen-year-
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them at a greater disadvantage in their dealings with the police.”). 
 149. Gault, 387 U.S. at 49–50. 
 150. Id. at 47. The Court recognized a number of significant benefits of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination: 
The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related to the 
question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or con-
fessions are reasonably trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits 
of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth. . . . One of 
its purposes is to prevent the state, whether by force or by psychological 
domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under 
investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to 
assist the state in securing his conviction. 
Id. 
 151. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979); FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND 
CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 35. The Court decided Michael C. as a Mi-
randa case rather than as a juvenile interrogation case. Kenneth J. King, Waiv-
ing Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect Children from Un-
knowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 WIS. 
L. REV. 431, 449 (2006). 
 152. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 724–25; FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, 
supra note 144, at 35; Feld, Behind Closed Doors, supra note 144. 
 153. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
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old juvenile’s age affected the Miranda custody analysis.154 The 
Court concluded that age was an objective factor that would af-
fect how a young person might experience restraint.155 J.D.B. 
recognized that juveniles could feel restrained under circum-
stances in which an adult might not, and drew on Roper and 
Graham’s diminished responsibility rationale to emphasize 
youths’ immaturity, inexperience, and heightened vulnerability 
during interrogation.156  
Despite J.D.B.’s renewed concern about youths’ vulnerabil-
ity, the vast majority of states use the same Miranda framework 
for juveniles and adults.157 Miranda only requires that suspects 
understand the words of the warning and not collateral conse-
quences of a waiver. Most states do not require a parent or law-
yer to assist juveniles.158 When trial judges evaluate Miranda 
waivers, they consider characteristics of the offender (age, edu-
cation, IQ, and prior police contacts) and the context of interro-
gation (location, methods, and length of interrogation).159 The 
leading cases provide long lists of factors for trial judges to con-
sider.160 Appellate courts identify many relevant elements, do 
not assign controlling weight to any one variable, and defer to 
trial judges’ decisions whether a juvenile made a valid waiver.161 
Without decisive factors, Michael C. provides no meaningful 
check on judges’ discretion to find that youths waived their 
rights. Judges regularly find valid waivers made by children as 
young as ten or eleven years of age, with limited intelligence or 
significant mental disorders, with no prior police contacts, and 
without parental assistance.162  
 
 154. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011). 
 155. Id. at 272 (“[A] reasonable child subjected to police questioning will 
sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to 
go. We think it clear that courts can account for that reality.”). 
 156. Id. 
 157. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 41. 
 158. Id. at 42; Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal Rights: Confessions, 
Miranda, and the Right to Counsel, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 105, 105–06 [hereinafter 
Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal Rights]. 
 159. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 42–43; Feld, 
Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal Rights, supra note 158. 
 160. Fare v. Michael C., 441 U.S. 707 (1979); FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CON-
FESSIONS, supra note 144, at 42–43. 
 161. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 29, at 183; FELD, KIDS, 
COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 43. 
 162. See In re Joseph H., No. E059942, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 171, at *176, *186–
87 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that Joseph H., a ten-year-old with low intelli-
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About ten states presume that most juveniles lack capacity 
to waive Miranda and require a parent or other adult to assist 
them.163 Some states require a parent for juveniles younger than 
fourteen years, presume that those fourteen or sixteen years or 
older are incompetent to waive, or oblige police to offer older 
youths an opportunity to consult.164 Most commentators endorse 
parental presence, even though many question the value of their 
participation.165 Parents’ and children’s interests may conflict, 
 
gence and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, voluntarily waived his Mi-
randa rights and such a waiver did not violate due process); FELD, KIDS, COPS, 
AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 43; Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal 
Rights, supra note 158, at 105. 
 163. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 43; Hillary B. 
Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardian in Juvenile Custodial Interrogations: 
Friend or Foe?, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1277, 1287 n.65 (2004) (listing Colorado, 
Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, and West Virginia as among the states with parental presence re-
quirements); Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal Rights, supra note 158, at 116–18 
(discussing various states’ per se rules for “assur[ing] the validity of a juvenile’s 
waiver of rights or confession”); Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise 
Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 
26, 36–37 (2006); King, supra note 151, at 451–52. 
 164. See, e.g., In re BMB, 955 P.2d 1302, 1312–13 (Kan. 1998) (holding that 
“a juvenile under 14 years of age must be given an opportunity to consult with 
his or her parent, guardian, or attorney as to whether he or she will waive his 
or her rights to an attorney and against self-incrimination”); Commonwealth v. 
A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983) (holding that for juveniles under 
the age of fourteen, a parent or interested adult must be present and have “had 
the opportunity to explain [the juvenile’s] rights to [him or her] so that [he or 
she] understands the significance of waiver of these rights”); State v. Presha, 
748 A.2d 1108, 1114 (N.J. 2000) (holding that “when a parent or guardian is 
absent from an interrogation involving a juvenile [under the age of fourteen], 
any confession resulting from the interrogation should be deemed inadmissible 
as a matter of law, unless the adult was unwilling to be present or truly una-
vailable”). 
 165. States assume that a parent will understand rights, provide legal ad-
vice, mitigate coercive influences, prevent unreliable statements, and reduce 
feelings of isolation. Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal Rights, supra note 158, at 
117–18; see Lisa M. Krzewinski, But I Didn’t Do It: Protecting the Rights of Ju-
veniles During Interrogation, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 355, 374–77 (2002) 
(outlining several states’ approaches to safeguarding juveniles’ Miranda rights 
and expressing the view that those approaches which “render inadmissible any 
statement by a juvenile made during the interrogation outside the presence of 
an interested adult, such as a parent or attorney” are the “best way to provide 
protection for a juvenile”). See generally Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, 
Tales from the Juvenile Confession Front: A Guide to How Standard Police In-
terrogation Tactics Can Produce Coerced and False Confessions from Juvenile 
Suspects, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 127, 153–55 
(G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004) (endorsing a parental presence requirement even 
though interrogators reduce parents’ role to passive observer). Parents may 
pressure their children to tell the truth and confess. See, e.g., FELD, KIDS, COPS, 
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for example, if the juvenile assaulted or stole from a parent, vic-
timized another sibling, or if the parent is a suspect. Parents 
may have a financial conflict of interest if they have to pay for 
their child’s attorney; they may have an emotional reaction to 
their child’s current arrest or chronic trouble; they may expect 
their child to tell the truth, urge her to stop lying, or physically 
threaten her to confess. Additionally, parents may not under-
stand legal rights or consequences of waiver any better than 
their child.  
If youths differ from adults in understanding Miranda, con-
ceiving of or exercising rights, or susceptibility to pressure, then 
the law establishes a standard that few can meet and enables 
states to take advantage of their limitations. Miranda requires 
police to advise suspects of their rights, but some juveniles do 
not understand the words or concepts. Psychologists studied the 
vocabulary, concepts, and reading levels required to understand 
warnings and concluded that they exceed many adolescents’ abil-
ities.166 Key words require an eighth-grade level of education 
and most juveniles thirteen years or younger cannot grasp their 
meaning.167 Some concepts—the meaning of a right, the term ap-
pointed to secure counsel, and waiver—require a high school ed-
ucation and render Miranda incomprehensible.168 Many juve-
niles cannot define critical words in the warning.169 Special 
dumbed-down juvenile warnings are often longer and more diffi-
cult to understand.170 If demanding reading level or verbal com-
plexity makes a warning unintelligible, then it cannot serve its 
protective function.  
Psychologist Thomas Grisso has studied juveniles’ exercise 
of Miranda for more than four decades. He reports that many, if 
not most, do not understand the warning well enough to make a 
 
AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 44, 200–06; THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES’ 
WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 180–81 (1981) 
[hereinafter GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS]. 
 166. See Richard Rogers et al., The Comprehensibility and Content of Juve-
nile Miranda Warnings, 14 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 63, 72–85 (2008) [here-
inafter Rogers, Comprehensibility and Content]; Richard Rogers et al., The Lan-
guage of Miranda Warnings in American Jurisdictions: A Replication and 
Vocabulary Analysis, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 124, 135 (2008) [hereinafter Rog-
ers, Language of Miranda Warnings]. 
 167. Rogers, Comprehensibility and Content, supra note 166, at 78; Rogers, 
Language of Miranda Warnings, supra note 166. 
 168. See Rogers, Comprehensibility and Content, supra note 166, at 78.  
 169. See id. 
 170. See id. 
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valid waiver.171 Although age, intelligence, and prior arrests cor-
related with Miranda comprehension, more than half of juve-
niles, as contrasted with less than one-quarter of adults, did not 
understand at least one of the four warnings and only one-fifth 
of juveniles, as compared with twice as many adults, grasped all 
four warnings.172 Juveniles fifteen years of age or younger exhib-
ited significantly poorer comprehension of Miranda rights, 
waived more readily, and confessed more frequently than did 
older youths.173 Other research reports that older youths under-
stand Miranda about as well as adults, but many younger juve-
niles do not understand the words or concepts.174 Adolescents 
with low IQs perform more poorly than adults with low IQs, and 
delinquent youths typically have lower IQs than do those in the 
general population.175 The higher prevalence of mental disorders 
compounds juveniles’ cognitive limitations, although police sel-
dom are able to assess youths’ impairments when they question 
them.176 
Even youths who understand Miranda’s words may be una-
ble to exercise its rights. Juveniles do not appreciate the function 
or importance of rights as well as adults and they are less com-
petent defendants.177 They have greater difficulty conceiving of 
a right as an absolute entitlement that they can exercise without 
adverse consequences.178 Juveniles view rights as something 
 
 171. GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 165, at 128–30; 
Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 146, at 1152–
54; Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 143, at 335; 
Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 11 (1997) [hereinafter Grisso, Trial Defendants].  
 172. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 51–52; see 
Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 146, at 1151–
54. 
 173. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 52–53; see 
Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 146, at 1151–
54. 
 174. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 50–57 (review-
ing research literature). 
 175. Id. at 53. 
 176. Id. at 52–53. 
 177. See GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 165, at 128–30; 
Grisso, Trial Defendants, supra note 171 (distinguishing between understand-
ing words of warning and appreciating the functions of rights); Kimberly Lar-
son, Improving the “Kangaroo Courts”: A Proposal for Reform in Evaluating Ju-
veniles’ Waiver of Miranda, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 629, 649–53 (2003) (reviewing social 
psychological research and juveniles’ limited understanding of the concept of 
“rights” as entitlements to be exercised). 
 178. See, e.g., Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: New 
Questions for an Era of Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, in MORE THAN MEETS 
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that authorities allow them to do, but which they may unilater-
ally retract or withhold.179 They misconceive the lawyer’s role 
and attorney-client privilege.180 Generally, youths with poorer 
understanding of rights waive them at higher rates than those 
with better comprehension.181  
Miranda characterized custodial interrogation as inherently 
compelling because police dominate the setting and create psy-
chological pressures to comply.182 The differing legal and social 
status of youths and adults render children questioned by au-
thority figures more suggestible. We expect youths to answer 
questions posed by police, teachers, parents, and other adults; 
social expectations and children’s lower status increase their 
vulnerability during interrogation.  
Juveniles may waive rights and admit responsibility be-
cause they believe they should obey authority, acquiesce more 
readily to negative pressure or critical feedback, and accede 
more willingly to suggestions.183 They impulsively confess to end 
 
THE EYE: RETHINKING ASSESSMENT, COMPETENCY AND SENTENCING FOR A 
HARSHER ERA OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 23, 29–30 (Patricia Puritz et al. eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter Grisso, Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial]; GRISSO, JUVENILES’ 
WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 165, at 130; Grisso, What We Know, supra note 
143, at 148–49; Grisso, Trial Defendants, supra note 171 (“[A] larger proportion 
of delinquent youths bring to the defendant role an incomplete comprehension 
of the concept and meaning of a right as it applies to adversarial legal proceed-
ings.”). 
 179. See, e.g., GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 165, at 
130.  
 180. See id. at 128.  
 181. See generally FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144 (dis-
cussing the correlation of juvenile waiver rates with comprehension of legal 
rights). 
 182. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455–58 (1966). See generally 
GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFES-
SIONS: A HANDBOOK 345 (2003) (“[I]nterrogative suggestibility [is defined] as 
‘[t]he extent to which, within a closed social interaction, people come to accept 
messages communicated during formal questioning, as the result of which their 
subsequent behavioural response is affected.’” (quoting Gisli H. Gudjonsson & 
Noel K. Clark, Suggestibility in Police Interrogation: A Social Psychological 
Model, 1 SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 83, 84 (1986))). 
 183. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confes-
sions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 1005 (2004) (finding that 
juveniles’ “eagerness to comply with adult authority figures, impulsivity, imma-
ture judgment, and inability to recognize and weigh risks in decision-making,” 
puts them at greater risk to confess falsely); Saul Kassin et al., Police-Induced 
Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 8 
(2010) (“[Y]outh under age 15 . . . are more likely to believe that they should 
waive their rights and tell what they have done, partly because they are still 
young enough to believe that they should never disobey authority.”). Juveniles 
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an interrogation, rather than consider long-term conse-
quences.184 
The Court requires suspects to invoke Miranda rights 
clearly and unambiguously.185 However, some groups of people—
juveniles, females, or racial minorities—may speak indirectly or 
tentatively to avoid conflict with those in power.186 Davis v. 
United States recognized that to require suspects to invoke 
rights clearly and unambiguously could prove problematic for 
some.187 If a suspect thinks she has invoked her rights, but police 
disregard it as an ambiguous request, then she may feel over-
whelmed by their indifference and succumb to further question-
ing.  
b. The Law in Action 
Research on police interrogation reports that about eighty 
percent of adults and ninety percent of juveniles waive their Mi-
randa rights.188 The largest empirical study of juvenile interro-
gations reported that 92.8% waived.189 Juveniles’ higher waiver 
rates may reflect lack of understanding or inability to invoke Mi-
randa effectively.190 As with adults, youths with prior felony ar-
rests invoked their rights more often than those with fewer or 
less serious police contacts.191 Youths who waived at prior ar-
rests may have learned that they derived no benefit from coop-
erating, spent more time with lawyers, and gained greater un-
derstanding.  
 
are more vulnerable to suggestion during questioning than adults. See 
GUDJONSSON, supra note 182, at 381. 
 184. See GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 165, at 158–59; 
Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 143, at 357. 
 185. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010); Davis v. United 
States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). 
 186. See Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Pow-
erlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 318 (1993). 
 187. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460 (“[R]equiring a clear assertion of the right to 
counsel might disadvantage some suspects who—because of fear, intimidation, 
lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons—will not clearly articulate 
their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present.”). 
 188. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 94; RICHARD 
A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 280 (2008). 
 189. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 94; Barry C. 
Feld, Real Interrogation: What Actually Happens When Cops Question Kids, 47 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1, 12 (2013). 
 190. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 95–96. 
 191. Id. at 98–101; Feld, Behind Closed Doors, supra note 144, at 431. 
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Once officers secure a juvenile’s waiver, they question him 
just like an adult. They employ the same maximization and min-
imization strategies used with adults to overcome young sus-
pects’ resistance and to enable them to admit responsibility.192 
Maximization techniques intimidate suspects and impress on 
them the futility of denial; minimization techniques provide 
moral justifications or face-saving alternatives to enable them to 
confess.193 Despite youths’ greater susceptibility, police do not 
incorporate developmental differences into the tactics they em-
ploy.194 They do not receive special training to question juveniles 
and use the same tactics as with adults.195 Techniques designed 
to manipulate adults—aggressive questioning, presenting false 
evidence, and using leading questions—create unique dangers 
when employed with youths.196  
Some states require a parent to assist juveniles in the inter-
rogation room although analysts question their protective 
role.197 Parents—as adults—may have marginally greater un-
 
 192. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 110; Kassin et 
al., supra note 183, at 12. 
 193. See, e.g., FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 110, 
126; Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put In-
nocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 223 (2005) (discussing various in-
terrogation techniques); Kassin et al., supra note 183, at 12 (explaining that 
maximization tactics “convey the interrogator ’s rock-solid belief that the sus-
pect is guilty and that all denials will fail. Such tactics include making an accu-
sation, overriding objections, and citing evidence, real or manufactured, to shift 
the suspect’s mental state from confident to hopeless.”). Minimization tech-
niques “provide the suspect with moral justification and face-saving excuses for 
having committed the crime in question. Using this approach, the interrogator 
offers sympathy and understanding; normalizes and minimizes the crime.” Kas-
sin et al., supra note 183, at 14.  
 194. Jessica Owen-Kostelnik et al., Testimony and Interrogation of Minors: 
Assumptions About Maturity and Morality, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 286, 291 
(2006). See generally FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144 (dis-
cussing police’s use of routine interrogation tactics with all suspects). 
 195. Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of 
Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 243–46 (2006). See gen-
erally FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144 (discussing lack of 
special training for juvenile interrogation). 
 196. David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, Owing to the Extreme Youth of 
the Accused: The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 641, 671–77 (2002). 
 197. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 43–44; 
GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 165, at 18; Jennifer L. 
Woolard et al., Examining Adolescents’ and Their Parents’ Conceptual and Prac-
tical Knowledge of Police Interrogation: A Family Dyad Approach, 37 J. YOUTH 
ADOLESCENCE 685, 687 (2008). 
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derstanding of Miranda than their children, but both share mis-
conceptions about police practices.198 Often parents do not pro-
vide useful legal advice, they increase pressure to waive rights, 
and many urge their children to tell the truth.199 Parents may 
be emotionally upset or angry at their child’s arrest, believe that 
confessing will produce a better outcome, or may think their 
child should respect authority or assume responsibility. If a par-
ent is present, police either enlist them as allies in the interro-
gation or neutralize their presence and render them as passive 
observers.200 In the vast majority of interrogations that parents 
attended in a pertinent study, parents did not participate after 
police gave their child a Miranda warning, sometimes switched 
sides to become active allies of the police, and rarely played a 
protective role.201 
c. Vulnerability and False Confessions 
Research on false confessions underscores juveniles’ unique 
vulnerability.202 Younger adolescents are at greater risk to con-
fess falsely than older ones; in one study, police obtained more 
than one-third (thirty-five percent) of proven false confessions 
from suspects younger than eighteen.203 In another study, false 
confessions occurred in fifteen percent of cases, but juveniles ac-
counted for forty-two percent of all false confessors and two-
thirds (sixty-nine percent) of those aged twelve to fifteen con-
fessed to crimes they did not commit.204 Significantly, research 
on exonerated juveniles who confess falsely involves only the 
small group of youths prosecuted as adults. This reflects the se-
riousness of their crimes, the greater pressure on police to solve 
them, and the longer period available to youths and their attor-
neys to correct the errors. 
 
 198. Woolard et al., supra note 197, at 688. 
 199. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 44–45; Feld, 
Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 29, at 181.  
 200. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 200–03. 
 201. Id. at 203–06. 
 202. Drizin & Leo, supra note 183, at 945; Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonera-
tions in the United States: 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
523, 545 (2005); Joshua A. Tepfer et al., Arresting Development: Convictions of 
Innocent Youth, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 904 (2010). See generally BRANDON L. 
GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO 
WRONG (2011) (discussing the unique vulnerability of juveniles in police inter-
rogations and resulting false confessions). 
 203. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 183, at 945. 
 204. See Gross et al., supra note 202, at 545. 
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Developmental psychologists attribute juveniles’ overrepre-
sentation among false confessors to reduced cognitive ability, de-
velopmental immaturity, and increased susceptibility to manip-
ulation.205 They have fewer life experiences or psychological 
resources with which to resist the pressures of interrogation. 
They are more likely to comply with authority figures, tell police 
what they think they want to hear, and respond to negative feed-
back.206 Their impulsive decision-making and tendency to obey 
authority heightens those risks, especially for younger juveniles 
with limited understanding. The stress and anxiety of interroga-
tion intensifies their desire to extricate themselves in the short-
run by waiving and confessing. The vulnerabilities of youth mul-
tiply when coupled with mental illness, mental retardation, or 
compliant personalities.  
d. Policy Recommendations 
Research on false confessions underscores the unique vul-
nerability of younger juveniles.207 Miranda is especially prob-
lematic for younger juveniles who may not understand its words 
or concepts. Miranda requires only shallow understanding of the 
 
 205. See Bonnie & Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful Offenders, 
in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, 
supra note 61, at 73, 87 (“[Y]ouths[ ] . . . may have significant deficits in compe-
tence-related abilities due . . . to developmental immaturity.”); Allison D. Red-
lich et al., The Police Interrogation of Children and Adolescents, in INTERROGA-
TIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT, supra note 165, at 107, 114 (examining 
research showing an inverse relationship between age and suggestibility); Ann 
Tobey et al., Youths’ Trial Participation as Seen by Youths and Their Attorneys: 
An Exploration of Competence-Based Issues, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOP-
MENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 225, 231–34 (dis-
cussing how juveniles are difficult clients for attorneys because they have diffi-
culty remembering information, maintaining attention, and making decisions 
appropriately); Drizin & Luloff, supra note 136, at 260.  
 206. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 182, at 381 (summarizing research which 
showed that juveniles are “markedly more suggestible than adults” when sub-
jected to interrogative pressure); LEO, supra note 188, at 233 (“Many juve-
niles . . . are highly compliant. They tend to be . . . acquiescent[ ] and eager to 
please . . . when questioned by police.”).  
 207. See generally GARRETT, supra note 202 (discussing false confessions 
and the unique vulnerability of adolescents compared to older juveniles and 
adults); Drizin & Leo, supra note 183 (analyzing 125 interrogation-induced false 
confession cases using a variety of demographic criteria and finding that juve-
niles are uniquely vulnerable); Gross et al., supra note 202 (finding that false 
confessions were heavily concentrated among the most vulnerable groups of in-
nocent defendants, including juveniles and individuals with mental disabili-
ties); Tepfer et al., supra note 202 (finding that younger exonerees falsely con-
fessed to crimes at nearly twice the rate of adult exonerees). 
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words which developmental psychologists conclude most six-
teen- and seventeen-year-old youths possess. By contrast, psy-
chologists report that many, if not most, children fifteen or 
younger do not understand Miranda or possess competence to 
make legal decisions.208 
i.  Mandatory Counsel for Younger Juveniles 
Younger juveniles’ limited understanding and heightened 
vulnerability warrant greater procedural protections: a nonwai-
vable right to counsel. The Supreme Court’s juvenile interroga-
tion cases—Haley, Gallegos, Gault, Fare, Alvarado, and J.D.B.—
excluded statements taken from youths fifteen years of age or 
younger and admitted those obtained from sixteen- and seven-
teen-year-olds. The Court’s de facto functional line—fifteen and 
younger versus sixteen and older—closely tracks what psycholo-
gists report about youths’ ability to understand the warning. 
Courts and legislatures should adopt that functional line and 
provide greater protections for younger juveniles. 
Psychologists advocate that juveniles younger than sixteen 
years of age “should be accompanied and advised by a profes-
sional advocate, preferably an attorney, trained to serve in this 
role.”209 More than three decades ago, the American Bar Associ-
ation (ABA) endorsed mandatory, nonwaivable counsel because 
it recognized that “[f]ew juveniles have the experience and un-
derstanding to decide meaningfully that the assistance of coun-
sel would not be helpful.”210 Juveniles should consult with an at-
torney, rather than rely on parents, before they exercise or waive 
rights.211 Requiring consultation with an attorney assures a 
functioning legal services delivery system and an informed and 
voluntary waiver. If youths fifteen years of age or younger con-
sult with counsel, it will somewhat limit police’s ability to secure 
confessions. However, if younger juveniles cannot understand or 
 
 208. Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 146, at 
1160; Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 143, at 356. 
 209. Kassin et al., supra note 183, at 30. 
 210. AM. BAR ASS’N & INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., JUVENILE JUSTICE STAND-
ARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 92 (1980). 
 211. Id. at 89–94 (discussing the “[s]cope of the juvenile’s right to counsel”); 
Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adoles-
cent Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re Gault, 
60 RUTGERS L. REV. 125, 167 (2007) (summarizing the findings of a variety of 
studies and concluding that “fairness requires that juveniles have the benefit of 
a nonwaivable right to counsel at every step in delinquency proceedings in order 
to fulfill the promise of Gault”). 
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exercise rights without assistance, then to treat them as if they 
do enables the state to exploit their vulnerability. Constitutional 
rights exist to assure factual accuracy, promote equality, and 
protect individuals from governmental overreaching. Michael C. 
emphasized lawyers’ unique role in the justice system, and Ha-
ley, Gallegos, and Gault recognized younger juveniles’ excep-
tional need for their assistance.  
ii.  Limiting the Length of Interrogation 
The vast majority of interrogations are very brief. In previ-
ous studies, police completed nearly all interviews in less than 
an hour and few took longer than two hours.212 By contrast, in-
terrogations that elicit false confessions are usually long inquir-
ies that wear down an innocent person’s resistance—eighty-four 
percent took at least six hours—and youthfulness exacerbates 
those dangers.213 The Supreme Court has recognized that ques-
tioning juveniles for five or six hours renders their statement in-
voluntary.214 Thus, states should create a sliding-scale presump-
tion that a confession is involuntary and unreliable based on 
length of interrogation. 
iii.  Mandatory Recording of Interrogation 
Within the past decade, legal scholars, psychologists, law 
enforcement, and justice system personnel have reached consen-
sus that recording interrogations reduces coercion, diminishes 
dangers of false confessions, and increases reliability.215 More 
than a dozen states require police to record interrogations, albeit 
some under limited circumstances, such as with homicide or very 
young suspects.216 Recording creates an objective record and pro-
vides an independent basis to resolve credibility disputes about 
 
 212. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 155–66; Rich-
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 213. Drizin & Leo, supra note 183, at 948–49. 
 214. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 
596 (1948).  
 215. See generally FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144 (dis-
cussing the benefits of recording interrogations); GARRETT, supra note 202 (re-
laying the positive experiences of police and judges regarding the electronic re-
cording of interrogations); LEO, supra note 188 (discussing how the recording of 
police interrogations benefits all parties who value accurate factfinding and 
more informed decision-making). 
 216. See GARRETT, supra note 202, at 248 (“Eleven states and the District of 
Columbia now require or encourage electronic recording of at least some inter-
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Miranda warnings, waivers, or statements. It enables a judge to 
decide whether a statement contains facts known to a guilty per-
petrator or whether police supplied them to an innocent suspect. 
Recording protects police from false claims of abuse, enhances 
professionalism, and reduces coercion. It enables police to focus 
on suspects’ responses, to review details of an interview not cap-
tured in written notes, and to test them against subsequently 
discovered facts. Recording avoids distortions that occur when 
interviewers rely on memory or notes to summarize a statement.  
Police must record all interactions with suspects (prelimi-
nary interviews and interrogations) rather than just a final 
statement (a post-admission narrative). Otherwise, police may 
conduct a preinterrogation interview, elicit incriminating infor-
mation, and then construct a final confession after the cat is out 
of the bag. Only a complete record of every interaction can pro-
tect against a final statement that ratifies an earlier coerced one 
or against a false confession contaminated by nonpublic facts 
that police supplied a suspect. 
2. Competence to Stand Trial 
Gault’s procedural rights are of no value to youths unable to 
exercise them. The Supreme Court long has required that de-
fendants be competent to preserve the integrity of trials, to pro-
mote factual accuracy, to reduce risk of error, and to enable them 
to play a part in proceedings.217 Dusky v. United States held that 
a defendant must possess “sufficient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understand-
ing . . . [and have] a rational as well as factual understanding of 
the proceedings against him.”218 Drope v. Missouri held that “a 
person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity 
to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against 
him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his de-
fense may not be subjected to a trial.”219 The standard is func-
tional and binary: a defendant either is or is not competent to 
stand trial.  
 
requiring or encouraging the recording of interrogations.”); LEO, supra note 188, 
at 295 (“At the time of this writing, eight states . . . and the District of Columbia 
have laws requiring police to record interrogations in their entirety in some or 
all criminal cases.”). 
 217. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due 
Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 800 (2005). 
 218. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
 219. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). 
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The standard for competency is not onerous because the 
more capability it requires of moderately impaired defendants, 
the fewer who will meet it.220 Juveniles must understand the 
trial process, have the ability to reason and work with counsel, 
and rationally appreciate their situation. If a person under-
stands that he is on trial for committing crimes, knows he can be 
sentenced if convicted, and can communicate with his attorney, 
a court likely would find him competent. Significant mental ill-
ness—psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia—or severe 
mental retardation typically render adult defendants incompe-
tent. However, psychotic disorders typically do not emerge until 
late adolescence or early adulthood and the American Psychiat-
ric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders cautions against diagnosing profound illnesses in 
younger populations.221 Despite that reservation, researchers re-
port that the prevalence of mental disorders among delinquent 
youths is substantially higher than in the general population—
half to three-quarters exhibit one or more mental illnesses.222 
Developmental psychologists contend that immaturity per 
se—especially for younger juveniles—produces the same deficits 
of understanding and inability to assist counsel that mental ill-
ness or retardation engender in incompetent adults.223 Youths’ 
developmental limitations adversely affect their ability to pay 
attention, absorb and apply information, understand proceed-
ings, make rational decisions, and work with counsel.224  
Significant age-related differences appear between adoles-
cents’ and young adults’ competence, judgment, and legal deci-
sion-making.225 Developmental psychologists report that many 
juveniles younger than fourteen years of age were as severely 
impaired as adults found incompetent to stand trial.226 Some 
 
 220. Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Juveniles’ Competency to Stand Trial: Wading 
Through the Rhetoric and the Evidence, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 135, 137 
(2009). 
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MENTAL DISORDERS 88–89 (5th ed. 2013). 
 222. GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 143, at 10–11. 
 223. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 151–52; Scott & Grisso, supra 
note 217, at 796. 
 224. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 158–60; Scott & Grisso, supra 
note 217, at 795–96. 
 225. See Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 143, 
at 343–46. 
 226. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 162–65; Grisso et al., Juve-
niles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 143, at 356. 
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older youths also exhibited substantial impairments.227 Age and 
intelligence produced higher levels of incompetence among ado-
lescents with low IQs than adults with low IQs.228 The MacAr-
thur study reported that about one-fifth of fourteen- to fifteen-
year-olds were as impaired as mentally ill adults found incom-
petent; those with below-average intelligence were more likely 
than juveniles with average intelligence to be incompetent.229 
Even nominally competent adolescents may suffer from cogni-
tive deficits—borderline intelligence, limited verbal ability, 
short attention span, or imperfect memory—that adversely af-
fect understanding and decision-making.  
While incompetence in adults stems from mental disorders, 
which may be transient or treatable with medication, it is less 
clear how to accelerate legal capacities in adolescents whose def-
icits result from developmental immaturity.230 Competency res-
toration may be especially problematic for younger juveniles who 
never possessed relevant knowledge or understanding to begin 
with.231 Moreover, adolescents deemed incompetent due to men-
tal retardation may be especially difficult to remediate or restore 
to competence.232  
The prevalence of mental illness among delinquents com-
pounds their developmental incompetence. In many jurisdic-
tions, the juvenile justice system has become the de facto mental 
health system as a result of inadequate mental health services 
for children.233 Analysts estimate that half or more of male de-
linquents and a larger proportion of female delinquents suffer 
 
 227. See Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 143, 
at 344 (reporting that seven percent of sixteen to seventeen-year-olds showed 
“significantly impaired [u]nderstanding,” compared with twenty percent of 
eleven to thirteen-year-olds and thirteen percent of fourteen to fifteen-year-
olds). 
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(2007). 
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from one or more mental disorders.234 Youths suffering from At-
tention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) may have diffi-
culty concentrating or communicating with their attorney and 
those suffering from depression may lack the motivation to do 
so. 
The issue of competence to stand trial arises both for youth 
transferred to and tried in criminal court and for those prose-
cuted in juvenile court. For youths tried as adults, criminal 
courts apply the Dusky/Drope standard, but focus on mental ill-
ness rather than developmental immaturity.235 For youths tried 
in juvenile courts, about half the states have addressed compe-
tency in statutes, court rules, or case law.236 However, most stat-
utes consider only mental illness or retardation as sources of in-
competence rather than developmental immaturity per se.237  
Even after states recognize juveniles’ right to a competency 
determination in delinquency proceedings, they differ over 
whether to apply the Dusky/Drope adult standard or a juvenile-
normed standard. Some courts apply the adult standard in de-
linquency as well as criminal prosecutions because both may re-
sult in a child’s loss of liberty and punitive consequences.238 
Other jurisdictions opt for a relaxed competency standard on the 
theory that delinquency hearings are less complex and penalties 
less severe.239  
Advocates for a watered-down standard of competence in de-
linquency proceedings contend that a youth who might be found 
incompetent to stand trial as an adult or if evaluated under an 
 
public mental health services for children and adolescents in many states and 
the subsequent referral of youths with mental disorders to the juvenile justice 
system). 
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adult standard in juvenile court should still be found competent 
under a relaxed standard.240 They insist that if delinquency 
sanctions are less punitive than criminal sentences and geared 
to promote youths’ welfare, then they require fewer procedural 
safeguards.241 However, the constitutional requirement of com-
petence hinges on defendants’ ability to participate in proceed-
ings and the legitimacy of the trial process, and not the punish-
ment that may ensue. Although delinquency dispositions, 
especially for serious crimes, may be shorter than criminal sen-
tences, as I argued above, it is disingenuous to claim they are not 
punitive. Baldwin v. New York held that no crime that carried 
an authorized sentence of six months or longer could be deemed 
a petty offense.242 While proponents of a watered-down standard 
argue that a rule that immunizes some incompetent youths from 
adjudication could undermine juvenile courts’ legitimacy,243 ad-
judicating immature youths under a relaxed standard enables 
the state to take advantage of their incompetence and under-
mines the legitimacy of the process. A finding of delinquency re-
quires proof of guilt. Either defendants understand the proceed-
ings and can assist counsel or they cannot; if they cannot perform 
those minimal tasks, then they should not be prosecuted in any 
court. 
Juvenile courts do not routinely initiate competency evalu-
ations, even for young offenders, and many delinquents may face 
charges without understanding the process or the ability to work 
with counsel. Defense attorneys may be best positioned to detect 
whether a competency evaluation is warranted, but often fail to 
do so because of heavy caseloads, limited time spent with a cli-
ent, and an inability to distinguish between immaturity and dis-
abling incompetence.244 Defense counsel tactically may not raise 
a juvenile’s incompetence because of the delays for competency 
evaluation and restoration.245 And justice system personnel may 
lack evaluation instruments or clinical personnel who can ad-
minister them.246  
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3. Access to Counsel 
Gideon v. Wainwright applied the Sixth Amendment to the 
states to guarantee criminal defendants’ right to counsel.247 
Gault relied on Gideon, compared a delinquency proceeding to a 
felony prosecution, and granted delinquents the right to coun-
sel.248 However, Gault used the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause rather than the Sixth Amendment and did not 
mandate automatic appointment of counsel.249 Gault, like Gid-
eon, left to state and local governments the task to fund legal 
services. Over the past half-century, penurious politicians who 
want to get tough on crime and avoid coddling criminals have 
shirked their responsibility to adequately fund public defenders’ 
offices and have severely undermined the quality of justice. 
Gault required a judge to advise the child and parent of the 
right to have a lawyer appointed if indigent, but ruled that juve-
niles could waive counsel.250 Most states do not use special pro-
cedural safeguards—mandatory nonwaivable appointment or 
prewaiver consultation with a lawyer—to protect delinquents 
from improvident decisions.251 Instead, they use the adult stand-
ard—knowing, intelligent, and voluntary—to gauge juveniles’ 
relinquishment of counsel. As with Miranda waivers, formal 
equality results in practical inequality—lawyers represent de-
linquents at much lower rates than they do criminal defend-
ants.252 
Despite statutes and court rules of procedure that apply 
equally throughout a state, juvenile justice administration var-
ies with urban, suburban, and rural context and produces justice 
by geography.253 Lawyers appear more frequently in urban 
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courts than in more informal rural courts.254 In turn, more for-
mal urban courts hold more youths in pretrial detention and sen-
tence them more severely.255 Finally, a lawyer’s presence is an 
aggravating factor at disposition; judges sentence youths who 
appear with counsel more severely than they do those who ap-
pear without an attorney.256 Several factors contribute to this 
finding: (1) lawyers who appear in juvenile court may be incom-
petent and prejudice their clients’ cases; (2) judges may prede-
termine sentences and appoint counsel when they anticipate out-
of-home placements; or (3) judges may punish delinquents for 
exercising procedural rights.257 
a. Presence of Counsel 
When the Court decided Gault, lawyers appeared in fewer 
than five percent of delinquency cases, in part because juvenile 
court judges actively discouraged juveniles from retaining coun-
sel and the courts’ informality prevented lawyers from playing 
an advocate’s role.258 Although states amended their juvenile 
codes to comply with Gault, evaluations of initial compliance 
found that most judges did not advise juveniles of their rights 
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and the vast majority did not appoint counsel.259 Studies in the 
1970s and 1980s reported that many judges did not advise juve-
niles of their right to a lawyer and most did not appoint coun-
sel.260 Research in Minnesota in the mid-1980s reported that 
most youths appeared without counsel, that rates of representa-
tion varied widely in urban, suburban, and rural counties, and 
that one-third of youths whom judges removed from home and 
one-quarter of those in institutions were unrepresented.261 A 
decade later, about one-quarter of juveniles removed from home 
were unrepresented despite legal reforms to eliminate the prac-
tice.262 A study of delivery of legal services in six states reported 
that only three of them appointed counsel for a substantial ma-
jority of juveniles.263 Studies in the 1990s described juvenile 
court judges’ continuing failure to appoint lawyers.264 In 1995, 
the General Accounting Office confirmed that rates of represen-
tation varied widely among and within states and that judges 
tried and sentenced many unrepresented youths.265 
In the mid-1990s the ABA published two reports on juve-
niles’ legal needs. America’s Children at Risk reported that many 
children appeared without counsel and that lawyers who repre-
sented youth lacked adequate training and often failed to pro-
vide effective assistance.266 A Call for Justice, which focused on 
the quality of defense lawyers, again reported that many youths 
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appeared without counsel and that many attorneys failed to ap-
preciate the challenges of representing young clients.267 Since 
the late 1990s, the ABA and the National Juvenile Defender 
Center have conducted more than twenty state-by-state assess-
ments, reporting that many, if not most, juveniles appeared 
without counsel and that lawyers who represented youth often 
encountered structural impediments to effective advocacy—
heavy caseloads, inadequate resources, lack of training, and the 
like.268  
b. Waivers of Counsel 
Several factors account for why so many youths appear in 
juvenile courts without counsel. Public defender services may be 
less available or nonexistent in nonurban areas.269 Judges may 
give cursory advisories of the right to counsel, imply that waivers 
are just legal technicalities, and readily find waivers to ease 
their administrative burdens.270 If judges expect to impose non-
custodial sentences, then they may dispense with counsel. Some 
jurisdictions charge fees to determine a youth’s eligibility for a 
public defender and others base youths’ eligibility on their par-
ents’ income.271 Parents may be reluctant to retain or accept an 
attorney if, as in many states, they may have to reimburse attor-
ney fees if they can afford them.272  
The most common explanation for why fifty to ninety per-
cent of juveniles in many states are unrepresented is that they 
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waive counsel.273 Judges in most states use the adult standard 
to gauge juveniles’ waivers of counsel and consider the same fac-
tors—age, education, IQ, prior police contacts, or court experi-
ence—as those in Miranda waivers.274 Many juveniles do not un-
derstand their rights or the role of lawyers and waive counsel 
without consulting with either a parent or an attorney.275 Alt-
hough judges are supposed to conduct a dialogue to determine 
whether a child can understand rights and represent herself, 
they frequently fail to give any waiver of counsel advisory, often 
neglect to create a record, and readily accept waivers from man-
ifestly incompetent children.276 Many juveniles’ marginal com-
petence to stand trial exacerbates the dangers of improvident 
waivers. Judges who give waiver of counsel advisories often seek 
waivers to ease their administrative burdens, which affects how 
they inform juveniles of their rights and interpret their re-
sponses.277 As long as the law allows juveniles to waive counsel, 
judges can find valid waivers regardless of youths’ incompetence. 
Juveniles’ diminished competence, inability to understand pro-
ceedings, and judicial incentives and encouragement to waive 
counsel results in larger proportions of delinquents adjudicated 
without lawyers than criminal defendants.278  
c. Pleas Without Bargains 
Like adult criminal defendants, nearly all delinquents plead 
guilty and proceed to sentencing.279 Even though pleading guilty 
is the most critical decision a delinquent makes, states use adult 
waiver standards to evaluate their pleas.280 Judges and lawyers 
 
 273. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 128; Berkheiser, supra note 270, at 
649–50; see FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 63, at 4; NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 199–200. 
 274. See Feld, Behind Closed Doors, supra note 144, at 402; see also FELD, 
KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 41–45. 
 275. Berkheiser, supra note 270, at 629–31. 
 276. See In re Manuel R., 543 A.2d 719, 722 (Conn. 1988) (concluding the 
juvenile did not “knowingly and voluntarily” waive the right to an attorney, not-
withstanding court records indicating an affirmative response to the judge’s 
question about waiving counsel); Berkheiser, supra note 270, at 633–34; Drizin 
& Luloff, supra note 136, at 285–86. 
 277. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 128. 
 278. See generally FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144 (dis-
cussing law and policy concerning juveniles’ encounters with the law). 
 279. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 201–02. See generally FELD, 
JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 63 (discussing and analyzing the juvenile 
justice system and the right to counsel). 
 280. See Joseph B. Sanborn Jr., Pleading Guilty in Juvenile Court: Minimal 
Ado About Something Very Important to Young Defendants, 9 JUST. Q. 127, 127 
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often speak with juveniles in complicated legal language and fail 
to explain long-term consequences of pleading guilty.281 A valid 
guilty plea requires a judge to conduct a colloquy on the record, 
in which an offender admits the facts of the offense, acknowl-
edges the rights being relinquished, and demonstrates that she 
understands the charges and potential consequences. Because 
appellate courts seldom review juveniles’ waivers of counsel, 
pleas made without counsel receive even less judicial scrutiny.282 
Guilty pleas by factually innocent youths occur because attor-
neys fail to investigate cases, assume their clients’ guilt—espe-
cially if they have already confessed—and avoid adversarial liti-
gation, discovery requests, and pretrial motions that conflict 
with juvenile courts’ cooperative ideology. Juveniles’ emphasis 
on short-term over long-term consequences and dependence on 
adult authority figures increases their likelihood to enter false 
guilty pleas.283 
d. Counsel as an Aggravating Factor in Sentencing 
Historically, juvenile court judges discouraged adversarial 
litigants and impeded effective advocacy. Today, lawyers in ju-
venile courts may put their clients at a disadvantage when 
judges sentence them.284 Research that controls for legal varia-
bles—present offense, prior record, pretrial detention, and the 
like—consistently reports that judges remove from home and in-
carcerate delinquents who appeared with counsel more fre-
quently than unrepresented youths.285 Legal reforms to improve 
 
(1992); see also Lacey Cole Singleton, Study Note, Say “Pleas”: Juveniles’ Com-
petence to Enter Plea Agreements, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 439, 446 (2007). 
 281. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 201–02. 
 282. See Berkheiser, supra note 270, at 633. See generally Sanborn, supra 
note 280 (examining the juvenile guilty plea process through statutes, court 
rules, and case law from all fifty states). 
 283. See FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 48–49. 
 284. Burruss & Kempf-Leonard, supra note 252, at 41–45; Feld, In re Gault 
Revisited, supra note 252, at 418–19; Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 64, at 
1330–31. See generally Feld & Schaefer, Right to Counsel, supra note 253 (dis-
cussing attorneys as an aggravating factor in juvenile dispositions). 
 285. Burruss & Kempf-Leonard, supra note 252. See generally FELD, JUS-
TICE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 63 (reviewing research on aggravating impact 
of representation); Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 64 (analyzing variations 
in rates of representation and the effects of attorneys in juvenile delinquency 
and status proceedings in Minnesota in 1986); Feld & Schaefer, Law Reform, 
supra note 253 (reporting on inconsistent judicial compliance with the Gault 
requirement for appointment of counsel in juvenile courts); Feld & Schaefer, 
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delivery of legal services actually increase the aggravating effect 
of representation on dispositions.286  
Several factors contribute to lawyers’ negative impact at dis-
position. First, juveniles may not believe lawyers’ explanations 
of confidential communications and withhold important infor-
mation to their detriment.287 Second, lawyers assigned to juve-
nile court may be incompetent and prejudice their clients’ cases; 
public defender offices often send their least capable or newest 
attorneys to juvenile court to gain trial experience.288 Third, lack 
of adequate funding for defender services may preclude investi-
gations, which increases the risk of wrongful convictions;289 de-
fense attorneys seldom investigate cases or interview their cli-
ents prior to trial because of heavy caseloads and limited 
organizational support.290 Fourth, court-appointed lawyers may 
place a greater premium on maintaining good relations with 
judges who assign their cases than vigorously defending their 
revolving clients.291 Juvenile courts’ parens patriae ideology dis-
courages zealous advocacy and engenders adverse consequences 
for attorneys who rock the boat or for their clients.292 Fifth, and 
most significantly, many defense attorneys work under condi-
tions that create structural impediments to quality representa-
tion.293 Assessments in dozens of states report derisory working 
conditions—crushing caseloads, penurious compensation, scant 
support services, inexperienced attorneys, and inadequate su-
pervision—that detract from or preclude effective representa-
tion.294 Ineffective assistance of counsel, for whatever reason, is 
a significant factor in one-quarter of wrongful convictions.295 
 
Right to Counsel, supra note 253 (comparing how Minnesota juvenile courts pro-
cessed youths in 1994, prior to reform laws enacted in 1995, with how state 
juvenile courts processed youths in 1999). 
 286. See Feld & Schaefer, Law Reform, supra note 253; see also Feld & 
Schaefer, Right to Counsel, supra note 253 (comparing pre- and post-reform 
rates of representation in Minnesota). 
 287. See FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 129. 
 288. Feld & Schaefer, Right to Counsel, supra note 253, at 717.  
 289. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 136, at 284. 
 290. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 200. 
 291. Feld & Schaefer, Right to Counsel, supra note 253, at 717. 
 292. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 201; Drizin & Luloff, supra 
note 136, at 291. 
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 Another explanation of lawyers’ negative impact on dispo-
sitions is that judges may appoint them when they anticipate 
more severe sentences. The Court in Scott v. Illinois prohibited 
“incarceration without representation” and limited an indigent 
adult misdemeanant’s right to appointed counsel to cases in 
which judges ordered defendants’ actual confinement.296 In most 
states, the same judge presides at a youth’s arraignment, deten-
tion hearing, adjudication, and disposition and may appoint 
counsel if she anticipates a more severe sentence.297 Judges typ-
ically appoint counsel, if at all, at the arraignment, detention 
hearing, or on the day of trial.298 Court practices that appoint 
lawyers who meet their clients for the first time on the day of 
trial create a system conducive to inadequate representation and 
wrongful convictions.  
Finally, judges may sentence delinquents who appear with 
counsel more severely than those who waive because the law-
yer’s presence insulates them from appellate reversal. Juvenile 
court judges may sanction youths whose lawyers invoke formal 
procedures, disrupt routine procedures, or question their discre-
tion in ways similar to an adult defendant’s trial penalty—the 
harsher sentences imposed on those who demand a jury trial ra-
ther than plead guilty.  
e. Appellate Review 
Gault rejected the juvenile’s request for a constitutional 
right to appellate review because it had not found that criminal 
defendants enjoyed such a right.299 However, states invariably 
provided adult defendants with a statutory right to appellate re-
view. By avoiding the constitutional issue, the Court under-
mined the other rights that it granted delinquents because the 
only way to enforce its rules would have been through rigorous 
appellate review of juvenile court judges’ decisions.300 Regard-
less of how poorly lawyers perform, appellate courts seldom can 
correct juvenile courts’ errors. Juvenile defenders appeal ad-
verse decisions far less frequently than lawyers representing 
adult criminal defendants and often lack a record with which to 
 
 296. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979); Feld & Schaefer, Right to 
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challenge an invalid waiver of counsel or trial errors.301 Juvenile 
court culture may discourage appeals as an impediment to a 
youth assuming responsibility. The vast majority of delinquents 
enter guilty pleas, which waive the right to appeal and further 
precludes review.302 Moreover, juveniles who waive counsel at 
trial will be less aware of or able to pursue an appeal.  
f. Conclusion 
The formal procedures of juvenile and criminal courts have 
converged in the decades since Gault. Differences in age and 
competence would suggest that youths should receive more safe-
guards than adults to protect them from punitive delinquency 
adjudications and their own limitations. However, states do not 
provide juveniles with additional safeguards—mandatory 
nonwaivable appointment of counsel or prewaiver consultation 
with a lawyer—to protect them from their own immaturity. In-
stead, they use adult legal standards that most youths are un-
likely to meet. 
High rates of waiver undermine the legitimacy of the juve-
nile justice system because assistance of counsel is the prerequi-
site to the exercise of other rights.303 Youths require safeguards 
which only lawyers can provide to protect against erroneous and 
punitive state intervention. The direct consequence of delin-
quency convictions—institutional confinement—and use of prior 
convictions to sentence recidivists more harshly, to waive youths 
to criminal court, and to enhance criminal sentences makes as-
sistance of counsel imperative. A justice system that recognizes 
youths’ developmental limitations would provide, at a minimum, 
no pretrial waivers of Miranda rights or counsel without prior 
consultation with counsel. Only mandatory nonwaivable counsel 
can prevent erroneous convictions and collateral use of adjudica-
tions that compound injustice. Lawyers can only represent de-
linquents effectively if they have adequate support, resources, 
and specialized training to represent children. 
 
 301. See Berkheiser, supra note 270, at 619, 650; Donald J. Harris, Due Pro-
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As Michael C. repeatedly emphasized, lawyers play a unique 
role in the legal process and only they can effectively invoke the 
procedural safeguards that are every citizens’ right. A rule that 
requires mandatory nonwaivable appointment of counsel would 
impose substantial costs and burdens on legal services delivery 
in most states. But after Gault, all juveniles are entitled to ap-
pointed counsel. Waiver doctrines to relieve states’ fiscal or ad-
ministrative burdens are scant justifications to deny fundamen-
tal rights. 
4. Jury Trial: Factfinding, Governmental Oppression, and 
Collateral Consequences  
States’ laws treat juveniles just like adults when formal 
equality produces practical inequality. Conversely, they use ju-
venile court procedures that provide less effective protection 
when called upon to provide delinquents with adult safeguards. 
Duncan v. Louisiana gave adult defendants the right to a jury 
trial to assure accurate factfinding and to prevent governmental 
oppression.304 By contrast, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania denied de-
linquents protections the Court deemed fundamental to criminal 
trials.305 The presence of lay citizens functions as a check on the 
State, provides protection against vindictive prosecutors or bi-
ased judges, upholds the criminal standard of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, and enhances the transparency and accountabil-
ity of the justice system. Despite those salutary functions, 
McKeiver insisted that delinquency proceedings were not yet 
criminal prosecutions despite their manifold criminal aspects.306  
The McKeiver plurality reasoned that a judge could find 
facts as accurately as a jury, rejected concerns that informality 
could compromise factfinding, invoked the imagery of a pater-
nalistic judge, and disregarded delinquents’ need for protection 
from punitive state overreaching.307 The Court feared that jury 
trials would interfere with juvenile courts’ informality, flexibil-
ity, and confidentiality, make juvenile and criminal courts pro-
cedurally indistinguishable, and lead to abandonment of the ju-
venile court.308 
 
 304. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
 305. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). 
 306. Id. at 541. 
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The McKeiver dissenters insisted that when the State 
charged a delinquent with a crime for which it could incarcerate 
her, she should enjoy the same jury right as an adult.309 For 
them, Gault’s rationale—criminal charges and the possibility of 
confinement—required comparable procedural safeguards.310 
The dissenters feared that juvenile courts’ informality would 
contaminate factfinding.311 Although the vast majority of delin-
quents, like criminal defendants, plead guilty, the possibility of 
a jury trial provides an important check on prosecutorial over-
charging, on judges’ evidentiary rulings, and the standard of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite the prevalence of guilty 
pleas, lawyers are supposed to evaluate cases as if they were to 
go to trial and practice in the shadow of the jury. The possibility 
of a jury trial increases the visibility and accountability of justice 
administration and the performance of lawyers and judges. The 
jury’s checking function may be even more important in highly 
discretionary, low visibility juvenile courts that deal with de-
pendent youths who cannot effectively protect themselves. 
A few states give juveniles a right to a jury trial as a matter 
of state law, but the vast majority do not.312 During the Get 
Tough Era, states revised their juvenile codes’ purpose, opened 
delinquency trials to the public, adopted determinate or manda-
tory sentencing laws, fostered a punitive convergence with crim-
inal courts, imposed collateral consequences for delinquency con-
victions, and eroded the rationale for fewer procedural 
safeguards.313 Despite the explicit shift from treatment to pun-
ishment, most state courts continue to deny juveniles a jury.314  
Constitutional procedural protections serve dual functions: 
assure accurate factfinding and protect against governmental 
oppression. McKeiver ’s denial of a jury fails on both counts. 
First, judges and juries find facts differently and when they dif-
fer, judges are more likely to convict than a panel of laypeople. 
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Second, punitive sanctions increase the need to protect delin-
quents from direct and collateral consequences of convictions. 
Providing delinquents with a second-rate criminal court denies 
them fundamental fairness, undermines the legitimacy of the 
process, and increases the likelihood of wrongful convictions. 
a. Accurate Factfinding 
Winship reasoned that the seriousness of proceedings and 
the consequences for a defendant—juvenile or adult—required 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.315 McKeiver assumed that 
judges could find facts as accurately as juries.316 Its rejection of 
jury trials undermines factual accuracy and increases the likeli-
hood that outcomes will differ in delinquency and criminal trials. 
Although juries and judges agree about defendants’ guilt or in-
nocence in about four-fifths of criminal cases, when they differ, 
juries acquit more often than do judges.317 
Factfinding by judges and juries differs because juvenile 
court judges may preside over hundreds of cases a year, while a 
juror may only participate in one or two cases in a lifetime.318 
Several factors contribute to jurors’ greater propensity to acquit 
than judges. The presence of jurors affects the ways in which 
lawyers present their cases.319 As judges hear many cases, they 
may become less meticulous when they weigh evidence and ap-
ply less stringently the reasonable doubt standard than do ju-
rors.320 Judges hear testimony from police and probation officers 
on a recurring basis and form settled opinions about their credi-
bility.321 Similarly, judges may have formed an opinion about a 
youth’s credibility, character, or the case from hearing earlier 
charges against her or presiding at a detention hearing.  
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Delinquency proceedings’ informality compounds differ-
ences between judge and jury factfinding and further disad-
vantages delinquents. Judges in criminal cases instruct jurors 
about the applicable law. By contrast, a judge in a bench trial 
does not discuss either the law or the evidence before reaching a 
conclusion, which makes it more difficult for an appellate court 
to determine whether the law was correctly understood and ap-
plied. Further, a lack of diverse opinions increases the variabil-
ity of outcomes. Ballew v. Georgia recognized the superiority of 
group decision-making over individual judgments. In jury trials, 
some group members remember facts that others forget, and de-
liberations air competing views and promote more accurate de-
cisions.322 By contrast, in bench trials, judges administer the 
courtroom, make evidentiary rulings, take notes, and conduct 
sidebars with lawyers, which divert their attention during pro-
ceedings.323 
The greater flexibility and informality of closed juvenile pro-
ceedings compounds the differences between judge and jury rea-
sonable doubt. When a judge presides at a youth’s detention 
hearing, she receives information about the offense, criminal his-
tory, and social background, which may contaminate impartial 
factfinding.324 Exposure to nonguilt related evidence increases 
the likelihood that a judge subsequently will convict and institu-
tionalize her.325 Some differences between judges and juries re-
flect the latter’s use of a higher threshold of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.326 
The youthfulness of a defendant is a factor that elicits jury 
sympathy and accounts for some differences between judge and 
jury decisions.327 By contrast, juvenile court judges may be more 
predisposed to find jurisdiction to help a troubled youth.328 Fi-
nally, without a jury, judges adjudicate many delinquents with-
out an attorney, which prejudices factfinding and increases the 
likelihood of erroneous convictions.  
 
 322. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232–39 (1978); see Guggenheim & 
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i.  Suppression Hearings and Evidentiary Contamination 
In bench trials, judges typically conduct suppression hear-
ings immediately before or during trial, a practice that exposes 
them to inadmissible evidence and prejudicial information.329 A 
judge may know about a youth’s prior delinquency from presid-
ing at a detention hearing, prior adjudication, or trial of co-of-
fenders. Similarly, a judge who suppresses an inadmissible con-
fession or illegally seized evidence may still be influenced by it. 
The presumption that exposure to inadmissible evidence will not 
affect a judge is especially problematic where the same judge 
typically handles a youth’s case at several different stages. An 
adult defendant can avoid these risks by opting for a jury trial, 
but delinquents have no way to avoid the cumulative risks of 
prejudice in a bench trial. Critics of juvenile courts’ factfinding 
conclude that “judges often convict on evidence so scant that only 
the most closed-minded or misguided juror could think the evi-
dence satisfied the standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”330 As a result, states adjudicate delinquents in cases in 
which they could not have obtained convictions with adequate 
procedural safeguards.331 The differences between the factual re-
liability of delinquency adjudications and criminal convictions 
raise questions about the use of juveniles’ records to enhance 
criminal sentences. 
b. Preventing Governmental Oppression and Get Tough 
Policies  
McKeiver uncritically assumed that juvenile courts treated 
delinquents rather than punished them, but it did not review 
any record to support that assumption. The Court did not ana-
lyze the indicia of treatment or punishment—juvenile code pur-
pose clauses, sentencing statutes, judges’ sentencing practices, 
conditions of confinement, or intervention outcomes—when it 
denied delinquents a jury.  
The Court long has recognized that juries serve a special 
role to prevent governmental oppression and protect citizens fac-
ing punishment.332 In our system of checks and balances, lay cit-
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izen jurors represent the ultimate restraint on abuses of govern-
mental power, which is why it is the only procedural safeguard 
listed in three different places in the constitution.333 Duncan v. 
Louisiana, decided three years before McKeiver, held that the 
Sixth Amendment guaranteed a jury right in state criminal pro-
ceedings to assure accurate factfinding and to prevent govern-
mental oppression.334 Duncan emphasized that juries inject com-
munity values into the law, increase visibility of justice 
administration, and check abuses by prosecutors and judges.335 
The year after Duncan, Baldwin v. New York again emphasized 
the jury’s role to prevent government oppression by interposing 
lay citizens between the State and the defendant.336 Baldwin is 
especially critical for juvenile justice because an adult charged 
with any offense that carries a potential sentence of confinement 
of six months or longer enjoys a right to a jury trial.337  
McKeiver feared that granting delinquents jury trials would 
also lead to public trials.338 However, as a result of Get Tough 
Era reforms to increase the visibility, accountability, and pun-
ishment powers of juvenile courts, about half the states author-
ized public access to all delinquency proceedings or to felony 
prosecutions.339 States limited confidentiality protections to hold 
youths accountable and put the public on notice of those who 
pose risks to the community.340  
i.  Punitive Juvenile Justice 
The vast majority of states deny delinquents the right to a 
jury341 and youths have challenged McKeiver ’s half-century old 
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rationale in light of Get Tough Era changes.342 Most state appel-
late courts have rejected their claims with deeply flawed, uncrit-
ical analyses, which often conflate treatment with punish-
ment.343 Few courts engage in the careful analysis of purpose 
clauses, sentencing statutes, judicial practices, and conditions of 
confinement required to distinguish treatment from punish-
ment.344 States rejected juveniles’ challenges to Get Tough Era 
changes—open hearings, mandatory sentences, and the use of 
delinquency convictions to enhance criminal sentences—by em-
phasizing differences in the severity of penalties imposed on de-
linquents and criminal defendants convicted of the same 
crime.345 However, once a penalty crosses Baldwin’s six-month 
authorized sentence threshold, further severity is irrelevant. By 
contrast, the Kansas Supreme Court in In re L.M. concluded that 
legislative changes eroded the benevolent parens patriae char-
acter of juvenile courts and transformed it into a system for pros-
ecuting juveniles charged with committing crimes.346 
c. Delinquency Convictions to Enhance Criminal Sentences 
Apprendi v. New Jersey ruled that “any fact that increases 
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maxi-
mum,” other than the fact of a prior conviction, “must be submit-
ted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”347 The 
Court exempted the “fact of a prior conviction” because criminal 
defendants enjoyed the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a 
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sin’s Juvenile Justice Code is criminal in nature and thus McKeiver’s rationale 
is inapposite). 
 343. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 46, at 50–51. 
 344. See In re J.F., 714 A.2d 467; In re Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d 660. 
 345. See In re D.J., 817 So. 2d at 33 (arguing that the juvenile would face a 
maximum of eight years of detention if found delinquent while an adult con-
victed of the same charge could receive a maximum of fifty-five years imprison-
ment at hard labor). 
 346. See In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 170 (Kan. 2008). 
 347. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
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reasonable doubt, which assured reliability of prior convic-
tions.348 Apprendi emphasized the jury’s role to uphold Win-
ship’s standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.349 While 
McKeiver approved jury-free delinquency proceedings to impose 
rehabilitative dispositions, they would not be adequate to punish 
a youth. 
Juvenile courts historically restricted access to records to 
avoid stigmatizing youths.350 Criminal courts lacked access to 
delinquency records because of juvenile courts’ confidentiality, 
practice of sealing or expunging delinquency records, physical 
separation of juvenile and criminal court staff and records, and 
the difficulty of maintaining systems to track offenders and com-
pile histories across both systems.351 But criminal courts need to 
know which juveniles’ delinquent careers continue into adult-
hood to incapacitate them, punish them, or protect public 
safety.352 Therefore, despite a tradition of confidentiality, states 
have long used some delinquency convictions. Some states use 
juvenile records on a discretionary basis.353 Many state and fed-
eral sentencing guidelines include some delinquency convictions 
in defendants’ criminal history score,354 although some vary in 
how they weigh delinquency convictions.355 
As a matter of policy, however, states should not equate de-
linquency and criminal convictions for sentence enhancements. 
Despite causing the same physical injury or property loss as 
older actors, juveniles’ reduced culpability makes their choices 
less blameworthy and should diminish their weight.356 Moreo-
ver, their use to enhance criminal sentences raises questions 
about the procedures used to obtain those convictions. Juvenile 
courts in many states adjudicate half or more delinquents with-
out counsel.357 The vast majority of states deny juveniles the 
 
 348. Id.; see Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 17, at 1120–24. 
 349. Appredni, 530 U.S. at 483–84. 
 350. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 233–35. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id.; James B. Jacobs, Juvenile Criminal Record Confidentiality, in 
CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 106, at 
149, 155. 
 353. See Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 17, at 1184–88. 
 354. Id. at 1184–85; see United States v. Davis, 48 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 
1995); United States v. McDonald, 991 F.2d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 355. For example, under California’s three strikes law, some juvenile felony 
convictions count as strikes for sentence enhancements. Feld, Constitutional 
Tension, supra note 17 at 1187–88. 
 356. See infra Part II.B. 
 357. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 128. 
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right to a jury trial.358 Because some judges in bench trials may 
apply Winship’s reasonable doubt standard less stringently, 
more youths are convicted than would be with adequate safe-
guards. 
Federal circuits are divided whether Apprendi allows judges 
to use delinquency convictions to enhance criminal sentences.359 
State appellate court rulings reflect the federal split of opinion 
 
 358. Id. at 158.  
 359. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The Ninth Circuit in 
United States v. Tighe reasoned that delinquency adjudication does not fall 
within the prior conviction exception. 266 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001). Tighe 
explains: 
[T]he “prior conviction” exception to Apprendi’s general rule must be 
limited to prior convictions that were themselves obtained through pro-
ceedings that included the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Juvenile adjudications that do not afford the right to a 
jury trial and a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof, therefore, 
do not fall within Apprendi’s ‘prior conviction’ exception.  
Id. 
By contrast, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Smalley reasoned that 
Apprendi excepted prior convictions from its general rule because the proce-
dural safeguards of trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt assured 
their reliability. 294 F.3d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 2002). While Apprendi identified 
those procedural safeguards that clearly established the reliability of prior con-
victions—notice, right to a jury trial, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt—it 
did not hold that they were essential prerequisites to a valid conviction. 530 
U.S. at 476–78. The court in Smalley reasoned: 
We think that while the Court established what constitutes sufficient 
procedural safeguards (a right to jury trial and proof beyond a reason-
able doubt), and what does not (judge-made findings under a lesser 
[preponderance] standard of proof ), the Court did not take a position 
on possibilities that lie in between these two poles. In other words, we 
think that it is incorrect to assume that it is not only sufficient but 
necessary that the “fundamental triumvirate of procedural protec-
tions” . . . underly [sic] an adjudication before it can qualify for the Ap-
prendi exemption.  
Smalley, 294 F.3d. at 1032. 
Rather than focusing on the specific procedural safeguards of a criminal 
prosecution, Smalley focused on “whether juvenile adjudications, like adult con-
victions, are so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such an ex-
emption.” Id. at 1033. The court reviewed the procedural safeguards available 
to juveniles as a result of Gault and Winship and concluded that “these safe-
guards are more than sufficient to ensure the reliability that Apprendi re-
quires.” Id. at 1033. The court reiterated McKeiver ’s assertion that the absence 
of a jury would not detract from the accuracy of factfinding in delinquency ad-
judications. Id. However, Smalley did not examine McKeiver ’s “treatment” ra-
tionale for less stringent procedural safeguards or the inconsistency of using 
convictions obtained for a benign purpose subsequently to be used for a more 
punitive one. Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 17, at 1196–1222. 
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about the reliability of delinquency convictions and the require-
ment for a jury right.360 Until the Court clarifies Apprendi, de-
fendants in some states or federal circuits will serve longer sen-
tences than those in other jurisdictions based on flawed 
delinquency convictions. 
Finally, the use of delinquency convictions to enhance crim-
inal sentences further aggravates endemic racial disparities in 
justice administration. At each stage of the juvenile justice sys-
tem, racial disparities compound, cumulate, create more exten-
sive delinquency records, and contribute to disproportionate mi-
nority confinement. Richard Frase’s magisterial analysis of 
racial disparities in criminal sentencing in Minnesota concludes 
that “seemingly legitimate sentencing factors such as criminal 
history scoring can have strongly disparate impacts on nonwhite 
defendants.”361 
i.  Collateral Consequences of Delinquency Convictions 
In addition to direct penalties—confinement and enhanced 
sentences as juveniles or as adults—extensive collateral conse-
quences follow from delinquency convictions. Although state pol-
icies vary, collateral consequences may follow youths for decades 
and affect future housing, education, and employment opportu-
nities.362 States may enter juveniles’ fingerprints, photographs, 
and DNA into databases accessible to law enforcement and other 
agencies.363 Some get-tough reforms opened delinquency trials 
and records to the public, and media reports on the internet cre-
ate a permanent and easily accessed record.364 Criminal justice 
agencies, schools, child care providers, the military, and others 
may have access to juvenile court records automatically or by 
petition.365 Expungement of delinquency records is not auto-
matic and requires a petition and court hearing.366 Delinquency 
convictions may affect youths’ ability to obtain professional li-
censure, to receive government aid, to join the military, to obtain 
 
 360. See State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d 732 (Kan. 2002); State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 
1276 (La. 2004); Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 17, at 1203–14. 
 361. Richard Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in 
Minnesota’s Prison and Jail Populations?, 38 CRIME & JUST. 201, 265 (2009). 
 362. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 3; NELLIS, supra note 
50, at 61. 
 363. See FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 29, at 369–76. 
 364. See NELLIS, supra note 50, at 69–73. 
 365. See id. at 63–65; Jacobs, supra note 352, at 161.  
 366. See NELLIS, supra note 50, at 63–65 (discussing the complex process for 
juvenile record expungement). 
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or keep legal immigration status, to live in public housing, and 
more.367  
The response to juvenile sex offenders is among the most on-
erous collateral consequence of delinquency adjudication.368 The 
federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act—Sex Of-
fender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)—requires 
states to implement registration and notification standards for 
individuals convicted as adults or juveniles for certain sex of-
fenses.369 Some states require lifetime registration, limit where 
registered offenders can live, work, or attend school, and require 
neighborhood notification.370 
d. Conclusion  
The procedural as well as substantive convergence between 
juvenile and criminal courts since Gault has placed greater de-
mands on juveniles’ competence to exercise rights. Despite 
greater punitiveness and increased formality, most states do not 
provide delinquents the formal or functional procedural protec-
tions afforded adults. Juveniles waive Miranda rights and coun-
sel under an adult legal standard that many do not understand 
and cannot meet. The denial of juries undermines the reliability 
of delinquency convictions and their subsequent use for long-
term collateral consequences. 
State legislatures that define juvenile courts should recog-
nize that “children are different,” and provide greater assistance. 
Lawmakers passed punitive laws and simultaneously eroded ju-
venile courts’ meager protections—closed and confidential pro-
ceedings, limited collateral use of delinquency convictions, and 
the like. Legislators failed to appropriate adequate funds for le-
gal services and fostered crippled public defenders incapable of 
providing effective assistance of counsel. A half-century after 
 
 367. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 127; see also NELLIS, 
supra note 50, at 61. 
 368. See NELLIS, supra note 50, at 69–73. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIM-
RING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADOLESCENT SEXUAL OF-
FENDING (2004) (discussing the societal and legal response to the juvenile sex 
offender). 
 369. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16962 (2012); NELLIS, supra note 50, at 70–71. 
 370. See ZIMRING, supra note 368, at 147–50; see also Michael F. Caldwell, 
Juvenile Sexual Offenders, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE 
JUSTICE, supra note 106, at 55, 80 (discussing studies of registration laws, con-
cluding that these laws impede “community reintegration of less resilient of-
fenders, who are then rearrested more rapidly”). 
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Gault, many juveniles in many states are still waiting for a law-
yer to advocate on their behalf.371  
II.  YOUTHS IN CRIMINAL COURT   
A. TRANSFER TO CRIMINAL COURT 
During the Get Tough Era, lawmakers changed the theory 
and practice of transfer and increased the numbers of youths 
tried as adults. States use one or more often-overlapping trans-
fer strategies: (1) judicial waiver; (2) legislative offense exclu-
sion; and (3) prosecutorial direct-file.372 For around 200,000 
youths, states’ juvenile court jurisdiction ends at fifteen or six-
teen, rather than seventeen years of age.373 States transfer an-
other 50,000 youths via judicial waiver (7500), prosecutorial di-
rect-file (27,000), and the remainder with prosecutor-determined 
excluded offenses.374 We lack precise numbers because states 
only collect data on judicial transfers, which account for the few-
est number of youths waived.375  
During the Get Tough Era, legislators shifted control of 
transfer decisions from judges to prosecutors to avoid the for-
mer’s relative autonomy from political pressures.376 Legal 
changes lowered the age for transfer, increased the numbers of 
excluded offenses, and strengthened prosecutors’ charging pow-
ers.377 Despite the prevalence of judicial waiver statutes, prose-
cutors’ excluded offenses or direct-file charging decisions deter-
mine the adult status of eighty-five percent of youths.378  
 
 371. See generally NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., supra note 264 and accompa-
nying text.  
 372. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 33, at 110; Barry C. Feld & Donna M. 
Bishop, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 801, 802. 
 373. Feld & Bishop, supra note 372, at 815. 
 374. Id. 
 375. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 110.  
 376. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 207, 214–18; NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 38–39. 
 377. Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Ju-
risdiction: A History and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE 83, 126 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) [hereinafter 
Feld, Legislative Exclusion]. 
 378. Jolanta Juszkiewicz & Mark Schindler, Youth Crime/Adult Time: Is 
Justice Served?, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Feb. 2001, at 102; see also AMNESTY IN-
TERNATIONAL & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITH-
OUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (2005) [herein-
after AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL] (“[T]he proportion of children who have had a 
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The vast majority of states have judicial waiver laws that 
specify the ages and offenses for which a judge may conduct a 
transfer hearing.379 Kent v. United States required judges to con-
duct a procedurally fair hearing (counsel, access to probation re-
ports, and written findings for appellate review) because the loss 
of juvenile courts’ benefits (access to treatment, confidentiality, 
limited collateral consequences, and the like) was a critical ac-
tion.380 Breed v. Jones applied the Fifth Amendment double jeop-
ardy prohibition to delinquency adjudications and required 
states to decide whether to prosecute a youth in juvenile or crim-
inal court before proceeding to trial.381 Kent appended a list of 
factors for judges to consider and state courts and statutes incor-
porated those criteria.382 Judges have broad discretion to inter-
pret those factors and studies of judicial waiver document incon-
sistent rulings, justice by geography, and over-representation of 
racial minorities.383 For decades, studies reported racial dispar-
ities in judicial transfer decisions.384 Judges transfer minority 
youths more often than white youths especially for violent and 
drug crimes.385 In the seventy-five largest counties in the United 
States, racial minorities comprised more than two-thirds of ju-
veniles tried in criminal court and the vast majority of those sen-
tenced to adult prison.386  
A dozen states set their juvenile courts’ age jurisdiction at 
fifteen or sixteen years—rather than seventeen—for certain fel-
onies, which results in the largest numbers of youths tried as 
adults.387 In addition, some states’ laws exclude youths sixteen 
 
transfer hearing before being tried in criminal court has been steadily declin-
ing.”). 
 379. Feld & Bishop, supra note 372, at 802–05. 
 380. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
 381. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). 
 382. Kent, 383 U.S. at 566–67. 
 383. See generally Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, Judicial 
Waiver Policy and Practice: Persistence, Seriousness and Race, 14 LAW & INEQ. 
73 (1995); Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: 
An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 449 
(1996). 
 384. See, e.g., GAO, JUVENILE JUSTICE: JUVENILES PROCESSED IN CRIMINAL 
COURT AND CASE DISPOSITIONS 59 (1995); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 
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larly situated white youths at every stage of the criminal justice system.”). 
 385. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 216; POE-YAMAGATA & 
JONES, supra note 57, at 12–14. 
 386. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 220. 
 387. Feld & Bishop, supra note 372, at 806, 809–10. 
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or older charged with murder, while others exclude more exten-
sive lists of offenses.388 During the Get Tough Era, many states 
excluded more offenses—crimes against the person, property, 
drugs, or weapons offenses—to evade Kent’s hearing require-
ment.389 Appellate courts uniformly reject youths’ claims that 
prosecuting them for an excluded offense denies Kent’s proce-
dural safeguards.390  
In more than a dozen states, juvenile and criminal courts 
share concurrent jurisdiction over some ages and offenses—older 
youths and serious crimes—and prosecutors decide through di-
rect file in which forum to charge a youth.391 Under offense ex-
clusion, the crime charged determines the venue; direct-file laws 
allow prosecutors to select either system to try the crime.392 Di-
rect file elevates prosecutors’ power at judges’ expense and cre-
ates a model more typical of criminal courts. Most direct-file laws 
provide no criteria to guide prosecutors’ choice of forum.393 Pros-
ecutors lack access to personal, social, or clinical information 
about a youth that a judge would consider and base their deci-
sions primarily on police reports.394 Locally elected prosecutors 
exploit crime issues just as get-tough legislators do, introduce 
justice by geography and racial disparities, and exercise their 
discretion as subjectively as do judges, but without appellate re-
view. Nationally, prosecutors have determined the criminal sta-
tus of eighty-five percent of youths tried as adults395 and have 
acted as gatekeepers to the juvenile justice system, a role previ-
ously reserved for judges—who have more experience, infor-
mation, and less political motivations.  
Another Get Tough Era innovation was blended sentences, 
which provide judges with mixed juvenile-criminal sentencing 
options.396 Because juvenile courts lose jurisdiction when youths 
reach the age of majority or other dispositional age limit, judges 
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may be unable to sentence appropriately older offenders con-
victed of serious crimes. States increase judges’ sentencing pow-
ers by allowing juvenile courts to impose extended delinquency 
sentences with a stayed criminal sentence, or by giving criminal 
courts authority to use a delinquency disposition in lieu of im-
prisonment.397 Regardless of approach, blended sentencing laws 
require criminal procedural safeguards, including the right to a 
jury trial, to enable a judge to punish and thereby gain greater 
flexibility to treat.398 Although states adopted blended sentences 
as an alternative to transfer, they had a net-widening effect, and 
juvenile court judges frequently impose them on less-serious of-
fenders whom they previously handled as delinquents.399 Judges 
have imposed blended sentences on younger, less-serious offend-
ers, have subsequently revoked their probation—primarily for 
technical violations—and have doubled the number of youths 
sent to prison.400 Prosecutors have used the threat of transfer to 
coerce youths to plead to blended sentences, to waive procedural 
rights, to increase punishment imposed in juvenile courts, and 
to risk exposure to criminal sanctions.401 
1. Juveniles in Prison 
Criminal court judges sentence transferred youths like 
adults, which increases their likelihood of subsequent offend-
ing.402 While all inmates potentially face abuse, adolescents’ 
size, physical strength, lesser social skills, and lack of sophisti-
cation increase their risk for physical, sexual, and psychological 
victimization.403 To prevent victimization, some states place vul-
nerable youths in solitary confinement for twenty-two hours a 
day.404 Prisons are developmentally inappropriate places for 
youths to form an identity, acquire social skills, or make a suc-
 
 397. See Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 396, at 999. 
 398. Id. at 1009.  
 399. Id. at 1028, 1071. 
 400. See id. at 1063, 1070. 
 401. See id. at 1003, 1029–30. 
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 403. See Michele Deitch & Neelum Arya, Waivers and Transfers of Juveniles 
to Adult Court: Treating Juveniles Like Adult Criminals, in JUVENILE JUSTICE 
SOURCEBOOK 241, 252 (Wesley T. Church II et al. eds., 2d ed. 2014); Edward P. 
Mulvey & Carol A. Schubert, Youth in Prison and Beyond, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 843, 
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 404. Deitch & Arya, supra note 403, at 252–53. 
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cessful transition to adulthood. Imprisoning them exacts differ-
ent and greater developmental opportunity costs than those ex-
perienced by adults.405 It disrupts normal development—com-
pleting education, finding a job, forming relationships and 
creating social bonds that promote desistance—and ground lost 
may never be regained.  
2. Policy Justifications for Waiver: Unarticulated and 
Unrealized 
States will prosecute some youths in criminal court as a 
matter of public safety and political reality. Legislative changes 
that targeted violent and drug crimes increased the likelihood 
and severity of criminal sentences; judges incarcerate trans-
ferred youths more often and for longer sentences than youths 
retained in juvenile courts.406 Although approximately three-
quarters of youths convicted of violent felonies in criminal court 
go to prison, overall nearly half of all transferred youths are not 
convicted or placed on probation, fewer than twenty-five percent 
are sentenced to prison, and ninety-five percent are released 
from custody by their twenty-fifth birthday.407  
Although legislators assumed that threat of transfer and 
criminal punishment would deter youths, studies of juvenile 
crime rates before and after passage of get tough laws found no 
general deterrent effect.408 Studies of specific deterrence report 
that transferred youths had higher recidivism rates than did 
those sentenced as delinquents.409 Studies compared outcomes 
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of youths transferred to criminal courts with those who re-
mained in juvenile courts and concluded that youths tried as 
adults had higher and faster recidivism rates, especially for vio-
lent crimes, than their delinquent counterparts.410  
Although judges do not imprison all transferred youths, they 
sometimes treat youthfulness as an aggravating rather than a 
mitigating factor when they do. Prior to Miller v. Alabama, more 
youths convicted of murder received life without parole (LWOP) 
sentences than did adults sentenced for murder.411 Compared 
with young adult offenders, transferred juveniles convicted of 
the same crimes often received longer sentences.412  
Punitive transfer laws have targeted violent crimes, which 
black youths commit more often.413 Even prior to the Get Tough 
Era, studies reported racial disparities in judicial transfer deci-
sions.414 Subsequently, judges transferred youths of color more 
often than white youths charged with similar violent and drug 
crimes.415 The vast majority of juveniles transferred to criminal 
court and sentenced to prison are youths of color, primarily black 
youths.416 
3. Waiver Policy: What Should a Rational Legislature Do? 
Expansive transfer policies further no legitimate penal 
goals. Equating younger and older offenders ignores develop-
mental differences and disproportionately punishes less blame-
worthy adolescents. Transfer does not deter youths because their 
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immature judgment, short-term time perspective, and prefer-
ence for immediate gains lessen the threat of sanctions. Youths 
tried as adults reoffend more quickly and more seriously, 
thereby increasing the risk to public safety and negating any 
short-term crime reduction by incapacitation.417  
The vast majority of juvenile justice scholars agree that if 
some youths must be transferred, then it should occur in a judi-
cial waiver process and be used rarely.418 A state should waive 
only those youths whose serious and persistent offenses require 
minimum lengths of confinement that greatly exceed the maxi-
mum sanctions available in juvenile court. A retributive policy 
would limit severe sanctions to youths charged with homicide, 
rape, robbery or assault with a firearm or substantial injury. 
However, severely punishing all youths who commit serious 
crimes would be counterproductive because youths arrested for 
an initial violent offense desist at similar rates to other delin-
quents.419 Chronic offenders may require sentences longer than 
those available in juvenile court because of persistent criminal-
ity and exhaustion of juvenile court resources.420 
A legislature should prescribe a minimum age of eligibility 
for criminal prosecution. Developmental psychological and neu-
roscience research reports a sharp drop-off in judgment, self-con-
trol, and appreciation of consequences as well as in competence 
to exercise procedural rights for youths fifteen years of age or 
younger.421 The minimum age for transfer should be sixteen 
years of age. 
A juvenile court hearing (1) guided by offense criteria and 
clinical considerations; and (2) subject to rigorous appellate re-
view is the only sensible way to make transfer decisions.422 Cri-
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GANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 251, 254 (1972); Alex R. Piquero 
et al., Criminal Career Patterns, in FROM JUVENILE DELINQUENCY TO ADULT 
CRIME: CRIMINAL CAREERS, JUSTICE POLICY, AND PREVENTION, supra note 85, 
at 14, 24. 
 420. Feld, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 123. 
 421. See supra notes 166–81, 223–29, 273–76; infra notes 457–87 and ac-
companying text. 
 422. See FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 210; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra 
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teria should focus on violent offenses, prior record, offender cul-
pability, criminal participation, clinical evaluations, and aggra-
vating and mitigating factors which, taken together, distinguish 
youths who deserve sentences substantially longer than those 
juvenile courts can impose. Appellate courts should closely re-
view waiver decisions and develop substantive principles to de-
fine a consistent boundary of adulthood. Although waiver hear-
ings are less efficient than prosecutors’ charging decisions, it 
should be difficult to transfer youths—juvenile courts exist to 
keep them out of the criminal justice system. An adversarial 
hearing at which prosecution and defense present evidence 
about offense, culpability, and treatment prognoses will produce 
better decisions than will politically-motivated prosecutors act-
ing without clinical information. 
B. SENTENCING YOUTHS AS ADULTS: CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT 
The Supreme Court developed its jurisprudence of youth—
children are different—in response to punitive laws that ignored 
adolescents’ reduced culpability. It was a judicial assertion that 
enough is enough. In a trilogy of cases beginning in 2005, the 
Court applied the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment to juveniles.423 Roper v. Simmons prohib-
ited states from executing offenders for murder committed be-
fore they were eighteen years of age.424 The Justices concluded 
that youths’ immature judgment and lack of self-control, suscep-
tibility to negative peers, and transitory personalities reduced 
their culpability and precluded the most severe sentence.425 Gra-
ham v. Florida extended Roper ’s diminished-responsibility ra-
tionale and prohibited states from imposing LWOP sentences on 
juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses.426 It repudiated the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment doctrine that “death is different.”427 
 
note 1, at 244–45; Bishop, supra note 418; Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, 
supra note 48, at 205–06; cf. ZIMRING, supra note 23, at 125–27 (arguing that 
transfer decisions should be made by judges rather than prosecutors).  
 423. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportion-
ality, and Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth 
Discount, 31 LAW & INEQ. 263 (2013) [hereinafter Feld, Adolescent Criminal 
Responsibility] (explaining these cases’ impact on juvenile criminal law); Barry 
C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old Enough To Do the Crime, Too Young To Do 
the Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107 (2013) [hereinafter Feld, Youth Discount] 
(tracing the effects of these three cases).  
 424. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 425. Id. at 569–70. 
 426. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70–73, (2015). 
 427. Id. at 74 (majority opinion); id. at 103 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Miller v. Alabama extended Roper and Graham’s diminished-re-
sponsibility rationale and barred mandatory LWOP sentences 
for youths convicted of murder.428 Miller required judges to make 
individualized culpability assessments and to weigh youthful-
ness as a mitigating factor.429 
Despite the Court’s repeated assertions that children are 
different, Graham provided nonhomicide juvenile offenders very 
limited relief—“some meaningful opportunity to obtain re-
lease”430—without requiring either rehabilitative services or 
eventual freedom. Miller required a judge to make an individu-
alized assessment of a juvenile murderer’s culpability, but did 
not preclude a LWOP sentence.431 State courts and legislatures 
have struggled to implement juveniles’ diminished responsibility 
when sentencing them as adults.432  
The increased numbers and immaturity of many juveniles 
sentenced as adults impelled the Court to review states’ criminal 
sentencing laws as applied to children. Roper held that youths 
are categorically less criminally responsible than adults.433 Gra-
ham rejected the Court’s death is different jurisprudence and re-
formulated the Court’s proportionality analyses to account for 
the doubly diminished responsibility of juveniles who did not 
kill.434 Miller barred mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles 
who murder and relied on death-penalty precedents to require 
individualized assessments and to weigh youths’ diminished re-
sponsibility.435 State courts and legislatures have struggled un-
successfully to implement the Court’s children are different ju-
risprudence because the opinions’ broad language provides scant 
guidance on several critical questions. This Section concludes by 
proposing a youth discount—shorter sentences for younger of-
fenders—to formally recognize youthfulness as a mitigating fac-
tor.  
As noted above, states annually try upwards of 200,000 
 
 428. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). 
 429. Id. at 481, 489. 
 430. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. 
 431. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.  
 432. See infra notes 515–24 and accompanying text. See generally Cara H. 
Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1787, 1816–18 (2016) (review-
ing state responses to Miller); Perry L. Moriearty, Miller v. Alabama and the 
Retroactivity of Proportionality Rules, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 975–76 (2015) 
(describing how states have reformulated sentencing schemes after Miller). 
 433. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).  
 434. Graham, 560 U.S. at 72.  
 435. Miller, 567 U.S. at 474–79.  
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chronological juveniles as adults.436 The fallacious predictions 
during the Get Tough Era of an impending bloodbath by super-
predators propelled punitive policies.437 States lowered the age 
for transfer, increased the number of excluded offenses, and 
shifted discretion from judges to prosecutors, all of which exac-
erbated racial disparities.438 Racial stereotypes taint culpability 
assessments and reduce youthfulness’ mitigating role.439 Chil-
dren of color comprise the majority of juveniles tried in criminal 
court and three-quarters of those who enter prison.440 For adults, 
states’ Get Tough Era criminal laws lengthened sentences, 
adopted mandatory minimums, and imposed mandatory LWOP 
sentences for homicide and other crimes.441 The laws applied 
equally to juveniles as to adults; judges sentenced them as if they 
were adults and sent them to the same prisons. 
1. Roper v. Simmons: Banning the Death Penalty for 
Juveniles 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits states from inflicting 
cruel and unusual punishments.442 Prior to Roper v. Simmons, 
the Court thrice considered whether it prohibited states from ex-
ecuting juveniles convicted of murder.443 Before Roper in 1989, 
 
 436. POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 57, at 13.  
 437. See WILLIAM BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY. . . AND 
HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 21–34 (1996) (warn-
ing of ominous impending crime wave by young people); ZIMRING, supra note 
23, at 11–16; Zimring, supra note 28, at 265. 
 438. C.f. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 42 (explaining that 
these reforms made minority youth “[receive] disproportionately harsh treat-
ment in many states”).  
 439. George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assess-
ments in Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mecha-
nisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554, 561 (1998); Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, 
Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 483, 494 (2004); Perry L. Moriearty, Framing Justice, Media, 
Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD. L. REV. 849, 853–54 (2010). 
 440. POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 57, at 2, 25; see also AMNESTY IN-
TERNATIONAL, supra note 378, at 39–43. 
 441. See TONRY, supra note 61, at 170; MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MAT-
TERS, 146–47 (1996). 
 442. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).  
 443. Earlier decisions adverted to the importance of considering youthful-
ness as a mitigating factor in capital sentencing. See, e.g., Thompson v. Okla-
homa, 487 U.S. 815, 822–23 (1988) (plurality opinion) (concluding that fifteen-
year-old offenders lacked culpability to warrant execution); Eddings v. Okla-
homa, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (remanding a sixteen-year-old defendant for 
resentencing after the trial court’s failure to properly consider youthfulness as 
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Stanford v. Kentucky upheld the death penalty for sixteen- or 
seventeen-year-olds convicted of murder and allowed juries to 
assess their personal culpability on a case-by-case basis.444 Fi-
nally, in 2005, Roper overruled Stanford and prohibited states 
from executing youths for crimes committed prior to age eight-
een.445  
Roper gave three reasons why states could not punish juve-
niles as severely as adults. First, their immature judgment and 
limited self-control causes them to act impulsively and without 
adequate appreciation of consequences.446 Second, their suscep-
tibility to negative peers and inability to escape criminogenic en-
vironments reduce their responsibility.447 Third, their transitory 
personality provides less reliable evidence of enduring blame-
worthiness.448 Because juveniles’ character is transitional, the 
 
a mitigating factor and noting that “youth is more than a chronological fact” and 
“minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and respon-
sible than adults”). Thompson’s proportionality analysis considered both objec-
tive factors—state statutes, jury practices, and the views of organizations and 
the international community—and the Justices’ own subjective sense of “civi-
lized standards of decency.” Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823, 830–31. Thompson em-
phasized that deserved punishment must reflect individual culpability and con-
cluded that “[t]here is also broad agreement on the proposition that adolescents 
as a class are less mature and responsible than adults.” Id. at 834. 
 444. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374–77 (1989) (acknowledging that 
most juveniles were less criminally responsible than adults, but rejecting a cat-
egorical ban and allowing juries to decide whether a youth’s culpability war-
ranted execution). 
 445. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). Roper relied on the ana-
lytic methodology the Court used earlier in Atkins v. Virginia to bar execution 
of defendants with mental retardation. See id. at 563–67; Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (barring states from executing defendants with mental 
retardation). Atkins found a national consensus existed because many states 
barred the practice and few states actually executed offenders with mental re-
tardation. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–16 (counting state statutes and emphasizing 
that “[i]t is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the 
consistency of the direction of change” that enabled the Court to find the exist-
ence of a national consensus). The Atkins Justices’ independent proportionality 
analysis concluded that mentally impaired defendants lacked the culpability to 
warrant execution. Id. at 315–19. 
 446. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. (“[A] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped 
sense of responsibility are found in youth more often that in adults and are more 
understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and 
ill-considered actions and decisions.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 447. Id. at 569 (“[J]uveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative 
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”). The Court ex-
plained, “Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their im-
mediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be 
forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment.” 
Id. at 570. 
 448. Id. (“[T]he character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an 
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Court concluded that there is a great likelihood that they can be 
reformed.449 For Roper, youths’ diminished responsibility under-
mined retributive justifications for the death penalty.450 Simi-
larly, the Court concluded that impulsiveness and limited self-
control weakened any deterrent effect.451 Roper imposed a cate-
gorical ban rather than allowing juries to evaluate youths’ cul-
pability individually because the “unacceptable likelihood exists 
that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime 
would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a mat-
ter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective imma-
turity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a 
sentence less severe than death.”452 Because a brutal murder 
could overwhelm the mitigating role of youthfulness, Roper used 
age as a categorical proxy for reduced culpability. 
Roper reasoned that immature judgment, susceptibility to 
 
adult.”). Because juveniles’ character is transitional, “[f ]rom a moral standpoint 
it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, 
for a greater possibility exists that a minor ’s character deficiencies will be re-
formed.” Id. 
 449. Id. 
 450. Id. at 571. Roper noted the two penal functions served by the death 
penalty—retribution and deterrence—and concluded that: 
Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community’s moral out-
rage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim, 
the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult. 
Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is im-
posed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a 
substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.  
Id. 
 451. Id. The Court concluded that juveniles’ immature judgment decreased 
the likelihood that the threat of execution would deter them, explaining that 
“the absence of evidence of deterrent effect is of special concern because the 
same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as 
well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.” Id. 
 452. Id. at 572–73 (emphasis added). Clinicians do not diagnose people 
younger than eighteen with antisocial personality disorder, and Roper declined 
to allow jurors to make culpability assessments that clinicians eschew. Id. at 
573 (noting that psychologists cannot differentiate between a transiently imma-
ture juvenile and the “rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable 
corruption”). The Court feared that a brutal murder could overwhelm the miti-
gating role of youthfulness. Id.; see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Aggravating Youth: 
Roper v. Simmons and Age Discrimination, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 83 (2005) 
(arguing that “to the extent we see or want to see childhood as a time of inno-
cence, cognitive dissonance may prompt us to reconceive a child who does terri-
ble things as an adult”). See generally, Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, 
supra note 423 (tracing the Court’s jurisprudence on youth as a mitigating fac-
tor); Feld, Youth Discount, supra note 423 (advocating a categorical rule of mit-
igation based on offenders’ youth).  
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peer and environmental influences, and transitional personali-
ties reduced adolescents’ criminal responsibility.453 Roper—and 
subsequently Graham and Miller—analyzed youths’ reduced 
culpability within a retributive sentencing framework: propor-
tionality and deserved punishment. Retributive sentencing pro-
portions punishment to a crime’s seriousness.454 A crime’s seri-
ousness is defined by two elements, harm and culpability, which 
determine how much punishment an actor deserves. An of-
fender’s age has no bearing on the harm caused—children and 
adults can cause the same injuries. But proportionality requires 
consideration of an offender’s culpability, and immaturity re-
duces youths’ blameworthiness.455 Youths’ inability to fully ap-
preciate wrongfulness or to control themselves lessens, but does 
 
 453. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.  
 454. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY 
PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT AC-
TIONS 161 (2009) (arguing that “the offender ’s blameworthiness for an offense 
is generally assessed according to two elements: the nature and seriousness of 
the harm foreseeably caused or threatened by the crime and the offender ’s cul-
pability in committing the crime (in particular, the offender ’s degree of intent 
(mens rea), motives, role in the offense, and mental illness or other diminished 
capacity”); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISH-
MENTS 48 (1976) (“[P]unishing someone conveys in dramatic fashion that his 
conduct was wrong and that he is blameworthy for having committed it.”). Ac-
cording to Professor Frase:  
[T]he degree of blameworthiness of an offense is generally assessed ac-
cording to two kinds of elements: the nature and seriousness of the 
harm caused or threatened by the crime; and the offender ’s degree of 
culpability in committing the crime, in particular, his or her degree of 
intent (mens rea), motives, role in the offense, and mental illness or 
other diminished capacity. 
Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals and the Eighth 
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 590 
(2005). 
 455. Offender culpability is central to proportional sentencing. See Tison v. 
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (reasoning that “[d]eeply engrained in our 
legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is [sic] the criminal conduct, 
the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be 
punished”); see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Ado-
lescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 176 (1997) [hereinafter Scott & Grisso, Evolution of Ad-
olescence] (“[Adolescents’] criminal choices are presumed less to express individ-
ual preferences and more to reflect the behavioral influences characteristic of a 
transitory developmental stage that are generally shared with others in the age 
cohort. This difference supports drawing a line based on age, and subjecting 
adolescents to a categorical presumption of reduced responsibility.”); Laurence 
Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A Develop-
mental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 389, 407–09 (1999) (explaining that youths lack “ability to control 
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not excuse, responsibility for causing harms. They may have the 
minimum capacity to be criminally liable, that is, the ability to 
distinguish right from wrong, but still deserve less punish-
ment.456 
a. Developmental Psychology, Neuroscience, and Diminished 
Responsibility  
Developmental psychology focuses on how children and ad-
olescents’ thinking and behavior change with age.457 By mid-ad-
olescence, most youths reason similarly to adults, such as when, 
for example, they make informed-consent medical decisions.458 
But the ability to make reasonable decisions with complete in-
formation under laboratory conditions differs from the ability to 
act responsibly under stress with incomplete information. Emo-
tions influence youths’ judgment to a greater extent than adults 
 
[their] impulses, to manage [their] behavior in the face of pressure from others 
to violate the law, or to extricate [themselves] from a potentially problematic 
situation,” and that these deficiencies render them less blameworthy). Franklin 
Zimring uses the term “diminished responsibility” to refer to adolescents who 
possess “the minimum abilities for blameworthiness and thus for punish-
ment . . . [whose] immaturity . . . still suggests that less punishment is justi-
fied.” Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes 
on Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: 
A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 271, 
273 [hereinafter Zimring, Penal Proportionality]; see also SCOTT & STEINBERG, 
supra note 1 at 123–24; ZIMRING, supra note 23, at 75 (arguing that “even after 
a youth passes the minimum threshold of competence, this barely competent 
youth is not as culpable and therefore not as deserving of a full measure of pun-
ishment as a fully qualified adult offender”); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence 
Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 830 (2003) [hereinafter Scott & 
Steinberg, Blaming Youth] (arguing that compared with adults, youths act more 
impulsively, weigh consequences differently from adults, and discount risks be-
cause of normal developmental processes that “undermine [their] decision-mak-
ing capacity in ways that are accepted as mitigating culpability”). 
 456. Zimring, Penal Proportionality, supra note 455, at 278; SCOTT & STEIN-
BERG, supra note 1, at 122 (“[C]riminal law calculates culpability and punish-
ment on a continuum and is not limited to the options of full responsibility (the 
presumption for typical adult offenders) or excuse (the disposition of chil-
dren).”). 
 457. See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE SCIENCE OF ADO-
LESCENT RISK-TAKING: WORKSHOP REPORT 48–49 (2011). 
 458. Cf. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 95 (“Adolescents are 
similar to adults in their reasoning and abstract thinking abilities.”); Stephen 
J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 
52–53 (1997) (concluding that the cognitive capacity and formal reasoning abil-
ity of mid-adolescents does not differ significantly from that of adults).  
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and compromise adolescents’ decision-making and self-con-
trol.459 Youths are more heavily influenced by the reward centers 
of the brain, which contributes to riskier decisions.460  
In response to states’ adoption of punitive laws, in 1997 the 
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation sponsored the 
Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile 
Justice (ADJJ). Over the next decade, the ADJJ network con-
ducted research on adolescent decision-making, judgment, and 
adjudicative competence.461 The research distinguishes between 
cognitive abilities, judgment, and self-control: controlled think-
ing versus impulsive behaving.462 Cognitive capacities involve 
understanding, the ability to comprehend information, and rea-
soning, the ability to use information logically.463 Self-control re-
quires the ability to think before acting, to choose between alter-
natives, and to interrupt a course in motion.464 Although sixteen-
year-olds’ understanding and reasoning approximate adults, 
their ability to exercise mature judgment and control impulses 
takes several more years to emerge.465  
Youths differ from adults in risk perception, appreciation of 
consequences, impulsivity and self-control, sensation-seeking, 
and compliance with peers.466 The regions of the brain that con-
trol reward-seeking and emotional arousal develop earlier than 
 
 459. See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 39; 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 91; LINDA PATIA SPEAR, THE BE-
HAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE OF ADOLESCENCE 139–40 (2010); Ronald E. Dahl, Af-
fect Regulation, Brain Development, and Behavioral/Emotional Health in Ado-
lescence, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 60, 61 (2001). 
 460. See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 40; 
Dahl, supra note 459, at 62. 
 461. See, e.g., NELLIS, supra note 50, at 79–82; MACARTHUR FOUND. RE-
SEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEV. & JUVENILE JUSTICE, Development 
and Criminal Blameworthiness (2006), https://www.adjj.org/downloads/ 
3030PPT-%20Adolescent%20Development%20and%20Criminal%20 
Blameworthiness.pdf. 
 462. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 131–33, 136–38; Jennifer L. 
Woolard, Adolescent Development, Delinquency, and Juvenile Justice, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, 
at 107, 107–08. 
 463. See Woolard, supra note 462, at 107–10. 
 464. Id. at 108. 
 465. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 36–37; LAURENCE STEINBERG, 
AGE OF OPPORTUNITY: LESSONS FROM THE NEW SCIENCE OF ADOLESCENCE 69 
(2014); Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 455, at 813. 
 466. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 2; SCOTT & STEINBERG, 
supra note 1, at 37–44; Feld, Youth Discount, supra note 423, at 115–17. 
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do those that regulate executive functions and impulse con-
trol.467 Adolescents underestimate the amount and likelihood of 
risks, emphasize immediate outcomes, focus on anticipated 
gains rather than possible losses to a greater extent than adults, 
and consider fewer options.468 They weigh costs and benefits dif-
ferently, apply dissimilar subjective values to outcomes, and 
more heavily discount negative future consequences than more 
immediate rewards.469 They have less experience and knowledge 
to inform decisions about consequences. They prefer an immedi-
ate, albeit smaller, reward than do adults, who can better delay 
gratification.470 In a risk-benefit calculus, youths may view not 
engaging in risky behaviors differently than adults.471 Research-
ers attribute youths’ impetuous decisions to a heightened appe-
tite for emotional arousal and intense experiences, which peaks 
around sixteen or seventeen years of age.472  
Neuroscience research reports that the human brain contin-
ues to mature until the early to mid-twenties. Adolescents on av-
erage do not have adults’ neurobiological capacity to exercise ma-
ture judgment or control impulses.473 The relationship between 
 
 467. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 48. 
 468. See SPEAR, supra note 459, at 137–39; Woolard, supra note 462, at 109–
10. 
 469. INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 54–56; 
Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the Reg-
ulation of Youth Crime, 18 FUTURE OF CHILD., (Fall 2008), at 15, 20 (suggesting 
that because youths assess and weigh risks differently than adults, they are less 
likely to anticipate that someone might get hurt or killed in the commission of 
a felony); Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons 
from Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PER-
SPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 291, 304–05 (“Adolescents, 
perhaps because they have less knowledge and experience, are less aware of 
risks than are adults. . . . [T]he fact that adolescents have less experience and 
knowledge than adults seems likely to affect their decision making in tangible 
and intangible ways.”). 
 470. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 91, 93. 
 471. Barry C. Feld et al., Adolescent Competence and Culpability: Implica-
tions of Neuroscience for Juvenile Justice Administration, in A PRIMER ON CRIM-
INAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 179, 188 (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies 
eds., 2013); see also SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 42; INST. OF MED. & 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 50; Scott & Steinberg, Blaming 
Youth, supra note 455, at 814–15. 
 472. See Feld et al., supra note 471, at 186–88; INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 42; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 
1, at 91–93; SPEAR, supra note 459, at 140–41. 
 473. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 96–100 (citing studies 
showing the difference in adolescent brain function relative to adults, including 
 558 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:473 
 
two brain regions—the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the limbic 
system—underlie youths’ propensity for risky behavior.474 The 
PFC is responsible for judgment and impulse control.475 The 
amygdala and limbic system regulate emotional arousal and re-
ward-seeking behavior.476 The PFC performs executive func-
tions: reasoning, planning, and impulse control.477 These top-
 
the ability to exercise self-control). See generally SPEAR, supra note 459 (ex-
plaining how neurobiological developments in the brain affect how adolescents 
think and behave). 
 474. Dahl, supra note 459, at 69 (“Regions in the PFC that underpin higher 
cognitive-executive functions mature slowly, showing functional changes that 
continue well into late adolescence/adulthood.”). While summarizing research 
on brain development and its implications for adolescent self-control, Scott & 
Steinberg note: 
[R]egions of the brain implicated in processes of long-term planning, 
regulation of emotion, impulse control, and the evaluation of risk and 
reward continue to mature over the course of adolescence, and perhaps 
well into young adulthood. At puberty, changes in the limbic system—
a part of the brain that is central in the processing and regulation of 
emotion—may stimulate adolescents to seek higher levels of novelty 
and to take more risks; these changes also may contribute to increased 
emotionality and vulnerability to stress. At the same time, patterns of 
development in the prefrontal cortex, which is active during the perfor-
mance of complicated tasks involving planning and decision-making, 
suggest that these higher-order cognitive capacities may be immature 
well into middle adolescence. 
Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 455, at 816. See also Laurence 
Steinberg, A Dual Systems Model of Adolescent Risk-Taking, 52 DEVELOPMEN-
TAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 216, 217 (2010) [hereinafter Steinberg, Dual Systems] (re-
viewing the “neurobiological evidence for changes in brain structure and func-
tion during adolescence and early adulthood that facilitate improvements in 
self-regulation”). See generally Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Per-
spective on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78 (2008) [here-
inafter Steinberg, Social Neuroscience] (analyzing how changes in the brain 
during adolescence are related to a decline in risk-taking behavior). 
 475. Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 455, at 816. 
 476. Feld et al., supra note 471, at 191 (identifying the amygdala and limbic 
system as the parts of the brain that govern desire and emotion); Steinberg, 
Social Neuroscience, supra note 474, at 95 (linking maturity in the prefrontal 
cortex to improved emotional regulation and cognitive control).  
 477. The prefrontal cortex operates as the CEO of the brain and controls 
planning, goal-directed responses, risk assessment, and impulse control. 
ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND THE CIVI-
LIZED MIND 144 (2001); see also B.J. Casey et al., Structural and Functional 
Brain Development and Its Relation to Cognitive Development, 54 BIOLOGICAL 
PSYCHOL. 241, 244 (2000) [hereinafter Casey et al., Structural and Functional] 
(associating the PFC with a variety of cognitive abilities and behavior control); 
B.J. Casey et al., The Adolescent Brain, 1124 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI., March 
2008 at 111, 112 (reporting that the brain’s ability to control behavior continues 
to mature through late adolescence); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-
Todd, Neurobiology and the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 321, 323 (2006) (“The frontal cortex has been shown to play a major 
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down capabilities develop gradually and enable individuals to 
exercise greater self-control.478  
During adolescence, two neurobiological processes—mye-
lination and synaptic pruning—enhance the PFC’s functions.479 
Myelin is a white fatty substance that forms a sheath around 
neural axons, facilitates more efficient neurotransmission, and 
makes communication between different brain regions faster.480 
Synaptic pruning involves selective elimination of unused neural 
connections, promotes greater efficiency, speeds neural signals, 
and strengthens the brain’s ability to process information.481  
 
role in the performance of executive functions including short term or working 
memory, motor set and planning, attention, inhibitory control and decision 
making.”); Deborah Yurgelun-Todd, Emotional and Cognitive Changes During 
Adolescence, 17 CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY, April 2007 at 251, 253 (de-
tailing the correlation between levels of intellectual ability and “brain altera-
tions” during adolescence). See generally SPEAR, supra note 459, at 102–09 (de-
scribing changes in cognitive functioning with age). 
 478. INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 37 (“The 
development of the prefrontal cortex is gradual and is not complete until well 
into adulthood.”); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 97 (“[P]refrontal 
circuitry implicated in self-regulation and planning behavior continues to de-
velop into young adulthood. . . . This development is slow and linear in nature.”).  
 479. STEINBERG, supra note 465, at 31–33 (detailing how brain circuitry de-
velops throughout an individual’s life); Steinberg, Dual Systems, supra note 
474, at 217 (“As a consequence of synaptic pruning and late continued mye-
lination of prefrontal brain regions, there are improvements over the course of 
adolescence in many aspects of executive function, such as response inhibi-
tion . . . [and] weighing risks and rewards . . . .”).  
 480. Myelination and brain growth in the frontal cortex during adolescence 
improve brain function by acting like the insulation of a wire to increase the 
speed of neural electro-conductivity. See GOLDBERG, supra note 477, at 144 (ex-
plaining that “[t]he presence of myelin makes communication between different 
parts of the brain faster and more reliable”); SPEAR, supra note 459, at 64 (“[My-
elin] allows the electrical impulse to jump from gap to gap, considerably speed-
ing information flow along the axon . . . .”); Zoltan Nagy et al., Maturation of 
White Matter is Associated with the Development of Cognitive Functions During 
Childhood, 16 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1227, 1231 (2004) (“[T]he physio-
logical effects of increases in axon thickness and myelination are similar in that 
they both increase conduction speed.”).  
 481. The pruning and elimination of unused connections promotes greater 
efficiency and strengthens the brain’s ability to process complex information. 
See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 37 (“The 
pruning that occurs during adolescence contributes to the fine-tuning of brain 
connections necessary for adult cognition.”); STEINBERG, supra note 465, at 26 
(“Pruning makes the brain function more effectively, the way that thinning a 
tree allows the remaining branches to grow stronger.”); Casey et al., Structural 
and Functional, supra note 477, at 246 (reporting that “increasing cognitive ca-
pacity during childhood may coincide with a gradual loss [of grey matter] rather 
than formation of new synapses”); Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Hu-
man Cortical Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8174, 8175 (2004) (detailing how scans of grey matter 
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The limbic system controls emotions, reward-seeking, and 
instinctual behavior—the fight-or-flight response.482 The PFC 
and limbic systems mature at different rates and adolescents 
rely more heavily on the limbic system—bottom-up emotional 
processing—rather than the top-down cognitive regulatory sys-
tem.483 The developmental lag between the PFC regulatory sys-
tem and the reward- and pleasure-seeking limbic system con-
tributes to impetuous behavior driven more by emotions rather 
than reason.484 The imbalance between the impulse-control and 
reward-seeking systems contributes to youths’ poor judgment, 
impetuous behavior, and criminal involvement.485  
Roper attributed juveniles’ diminished responsibility to 
greater susceptibility to peer influences. As their orientation 
shifts toward peers, youths’ quest for acceptance and affiliation 
 
in the adolescent brain show that the prefrontal cortex does not mature until 
the end of adolescence). See generally SPEAR, supra note 459, at 75–76 (describ-
ing how synaptic pruning occurs in the brain); Feld et al., supra note 471 at 
189–91 (citing to studies that use brain imaging to measure changes in brain 
circuitry).  
 482. SPEAR, supra note 459, at 68–69 (identifying the components of the lim-
bic system that control learning and emotional response); STEINBERG, supra 
note 465, at 72–74 (explaining the function of the limbic system). 
 483. Feld et al., supra note 471, at 191–93; SPEAR, supra note 459, at 180.  
 484. INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 38 (“The 
limbic system develops on a steeper curve than the prefrontal cortex . . . . The 
result can be an imbalance that may favor behaviors driven by emotion and 
response to incentives over rational decision making.”); STEINBERG, supra note 
465, at 74 (“[S]ensation seeking . . . rises and falls during adolescence, peaking 
around age sixteen.”); Dahl, supra note 459, at 64 (“When the control of emo-
tional behavior includes a cognitive process that is abstract in the temporal do-
main (such as weighing the possibility of a future consequence), these processes 
are also likely to engage systems in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.”); Stein-
berg, Dual Systems, supra note 474, at 221 (noting that “heightened reward-
seeking is most clearly and consistently seen during mid-adolescence”); Stein-
berg, Social Neuroscience, supra note 474, at 96–97 (proposing that maturation 
of the prefrontal cortex and the limbic system at different points in adolescence 
explains impulsive behavior among adolescents). 
 485. Feld et al., supra note 471, at 193–94; see also SCOTT & STEINBERG, 
supra note 1, at 48–49 (“This gap in time, between the increase in sensation 
seeking around puberty and the later development of ‘regulatory competence,’ 
may combine to make adolescence a time of inherently immature judgment.”); 
Steinberg, Dual Systems, supra note 474, at 222 (“Middle adolescence appears 
to be a time of growing vulnerability to risky behavior . . . heightened reward-
seeking impels adolescent[s] toward risky activity, and immature self-regula-
tory capabilities do not restrain this impulse.”); Steinberg, Social Neuroscience, 
supra note 474, at 89 (observing that scores on measures of impulse control and 
resistance to peer influence improve with age).  
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makes them more susceptible to influences than adults.486 Peers 
increase youths’ propensity to take risks because their presence 
stimulates the brain’s reward centers.487 
Neuroscience research about brain development bolsters so-
cial scientists’ observations about adolescents’ impulsive behav-
ior and impaired self-control. Despite impressive advances, neu-
roscientists have not established a direct link between brain 
maturation and behavior, nor have they found ways to individu-
alize assessments of developmental differences.488  
 
 486. INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 50 (“The 
drive for affiliation and acceptance at this stage makes adolescents more open 
to peer influence . . . .”); SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 51 (“[A]s part of 
normal emotional development, youths individuate from parents, a process that 
sometimes involves engaging in risky behavior that reflects both challenges to 
parental control and a shift in orientation from parents to peers.”); SPEAR, supra 
note 459, at 155–57 (summarizing research on the social behavior of adoles-
cents); Feld, Youth Discount, supra note 423, at 120–21 (citing to studies of the 
impact of peer influences on juveniles’ behavior). 
 487. STEINBERG, supra note 465, at 98 (“Just by being around their friends, 
adolescents’ heightened sensitivity to social rewards makes them more sensitive 
to all kinds of rewards, including the potential rewards of a risky activity.”); 
Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 455, at 815–17 (discussing em-
pirical research on brain development, peer-influence, and risk-taking behav-
ior). 
 488. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 46 (“Research directly linking 
anatomical brain development with actual behavioral change is still very 
sparse . . . .”); STEINBERG, supra note 465, at 4 (“[N]euroscience frequently 
doesn’t add to the explanation of human behavior beyond what we already know 
from psychology and other social sciences . . . .”); Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent 
Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765, 769 (2011) 
(reporting that an analysis of claims based on adolescent brain science suggests 
that the “persuasive power” of such science “fall[s] far short of expectations”); 
Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A 
Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 397, 403–06 (2006) (explaining why 
brain science should not be the basis for determining responsibility in criminal 
cases). See generally Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain 
Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 176 (2009) (arguing that 
most attempts to introduce developmental neuroscience evidence in the courts 
have failed); Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in NEUROSCI-
ENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 157, 168–70 
(Brent Garland ed., 2004) (questioning the ability of neuroscience to show that 
individuals can act without forming intent).  
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2. Graham v. Florida: Banning LWOP for Nonhomicide 
Juvenile Offenders 
Prior to Graham v. Florida, the Court asserted that “death 
is different.”489 Graham extended Roper ’s diminished responsi-
bility rationale to nonhomicide juvenile offenders who received 
LWOP sentences. Graham raised “a categorical challenge to a 
term of years sentence”—a life without parole sentence applied 
to the category of juvenile offenders.490 Graham repudiated the 
Court’s “death is different” distinction, extended Roper ’s reduced 
culpability rationale to term-of-year sentences, and “declare[d] 
an entire class of offenders immune from a noncapital sen-
tence.”491 Graham rested on three features: offender, offense, 
and sentence. It reiterated Roper ’s rationale that juveniles’ re-
 
 489. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (reviewing Eighth Amend-
ment case law with respect to the death penalty). See generally Barry C. Feld, 
A Slower Form of Death: Implications of Roper v. Simmons for Juveniles Sen-
tenced to Life Without Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS, & PUBLIC POL’Y 9 
(2008) [hereinafter Feld, Slower Form of Death] (analyzing the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in juvenile death penalty and life without parole cases); Feld, Adoles-
cent Criminal Responsibility, supra note 423 (examining the Supreme Court’s 
non-death penalty proportionality framework). 
 490. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010). Graham arose at the inter-
section of two lines of Eighth Amendment proportionality cases. One line of 
cases raised “gross disproportionality” claims and challenged term-of-years sen-
tences that greatly exceeded the seriousness of the crime. See Harmelin v. Mich-
igan, 501 U.S. 957, 996–97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment) (elaborating upon principles of “narrow proportionality” 
review in noncapital cases); Solem v. Helms, 463 U.S. 277, 284, 286 (1983) (em-
phasizing that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments 
“prohibits . . . sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed” and 
that the “constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized explic-
itly in this Court for almost a century”); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284–85 (approving 
a mandatory life sentence for a recidivist following his third conviction for minor 
property crimes). 
The other line of cases made “categorical disproportionality” claims and 
challenged imposition of the death penalty on categories of offenders or offenses. 
E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2007) (prohibiting execution for rap-
ing a child); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (barring the execution of 
juveniles); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (barring the execution of de-
fendants with mental retardation); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) 
(barring execution for a felony murderer who did not kill or intend to kill the 
victim); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that the sentencer in a 
capital case should not be precluded from considering as mitigating factors the 
defendant’s character or the circumstances of the crime); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U.S. 584 (1977) (barring the execution for rape of an adult woman). 
 491. Graham, 560 U.S. at 102. 
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duced culpability warrants less severe penalties than those im-
posed on adults convicted of the same crime.492 Unlike Roper, 
Graham explicitly based young offenders’ diminished responsi-
bility on developmental and neuroscience research.493 
Focusing on the offense, Graham invoked the Court’s felony 
murder death-penalty decisions and concluded that even the 
most serious non-homicide crimes “cannot be compared to mur-
der in their ‘severity and irrevocability.’”494 The combination of 
diminished responsibility and a nonhomicide crime made a 
LWOP sentence grossly disproportional.495  
Finally, the Court equated a LWOP sentence for a juvenile 
with the death penalty.496 Graham found no penal rationale—
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation—justi-
fied the penultimate sanction for nonhomicide juvenile offend-
ers.497 While incapacitation might reduce future offending, 
judges cannot reliably predict at sentencing whether a juvenile 
will pose a future danger to society. Nevertheless, most states 
deny vocational training or rehabilitative services to youths 
 
 492. Id. at 67 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 568) (“The juridical exercise of inde-
pendent judgment requires consideration of the culpability of offenders at issue 
in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the pun-
ishment in question.”). 
 493. Id. at 68 (noting that “developments in psychology and brain science 
continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. 
For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature 
through late adolescence”). 
 494. Id. at 69 (quoting Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 438); see also Coker, 433 U.S. at 
598. 
 495. Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (“[W]hen compared to an adult murderer, a 
juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral 
culpability. The age of the offender and the nature of the crime each bear on the 
analysis”). 
 496. Id. at 79 (noting that “life in prison without the possibility of parole 
gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation 
with society, no hope”); Eva S. Nilsen, From Harmelin to Graham—Justice Ken-
nedy Stakes Out a Path to Proportional Punishment, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 67, 
69 (2010) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 74) (noting the inconsistency between 
rehabilitation and an LWOP sentence that “‘forswears altogether ’ the idea that 
the defendant can change”); Leslie Patrice Wallace, “And I Don’t Know Why It 
Is That You Threw Your Life Away”: Abolishing Life Without Parole, the Su-
preme Court in Graham v. Florida Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope 
for a Second Chance, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 58 (2010) (arguing that the ra-
tionale of Graham should also preclude lengthy term-of-years sentences that 
deny juveniles hope of release as well). 
 497. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–74. 
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serving LWOP sentences in favor of those who might return to 
the community.498  
Although Graham adopted a categorical rule, it only re-
quired states to provide “some meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”499 
It did not prescribe states’ responsibility to provide resources 
with which to change or specify when youths might become eli-
gible for parole. Parole consideration would not guarantee young 
offenders’ release and some might remain confined for life.500 
Although Graham barred LWOP for juveniles convicted of a 
nonhomicide crime, many more youths are serving de facto life 
sentences—aggregated mandatory minima or consecutive terms 
totaling fifty to one hundred years or more—than those formally 
sentenced to LWOP.501 Some state courts have found that very 
long sentences imposed on a juvenile convicted of several non-
homicide offenses do not provide a meaningful opportunity to ob-
tain release.502 By contrast, other courts have read Graham nar-
rowly, limiting its holding to formal LWOP sentences, and 
upholding consecutive terms that exceed youths’ life expec-
tancy.503 
 
 498. Id. at 79 (noting that “it is the policy in some prisons to withhold coun-
seling, education, and rehabilitation programs for those who are ineligible for 
parole consideration”); Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, supra note 
423, at 298–99; ASHLEY NELLIS, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: FINDINGS 
FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 4 (2012), https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/01/The-Lives-of-Juvenile-Lifers.pdf (providing statistics on the 
number of juvenile lifers who receive rehabilitative programming in prison).  
 499. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74. 
 500. Id. at 82 (“A State need not guarantee the offender eventual release, 
but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her with some realistic 
opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.”). 
 501. See Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, supra note 423, at 306 
(observing that judges can create “virtual life sentences” by imposing stacked 
consecutive terms in lieu of formal LWOP sentences). 
 502. People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 
41, 72 (Iowa 2013). 
 503. Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 2012) (identifying a split in 
opinion among courts as to “whether Graham bars a court from sentencing a 
juvenile nonhomicide offender to consecutive, fixed terms resulting in an aggre-
gate sentence that exceeds the defendant’s life expectancy”). 
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3. Miller v. Alabama: Banning Mandatory LWOP for 
Juveniles Convicted of Murder 
When the Court decided Miller v. Alabama, forty-seven 
states permitted judges to impose LWOP sentences on any of-
fender—adult or juvenile—convicted of murder.504 In twenty-
seven states, LWOP sentences were mandatory for those con-
victed of murder, precluded consideration of actors’ culpability 
or degree of participation, and equated juveniles’ criminal re-
sponsibility with adults.505 Courts regularly upheld mandatory 
LWOP and extremely long sentences imposed on children as 
young as twelve or thirteen years of age.506 One in six juveniles 
 
 504. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 378, at 25 (“Only Kentucky, New 
York, Oregon, and the District of Columbia specifically exclude anyone under 
the age of eighteen who is tried as an adult from life without parole sentenc-
ing.”). 
 505. Id. 
 506. Id. at 1 (specifying that children as young as ten years old are subject 
to prosecution as adults in forty-two states and under federal law); Feld, Ado-
lescent Criminal Responsibility, supra note 423, at 269; Feld, Youth Discount, 
supra note 423, at 129 (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 378, at 25 
n.44); see, e.g., Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming a 
mandatory LWOP sentence imposed on an illiterate, mildly retarded sixteen-
year-old murderer, even though the statute excluded consideration of any miti-
gating factors, including youthfulness, and holding that “we cannot find any 
basis in decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment, or in any other sources 
of guidance to the meaning of ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ for concluding 
that the sentence in this case was unconstitutionally severe”); Harris v. Wright, 
93 F.3d 581, 583–85 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a fifteen-year-old juvenile’s con-
stitutional challenge to a mandatory LWOP sentence imposed for murder); Tate 
v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting the argument 
that “a life sentence without the possibility of parole is cruel or unusual punish-
ment on a twelve-year-old child”); State v. Foley, 456 So. 2d 979, 984 (La. 1984) 
(affirming a LWOP sentence imposed on a fifteen-year-old juvenile convicted of 
rape); State v. Pilcher, 655 So. 2d 636, 644 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding a 
LWOP sentence imposed on a fifteen-year-old); Swinford v. State, 653 So. 2d 
912, 918 (Miss. 1995) (upholding a LWOP sentence imposed on fourteen-year-
old convicted of murder); Edmonds v. State, 955 So. 2d 864, 895–97 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2006) (approving a mandatory life sentence imposed on a youth convicted 
of murder committed at thirteen years of age), rev’d, 955 So. 2d 787 (Miss. 2007); 
State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 832 (N.C. 1998) (upholding life imprisonment 
sentence for a thirteen-year-old convicted of rape, recognizing that “the chrono-
logical age of a defendant is a factor that can be considered in determining 
whether a punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime,” but emphasiz-
ing that Green was morally responsible for the crime because he possessed suf-
ficient mental capacity to form criminal intent); State v. Standard, 569 S.E.2d 
325, 329 (S.C. 2002) (upholding a “two-strike” LWOP sentence imposed on a 
fifteen-year-old convicted of burglary based on his prior juvenile conviction for 
a serious felony, a sentence presumably invalid after Graham); Paul G. Morris-
sey, Do the Adult Crime, Do the Adult Time: Due Process and Cruel and Unusual 
Implications for a 13-Year-Old Sex Offender Sentenced to Life Imprisonment in 
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who received a LWOP sentence was fifteen years or younger at 
the time of their crime; for more than half, it was their first ever 
conviction.507 States may not execute a felony-murderer who did 
not kill or intend to kill, but one-quarter to one-half of juveniles 
who received LWOP sentences were convicted as accessories to 
a felony murder.508 Although the Supreme Court viewed youth-
fulness as a mitigating factor, many trial judges treated it as an 
aggravating factor and sentenced young murderers more se-
verely than adults convicted of murder.509  
Miller v. Alabama extended Roper and Graham and banned 
mandatory LWOP for youths convicted of murder.510 Miller in-
voked death penalty cases that barred mandatory capital sen-
 
State v. Green, 44 VILL. L. REV. 707, 738 (1999) (citing Green, 502 S.E.2d 819) 
(explaining that age was not a dispositive factor in the case of State v. Green). 
 507. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 378, at 1. 
 508. Id. at 27–28; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “WHEN I DIE . . . THEY’LL SEND 
ME HOME”: YOUTH SENTENCED TO LIFE IN PRISON WITHOUT PAROLE IN CALI-
FORNIA, AN UPDATE 4 (2012), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 
crd0112webwcover.pdf. 
 509. See Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in The 
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 377, at 227, 236–37 
(comparing the sentences imposed on youths transferred to criminal courts with 
those of adults and noting that “transferred youths are sentenced more harshly, 
both in terms of the probability of receiving a prison sentence and the length of 
the sentences they receive. In other words, we see no evidence that criminal 
courts recognize a need to mitigate sentences based on considerations of age and 
immaturity”); Kurlychek & Johnson, Juvenility and Punishment, supra note 
412, at 747 (reporting that judges sentenced juveniles waived into adult court 
more harshly than similar young adult offenders in four states); Tanenhaus & 
Drizin, supra note 196, at 665 (citing the impact of “get tough” politics and ar-
guing that “[b]y the mid-1990’s [sic], youth had ceased to be a mitigating factor 
in adult court, and instead had become a liability”). 
Youths convicted of murder are more likely to enter prison with LWOP sen-
tences than are adults convicted of murder. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra 
note 378, at 33 (reporting that judges imposed LWOP sentences on juveniles 
convicted of murder more frequently than they did adults and concluding that 
“states have often been more punitive toward children who commit murder than 
adults . . . age has not been much of a mitigating factor in the sentencing of 
youth convicted of murder”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 508, at 4 (re-
porting that “in more than half the cases where there was an adult co-defend-
ant, the adult received a lower sentence than the young person who was sen-
tenced to life without parole”). 
 510. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (“Graham, Roper, and our 
individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have 
the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the 
harshest possible penalty for juveniles . . . . [M]andatory-sentencing 
schemes . . . violate [the] principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth Amend-
ment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.”). 
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tences and required an individualized culpability assessment be-
fore a judge could impose LWOP on a juvenile murderer.511 Mil-
ler emphasized that “children are constitutionally different from 
adults for purposes of sentencing” and “mandatory penalties, by 
their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an of-
fender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances 
attendant to it.”512 The Court asserted that once judges consid-
ered a youth’s diminished responsibility individually, very few 
cases would warrant LWOP.513 
The Court’s recognition that children are different reflected 
a belated correction to states’ punitive excesses, but its Eighth 
Amendment authority to regulate their sentencing policies is 
very limited. Graham and Miller raised as many questions as 
they answered. Several years after Miller held mandatory 
LWOP unconstitutional, the Court in Montgomery v. Louisiana 
resolved lower courts’ conflicting decisions about Miller ’s retro-
active application to more than 2500 youths sentenced prior to 
the decision, and ruled that youths who received a mandatory 
LWOP sentence prior to Miller would be eligible for resentencing 
or parole consideration.514  
 
 511. Id. at 461 (citing cases within two strands of precedent that underpin 
the Court’s decision); see, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 
(1976) (holding that “in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity un-
derlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and 
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular of-
fense”). Woodson condemned:  
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the charac-
ter and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the 
particular offense excludes from consideration . . . the possibility of 
compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frail-
ties of mankind. It treats all persons convicted of a designated offense 
not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, 
undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the pen-
alty of death. 
Id. See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (quoting Franklin v. 
Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 184 (1988)) (requiring “reasoned moral response” that 
reflects an offender ’s individual culpability), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304 (2002); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 74 (1987) (requiring the 
sentencing authority to consider mitigating circumstances relative to the of-
fense and the defendant as an individual). 
 512. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, 476.  
 513. Id. at 479 (noting that “we think appropriate occasions for sentencing 
juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon”); see also id. at 
484 n.10 (observing that “when given the choice, sentencers impose life without 
parole on children relatively rarely”). 
 514. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
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Miller gave lawmakers and judges minimal guidance to 
make culpability assessments. The factors it described—age, im-
maturity, impetuosity, family and home environment, circum-
stances and degree of participation in the offense, youthful in-
competence, and amenability to treatment—enable judges to 
make subjective decisions without meaningful controls.515 As a 
result, state courts’ interpretations and legislatures’ responses 
to Miller vary substantially.516  
Miller required twenty-eight states and the federal govern-
ment to revise mandatory LWOP statutes to provide for individ-
ualized assessments.517 Some states adopted Miller factors for a 
judge to consider;518 a few states abolished juvenile LWOP sen-
tences entirely; and others replaced them with minimum sen-
tences ranging from twenty-five years to life with periodic re-
views, or determinate sentences of forty years to life.519 Other 
states provide age-tiered minimum sentences for parole consid-
eration: twenty-five years for youths fourteen or younger con-
victed of murder; thirty-five years for those fifteen or older.520 
None of these changes approximate the American Law Insti-
tute’s Model Penal Code recommendations that juveniles should 
be eligible for parole consideration after ten years.521  
State courts are divided over whether Miller applies to man-
datory sentences other than murder that preclude consideration 
 
 515. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–80 (identifying features of adolescence that 
judges should consider when sentencing juvenile offenders). 
 516. See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245, 249 (Cal. 2014) (holding that 
Miller requires a trial court to consider how certain attributes of youth may 
affect the justification for LWOP sentences as punishment for juveniles); People 
v. Chavez, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 334, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (reversing LWOP 
sentences and remanding for resentencing in the wake of Miller); People v. 
Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 849 (Mich. 2014) (holding that the rule from Miller does 
not apply retroactively); Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 749, 769 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2012) (vacating the sentence of life in prison for the commission of second-
degree murder and remanding the case for resentencing; Bear Cloud v. State, 
334 P.3d 132, 147 (Wyo. 2014) (ordering the trial court to conduct a “Miller hear-
ing” to resentence the defendant). See generally Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Rev-
olution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1787, 1816–18 (2016) (reviewing state responses to 
Miller). 
 517. Drinan, supra note 516, at 1795. 
 518. Id. at 1816–17. 
 519. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, SLOW TO ACT: STATE RESPONSES TO 2012 
SUPREME COURT MANDATE ON LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 2 (2014); Moriearty, su-
pra note 432, at 975–76 (2015) (describing how states have reformulated sen-
tencing schemes after Miller). 
 520. Drinan, supra note 516, at 1818. 
 521. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A(g) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative 
Draft No. 2, 2011). 
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of youthful mitigation.522 Several post-Miller courts have ap-
proved twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentences without 
any individualized culpability assessments,523 whereas others 
have found all mandatory minimum sentences violate the state 
constitution.524  
Miller ’s prohibition of mandatory LWOP may affect transfer 
provisions—offense exclusion and prosecutorial direct file—that 
do not provide individualized assessments. Both result in auto-
matic adulthood without any knowledge of a juvenile’s circum-
stances, opportunity to present mitigating evidence, or appellate 
review.  
C. YOUTH DISCOUNT 
There is a straightforward alternative to the confusion and 
contradiction reviewed above. States should formally incorpo-
rate youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing statutes. 
Youthful mitigation does not excuse criminality; it holds juve-
niles accountable for their crimes, but proportions punishment 
to their diminished responsibility.525 Roper and Graham adopted 
a categorical prohibition because the Court feared that a judge 
or jury could not properly consider youthful mitigation when con-
fronted with a heinous crime.526  
There are two reasons to prefer a categorical rule over indi-
vidualized discretion. First, judges and legislators cannot define 
or identify what constitutes adult-like culpability. Culpability is 
not an objectively measurable thing, but a subjective judgment 
 
 522. Drinan, supra note 516, at 1818. 
 523. Id. 
 524. E.g., State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 404 (Iowa 2014) (holding that man-
datory minimum sentences for juveniles violate the Iowa Constitution). 
 525. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 378, at 113 (“In order to 
achieve [the] goal of proportionality, both the nature of the offense and the cul-
pability of the offender must be taken into account.”); FELD, BAD KIDS, supra 
note 1, at 315–16 (reasoning that youthfulness as a mitigating factor requires 
proportional punishment); ZIMRING, supra note 23, at 139 (arguing for the gen-
eral applicability of the doctrine of diminished responsibility in sentencing); 
Feld, Youth Discount, supra note 423 (arguing that the use of age as a mitigat-
ing factor is consistent with the principle of proportionality in sentencing); Scott 
& Grisso, Evolution of Adolescence, supra note 455, at 172–76 (explaining how 
policy changes can support a presumption of diminished responsibility without 
providing a blanket excuse from responsibility); see also Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 398 
(“The Constitutional analysis is not about excusing juvenile behavior, but im-
posing punishment in a way that is consistent with our understanding of hu-
manity today.”); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 75 (Iowa 2013) (“[W]hile youth is 
a mitigating factor in sentencing, it is not an excuse.”). 
 526. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). 
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about criminal responsibility. Development is highly variable—
a few youths may achieve competencies prior to eighteen years 
of age, while many others may not attain maturity even as 
adults. Despite individual developmental differences, clinicians 
lack tools with which to assess youths’ impulsivity, foresight, 
and preference for risk, or a metric by which to relate maturity 
of judgment with criminal responsibility.527 The inability to de-
fine, measure, or diagnose immaturity or validly to identify a few 
responsible youths introduces a systematic bias to over-punish 
less culpable juveniles.528 The law uses age-based categorical 
lines to approximate the level of maturity required for particular 
activities—voting, driving, and consuming alcohol—and re-
stricts youths without individualized assessments of maturity. 
The second reason to adopt a categorical rule of youthful 
mitigation is judges’ or juries’ inability to fairly weigh the ab-
straction of diminished responsibility against the aggravating 
reality of a horrific crime. Roper rightly feared that jurors could 
not distinguish between a person’s diminished responsibility for 
causing a harm and the harm itself, and that the heinousness of 
a crime would trump reduced culpability.529 When courts sen-
tence minority offenders, unconscious racial stereotypes com-
pound the difficulties of assessing immaturity.530 Treating 
youthfulness categorically is a more efficient way to address im-
maturity when every juvenile can claim some degree of dimin-
ished responsibility. 
 
 527. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1; SCOTT & STEIN-
BERG, supra note 1, at 140 (“[W]e currently lack the diagnostic tools to evaluate 
psycho-social maturity reliably on an individualized basis or to distinguish 
young career criminals from ordinary adolescents who, as adults, will repudiate 
their reckless experimentation.”). 
 528. James C. Howell et al., Young Offenders and an Effective Justice System 
Response, in FROM JUVENILE DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME: CRIMINAL CA-
REERS, JUSTICE POLICY, AND PREVENTION, supra note 85, at 200, 229 (“Despite 
adolescents’ developmental differences, clinicians lack the tools with which to 
assess youths’ impulsivity, foresight, or preference for risks in ways that relate 
to maturity of judgment and criminal responsibility.”); SCOTT & STEINBERG, su-
pra note 1, at 154–57 (discussing how courts are trying to develop methods to 
assess competence); Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 455, at 836.  
 529. Roper, 543 U.S. at 553–54. 
 530. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, supra note 423, at 270–71 
(“Racial stereotypes taint culpability assessments, reduce the mitigating value 
of youthfulness for children of color, and contribute to disproportionate numbers 
of minority youths tried and sentenced as adults.”); see also Moriearty, supra 
note 439, at 850–51 (citing studies of racial bias in the juvenile justice system). 
 2017] COMPETENCE AND CULPABILITY 571 
 
The abstract meaning of culpability, the inability to meas-
ure or compare moral agency of youths, administrative complex-
ity of individualization, and the tendency to overweigh harm re-
quires a clear-cut alternative. A categorical youth discount 
would give all adolescents fractional reductions in sentence 
lengths based on age as a proxy for culpability.531 While age may 
be an incomplete proxy for maturity or culpability, no better ba-
ses exist on which to distinguish among young offenders. Miller 
recognized that same-length sentences exact a greater penal bite 
from younger offenders than older ones.532  
Imprisonment per se is more developmentally disruptive 
and onerous for adolescents than adults.533 Thus, a statutory 
youth discount would require judges to give substantial reduc-
tions to youths based on a sliding scale of diminished responsi-
bility with the largest reductions to the youngest offenders.534 If 
tried as an adult, a fourteen-year-old would receive a sentence 
substantially shorter than that an adult would receive—perhaps 
 
 531. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 317 (“A statutory sentencing policy 
that integrates youthfulness . . . with principles of proportionality and reduced 
culpability would provide younger offenders with categorical fractional reduc-
tions of adult sentences.”); SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 139 (“The 
uniqueness of immaturity as a mitigating condition argues for the adoption 
of . . . a categorical approach in the context of youth crime policy.”); Feld, Ado-
lescent Criminal Responsibility, supra note 423, at 322 (“A Youth Discount 
would require a judge to give a substantial reduction off of the sentence that she 
would impose on an adult convicted of the same crime.”); Feld, Slower Form of 
Death, supra note 489, at 55–65 (urging legislators to enact changes in sentenc-
ing for juvenile offenders); Feld, Youth Discount, supra note 423, at 108 (“A 
Youth Discount provides a straightforward way for legislatures to recognize ju-
veniles’ categorically diminished responsibility and formally to incorporate 
youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing.”). See generally Howell et al., 
supra note 528, at 227–29 (providing policy recommendations for juvenile sen-
tencing practices). 
 532. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 475 (2012) (“[LWOP] is an ‘especially 
harsh form of punishment for a juvenile,’ because he will almost inevitably serve 
‘more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult of-
fender.’” (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50 (2010))). 
 533. Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionate Sentences for Juveniles: How Differ-
ent Than for Adults?, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 221, 227 (2001); see also Barry C. 
Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility and 
Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 81 (1997) [hereinafter 
Feld, Abolish Juvenile Court] (explaining how differences in adolescents’ culpa-
bility “raise issues of sentencing policy and fairness”). 
 534. Feld, Abolish Juvenile Court, supra note 533, at 115–21 (describing how 
a youth discount would operate in the courts); Scott & Steinberg, Blaming 
Youth, supra note 455, at 837 (proposing a systematic discount in sentencing 
for youthful offenders); see also SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 140 (“The 
use of an age category is justified because the presumption of immaturity can 
be applied confidently to most persons in the group.”). 
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ten or twenty percent of the adult length. A sixteen-year-old 
would receive a maximum sentence no more than one-third or 
half the adult length. Deeper discounts for younger offenders 
correspond with their greater developmental differences in judg-
ment and self-control. A judge can more easily apply a youth dis-
count in states that use sentencing guidelines under which pre-
sent offense and prior record dictate presumptive sentences. In 
less structured sentencing systems, a judge would have to deter-
mine the going rate or appropriate sentence for an adult con-
victed of that offense and then reduce it by the youth discount. 
The youth discount’s diminished responsibility rationale 
would preclude mandatory, LWOP, or de facto life sentences for 
young offenders.535 Although some legislators may find it diffi-
cult to resist penal demagoguery, states can achieve all of their 
legitimate penal goals by sentencing youths to a maximum of no 
more than twenty or twenty-five years for even the most serious 
crimes, as recommended by the American Law Institute’s Model 
Penal Code.536 Several juvenile justice analysts and policy 
groups have endorsed the youth discount as a straightforward 
way to proportionally reduce sentences for younger offenders.537 
 
 535. Howell et al., supra note 528, at 367; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 
1, at 246–47; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 378, at 5–6 (outlin-
ing the types of sentences that juveniles receive and why culpability should be 
diminished by the youth of the offender).  
 536. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A(g) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative 
Draft No. 2, 2011). 
 537. Several academic analysts have explicitly endorsed my proposal for the 
youth discount. See, e.g., SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 246 (“Proportion-
ality supports imposing statutory limits on the maximum duration of adult sen-
tences impose[d] on juveniles—a ‘youth discount,’ to use Feld’s term.”); Tanen-
haus & Drizin, supra note 196, at 698 (“We endorse Feld’s proposals [for a youth 
discount] because they respect the notion that juveniles are developmentally 
different than adults and that these differences make juveniles both less culpa-
ble for their crimes and less deserving of the harsh sanctions, which now must 
be imposed on serious and violent adult offenders.”); von Hirsch, supra note 533, 
at 227 (arguing for categorical penalty reductions based on juveniles’ reduced 
culpability). 
While actual appreciation of consequences varies highly among youths 
of the same age, the degree of appreciation we should demand depends 
on age: we may rightly expect more comprehension and self-control 
from the 17-year-old than a 14-year-old, so that the 17-year-old’s pen-
alty reduction should be smaller. Assessing culpability on the basis of 
individualized determinations of a youth’s degree of moral develop-
ment would be neither feasible nor desirable. 
Id. at 226. See also MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A(g) Reporter ’s 
Note (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (acknowledging that the 
framework of the MPC’s recommendation for “specialized sentencing rules and 
mitigated treatment of juvenile offenders sentenced in adult courts, owes much” 
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For example, a National Institute of Justice study group con-
cluded that youths’ diminished responsibility required mitigated 
sanctions for youths sentenced as adults.538 Additionally, the 
ABA has condemned juvenile LWOP sentences, and has pro-
posed that statutes formally recognize youthfulness as a mitigat-
ing factor, and provide for earlier parole release consideration.539 
  CONCLUSION   
The time is right to reform juvenile courts’ jurisdiction, ju-
risprudence, and procedures. Although most states’ juvenile 
court jurisdiction extends to youths under eighteen years of age, 
North Carolina, for example, sets the boundary at sixteen, and 
ten other states set it at seventeen years of age.540 Developmen-
tal psychology and neuroscience research strengthens the case 
to raise the age of jurisdiction to eighteen in every state. Indeed, 
it would be appropriate to extend to young adults aged eighteen 
to twenty-one some of the protections associated with juvenile 
courts: shorter sentences like a youth discount, rehabilitative 
treatment in separate facilities, protected records, and the like. 
Many European countries’ criminal laws provide separate young 
adult sentencing provisions and institutions to afford greater le-
niency and use of rehabilitative measures.541  
 
to Feld’s proposal for a youth discount—“a sliding scale of developmental and 
criminal responsibility”).  
 538. A study group funded by the National Institute of Justice determined 
that “[y]ouths’ diminished responsibility requires mitigated sanctions to avoid 
permanently life-changing penalties and provide room to reform.” Rolf Loeber 
et al., Overview, Conclusions, and Key Recommendations, in FROM JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME: CRIMINAL CAREERS, JUSTICE POLICY, AND PRE-
VENTION, supra note 85, at 315, 353. Following the rationale of Roper and Gra-
ham, the study group concluded that “[a] categorical rule of youthfulness as a 
mitigating factor in sentencing is preferable to individualized discretion.” How-
ell et al., supra note 528, at 229; David P. Farrington, Rolf Loeber & James C. 
Howell, Young Adult Offenders: The Need for More Effective Legislative Options 
and Justice Processing, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 729, 743 (endorsing a 
“maturity discount” that provides a “decrease in the severity of penalties that 
take account of younger persons’ lesser culpability and diminished responsibil-
ity”). 
 539. Stephen Saltzburg, ABA Policies on Youth in the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, 2008 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. 1, 5–6. 
 540. Anne Teigen, Juvenile Age of Jurisdiction and Transfer to Adult Court 
Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 17, 2017), http://www.ncsl 
.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/juvenile-age-of-jurisdiction-and 
-transfer-to-adult-court-laws.aspx. 
 541. Loeber et al., supra note 538, at 350–51.  
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Most youths involved with the juvenile justice system will 
outgrow their youthful indiscretion without significant interven-
tions. We can facilitate desistance by reinforcing the two-track 
system—one informal, one formal—proposed by the President’s 
Crime Commission a half-century ago.542 For youths who require 
services, diversion to community resources provides a more effi-
cient and flexible alternative to adjudication and disposition. If 
states explicitly forgo home removal, then juvenile courts can 
use summary processes to make noncustodial dispositions. Scott 
v. Illinois prohibits incarceration without representation.543 Al-
abama v. Shelton prohibits revocation and confinement of an un-
represented defendant who violated probation.544 Baldwin v. 
New York affords a jury right to any person facing the prospect 
of at least six months incarceration.545 By clearly foregoing home 
removal or incarceration dispositions, states can administer a 
streamlined justice system for most youths. Diversion raises its 
own issues because low-visibility decisions contribute to racial 
disparities at the front end.546 States can adopt formal criteria, 
 
 542. The President’s Crime Commission suggested that the juvenile court 
ultimately might evolve into a two-track system with separate crime control and 
social welfare functions. In such a system, public officials would divert and han-
dle informally most minor delinquents and status offenders. “In place of the 
formal system, dispositional alternatives to adjudication must be developed for 
dealing with juveniles . . . . The range of conduct for which court intervention is 
authorized should be narrowed with greater emphasis upon consensual and in-
formal means of meeting the problems of difficult children.” PRESIDENT’S 
COMM’N, supra note 12, at 2. The Commission also acknowledged that juvenile 
courts intervened to control crime rather than simply to treat youths and rec-
ommended that public officials refer more serious offenders for formal adjudi-
cation: 
The cases that fall within the narrowed jurisdiction of the court and 
filter through the screen of prejudicial, informal disposition methods 
would largely involve offenders for whom more vigorous measures 
seem necessary. Court adjudication and disposition of those offenders 
should no longer be viewed solely as a diagnosis and prescription for 
cure, but should be frankly recognized as an authoritative court judg-
ment expressing society’s claim to protection. While rehabilitative ef-
forts should be vigorously pursued in deference to the youth of the of-
fenders and in keeping with a general commitment to individualized 
treatment of all offenders, the incapacitative, deterrent, and condem-
natory aspects of the judgment should not be disguised. 
Id. 
 543. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
 544. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002). 
 545. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).  
 546. Mears, supra note 137, at 587 (“[C]onsiderable room exists for front-end 
decision-making, especially arrest and intake decisions, to contribute to racial 
disparities in the processing of young people.”). 
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risk assessment instruments, data collection, and ongoing mon-
itoring to rationalize diversion decisions and reduce disparities. 
Finally, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Preven-
tion programs that target at-risk youths, families, and commu-
nities, have demonstrated efficacy, provide cost-benefit returns, 
and would reduce the number of youths referred to juvenile 
courts in the first instance. 
For delinquents facing custodial restraints—pretrial deten-
tion or postconviction confinement—juvenile courts are criminal 
courts and require criminal procedural safeguards including the 
right to a jury. Increasing protections and costs of formal adju-
dication provide financial and administrative incentives to di-
vert more youths. Although delinquency sanctions are shorter 
than those imposed by criminal courts, it is disingenuous to 
claim that they do not pursue deterrent, incapacitative, and re-
tributive goals. Apart from those who pose a risk of flight, states 
should reserve secure detention for youths whose offense and 
prior record indicate that they likely would be removed from 
home if convicted. Risk assessment instruments, other JDAI 
strategies, and effective assistance of counsel could reduce pre-
trial detention and disproportionate minority confinement. Ju-
venile court interventions should keep youths in their commu-
nity and avoid out-of-home placements and secure confinement 
to the greatest extent possible and use evidence-based programs 
to rehabilitate and reintegrate them.  
The procedural safeguards of juvenile courts should be 
greatly enhanced to compensate for adolescents’ developmental 
immaturity: automatic competency assessment for children 
younger than fourteen years of age, mandatory presence of coun-
sel during interrogation for those younger than sixteen, and 
mandatory nonwaivable counsel for youths in court proceedings. 
Any system of justice will fail without a robust public defender 
system to enable youths to exercise rights. Delinquents should 
enjoy the right to a jury trial to assure reliability of convictions 
and to increase the visibility and accountability of judges, pros-
ecutors, and defense lawyers. States should strengthen appellate 
oversight of delinquency proceedings. Records of youths should 
be easily sealed or expunged to reduce impediments to education 
and employment. In keeping with juvenile courts’ rationale to 
avoid stigmatizing youths, states should eschew collateral con-
sequences of delinquency convictions.  
For those few youths whom policymakers believe should be 
tried as adults, a judicial hearing guided by offense criteria and 
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clinical considerations and subject to rigorous appellate review 
is the only sensible way to make transfer decisions.547 Criteria 
should focus on serious offenses and extensive prior records, 
criminal participation, clinical evaluations, and aggravating and 
mitigating factors which, taken together, distinguish the few 
youths who might deserve sentences substantially longer than 
the maximum sanctions that juvenile courts can impose. A judi-
cial hearing will produce better decisions than will politically 
motivated prosecutors. Appellate courts should closely review 
waiver decisions and develop substantive principles to define a 
consistent boundary of adulthood. A legislature should prescribe 
a minimum age of eligibility for criminal prosecution.  
Developmental psychological and neuroscience research re-
ports a sharp drop-off in judgment, self-control, and appreciation 
of consequences as well as in competence to exercise rights for 
youths fifteen years of age or younger. The minimum age for 
transfer should be sixteen. Sentences of youths convicted as 
adults should be substantially reduced—through a youth dis-
count—to reflect their diminished culpability. Once judges 
properly consider youths’ generic developmental limitations and 
diminished responsibility, there will be very few youths or 
crimes for which prosecution as an adult would be appropri-
ate.548 
It will take political courage for legislators to enact laws that 
recognize the diminished responsibility of serious young offend-
ers—and even greater political courage when they are charged 
with being soft on crime. However, the legislators of the Get 
Tough Era produced punitive delinquency sanctions as well as 
unjust and counterproductive waiver and criminal sentencing 
laws—all of which have had a disproportional impact on youths 
of color. The legislators who enacted these laws are obliged to 
undo the damage and adopt sensible policies that reflect our 
greater understanding of adolescent development—that chil-
dren are different. 
 
 547. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 178–79 (proposing a new standard 
for juvenile dispositions in delinquency proceedings); ZIMRING, supra note 23, 
at 107–29 (concluding that case-by-case determinations are preferable to cate-
gorical transfer rules). See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 208–44 
(detailing juvenile transfer policies); Bishop, supra note 418 (discussing auto-
matic and prosecutorial transfer to adult court); Feld, Responses to Youth Vio-
lence, supra note 48, at 195–220 (summarizing research on transfers of juvenile 
offenders to criminal courts and sentences to prisons). 
 548. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (noting that “we think appropriate 
occasions for sentencing juveniles . . . will be uncommon”). 
